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What difference does it make to add "culture" into development 
thinking and projects on the ground? Culture has gone from being 
a "background" factor in development thinking to becoming a 
new buzzword, seen to be central in the dynamics associated with 
development processes. Yet the evaluation of the practical and 
theoretical implications of this cultural shift in development has 
often been abstract. 
By contrast, this volume offers a grounded engagement with culture 
as it enters into development paradigms, institutions, and local 
dynamics. With case studies ranging from Africa through to Andean 
Latin America, the chapters provide a detailed empirical discussion 
of the possibilities of, and limits to, "adding culture" into 
development. 
Key scholars have combined broad theoretical discussions on the 
neo-liberal context for development's cultural turn and the concept 
of social capital with thorough, critical, and original evaluations of 
specific development processes and projects. The chapters thus bring 
the culture and development debate up-to-date by using the latest 
theoretical approaches to socioeconomic change to critically evaluate 
current initiatives. 
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.. Culture in development 
thinking: geographies, 
actors, and paradigms 
Sarah A. Radcliffe 
Why culture and development? The context 
As I was researching Ecuadorian development projects and debates 
recently, references to culture kept coming up - in my conversations 
with Quechua indigenous representatives, in roundtable discussions 
about national policy, and in the corridors of Washington DC based 
multilateral development agencies. Not only were differently 
positioned actors and institutions talking about culture; people and 
policy were additionally drawing on specific examples of culture in 
action to illustrate their points. Indigenous leaders and international 
donors pointed out how in Bolivia's Andean highlands, "traditional" 
forms of decision-making and administration were giving unionist 
structures a run for their money. In the midst of Ecuador's economic 
and political crisis, Indian traders from the Otavalo area continued 
to export their distinctive textiles worldwide, giving anti-poverty 
policy-makers food for thought. 
Culture has always been in development thinking and practice, but 
how it is conceptualized and when and where put in to operation 
reflect complex historical and geographical patterns of institutional, 
social, and political action. As the chapters here show, culture has 
recently acquired a new visibility and salience in development 
thinking and practice. Whereas in the past cultural norms and 
assumptions might have informed powerful development actors in 
their interaction with beneficiaries, culture is now being discovered 
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among those very beneficiaries. Development practitioners and 
development thinkers alike are puzzling over the implications 
of culture for the participation of beneficiaries, for the success of 
projects and how culture contributes to non-economic goals of 
development. This volume examines cultures and the puzzles they 
throw up for development thinking and practice, by analyzing the 
"why, how, when and where" questions of culture and development. 
By starting from specific historical, social, and geographical 
locations, the chapters illustrate what happens when culture is taken 
seriously in grappling with development practice "on the ground." 
Despite the breadth of the development field, there is no doubt that 
culture has arrived in development. Development thinking in the 
past decade has experienced a cultural turn (Chua, Bhavnani, and 
Foran 2000; Schech and Haggis 2000; Clague and Grossbard-
Shechtman 2001 ), in what Kliksberg presciently termed "the new 
development debate" (Kliksberg 1999: 84). The emergence of culture 
at the heart of mainstream development debates has been a core 
feature of development since the late 1990s (Worsley 1999: 41). 
Major international initiatives such as in the United Nations Decade 
for Cultural Development from 1988 to 1997 have placed culture and 
development together, while multilateral development agencies 
have began to talk about the need for "culturally appropriate 
development" (Davis 1999: 28; UNDP 2004). Among a broad group 
of development practitioners from applied anthropologists through to 
World Bank economists, a general agreement exists that "culture 
in its broadest sense needs to be brought into the development 
paradigm" (Davis 1999: 25). Bringing culture into development, 
however, requires a rethinking of development's objectives and its 
treatment of the complex concept of culture. 
The cultural values that underlie the global context for development 
thinking and interventions are by now increasingly widely recognized 
and analyzed (Escobar 1995; Schech and Haggis 2000). Studies have 
demonstrated how postcolonial legacies of cultural interaction and 
the contests over development's meanings and practices have long 
been questions of culture. Yet as traced in this introduction and 
the following chapter, a recent paradigm shift has occurred in 
development's approach to culture as cultural difference is now 
treated explicitly as a significant variable in the success of 
development interventions (Rao and Walton 2004). In order to 
understand the reasons for this new development debate, however, 
we must first look at how development itself has been 
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conceptualized. In the mid-twentieth century, development was 
equated with poor countries' economic growth and modernization 
that were expected to replicate Western experience. To summarize a 
complex history (see Schech and Haggis 2000; Watts, this volume), 
development thinking was increasingly challenged by Marxist, 
feminist, and postcolonial writers and activists, and began to 
reconsider its own specific institutional, historical, and cultural 
location. The approaches of these critical writers demonstrated how 
development included not only the specific interventions - projects, 
programs, loans, and aid flows - usually included in definitions of 
development, but that it was additionally embedded in the cultural 
economy of Western capitalist political economies and the 
cultural histories of European colonialism. 
In current understandings, development includes the reworkings 
of relations of production and reproduction, and of sociocultural 
meanings, resulting from planned interventions and from uneven 
political economies. Development comprises "an uneven motion 
of capital finding, producing and reproducing places and people 
in particular and differentiated relation to peculiar strategies of 
accumulation ... [Its] signal form in the second half of the twentieth 
century demarcated a specific relationship between the global north 
and south or between the 'first' and 'third worlds"' (Katz 2004: ix). 
As it encompasses both intentional practice and broad political 
economic processes (Cowen and Shenton 1995: 28), development's 
double-sided essence has to be kept in creative tension in any 
discussion of development's constantly shifting horizon of global 
and local change (Hart 2001). 
The context for taking culture seriously in development arises from a 
number of cognate issues, processes, and debates. In order to explain 
development's "cultural tum," commentators identify five main 
reasons for the recent prominence of culture as a key concept in 
development thinking. These reasons include the failure of previous 
development paradigms; perceptions of globalization's threat to 
cultural diversity; activism around social difference (gender, 
ethnicity, anti-racism); the development success stories in East Asia; 
and the need for social cohesion. These views are not found together, 
and even one reason for taking culture seriously covers a number 
of different political, analytical, or ideological perspectives. 
One of the key prompts for a rethinking of development's 
relationship with its cultural field was the widespread disillusionment 
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with development among practitioners, thinkers, and grassroots 
actors from the 1980s. While the impasse in development thinking 
was argued by sociologists, anthropologists, and geographers 
to be due to the inability of development thinking to overcome its 
economism and teleological frameworks, the practical failure of 
projects on the ground to deliver satisfactorily was a key component 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2001a: chapter 3). During the 1980s in many 
parts of the majority world, development indicators were reversed 
due to the combined effects of debt burden, falling productivity and 
job availability, and loss of development directions. In Ecuador 
for example, rural credit and various development programs of the 
Inter-American Development Bank and UNDP were suspended 
or terminated due to conflict and poor project performance 
(Griffiths 2000: 33). The following chapters give other examples 
of development rethinking following negative experiences with 
development work. 
Prominent in discussions about culture in development are concerns 
about the potentially homogenizing cultural effects of globalization. 
In the words of the United Nations report on culture and 
development, a "danger looms of a uniform global culture" (United 
Nations Report 1998: 22). Voices from the global South also raise 
the specter of loss of cultural diversity. In Africa, the erosion of 
cultural heritage under the experience of development is argued 
to "precipitate development crises" causing alienation and 
disorientation for ordinary Africans (Yakubu 2002: 8-9). Similarly, 
Prah argues that "the brooding presence of Western culture [in 
Africa] is singularly blighting and fossilizing indigenous cultures" 
(Prah 2001: 96). During its Decade on Culture and Development 
(1988-97), the United Nations argued that "the defense of local 
and regional cultures threatened by cultures with a global reach" 
(UN Preamble 2003) required in turn action for "preservation 
of the diversity of cultures" (UNESCO 2003). According to 
development anthropologists, the way in which globalization tends to 
lead to the "leveling of national and local cultures and its consequent 
social dislocations and economic crises" (Davis 1999: 31) needs to 
be addressed. In order to challenge or halt cultural homogenization, 
cultural policies beyond the national scale are being promoted at 
inter-regional and even global scales (UN Report 1998: 22). Such 
policies can provide "an antidote to globalization" according to the 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation ( quoted in UN Report 
1998: 85). Yet cultural globalization occurs in the context of 
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global markets, complicating the agendas of democratic national 
policies in their attempts to shape increasingly complex individual 
consumption patterns (Sen 2004: 52-3). Trajectories of desire 
often encompass goods produced around the world, making the 
substitution of "national" products for "global" products problematic 
(Sen 2004: 52-3). 
Anti-discrimination measures connected with postcolonial political 
struggles have also played their part in questioning the implicitly 
Western cultural focus and expectations that long underlay 
development thinking and practice. Efforts to challenge Eurocentric 
visions of progress and development modernity thus form part of a 
broad agenda to question culture's power to proclaim what is an 
appropriate or inappropriate culture in a development context. For 
example, some African commentators argue that development 
occurring after colonialism brings a profound malaise to the region's 
cultures by undermining their autonomous values (Prah 2001 ). As a 
result of these broad critiques, development policy has explicitly 
attempted to understand and encompass a regard for cultural 
diversity during the last decade (Allen 2000). Often analyses from 
these perspectives are informed by diverse Third World feminist 
movements, and by campaigns to ensure rights for populations 
marginalized by ethnic/racial hierarchies (such as the global 
indigenous rights movement). While in fact most people around the 
world live with the overlap and juxtaposition of multiple cultures 
(produced by variable combinations of local societies, nation-states, 
international consumer and religious cultures), anti-discrimination 
and anti-racist work has to grapple with the persistent hierarchies 
between cultures and groups in multicultural and multiethnic 
societies. Building bridges of communication and mutual respect 
creates intercultural understanding and speaks to an agenda of 
working across/through social differences. Hence the United Nations' 
"commitment to pluralism" works from the need to build policies 
around cultural diversity and intercultural understanding (UN 
Report 1998: 22), a position endorsed by applied anthropologists 
(Davis 1999: 28). The economic benefits of working for intercultural 
understanding have also been pointed up by development economists 
who argue that development of flexible labor markets and 
employment opportunities are impeded by employers' misperceptions 
of workers' cultural attributes, thereby causing the waste of human 
capital (Kliksberg 1999; Hojman 1999). 
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The dramatic growth and improved living standards for populations 
in certain East Asian countries, often termed the Asian Tigers, has 
generated considerable debate about what lies behind their success 
story. Early economic discussions attributed much weight to the 
region's ancestral and long-standing cultures, arguing that the 
Confucian tradition provided sociocultural rules that assisted 
accumulation. Such arguments finally put to rest the assumption, 
embedded in mid-twentieth century modernization models of 
development, that Western-style development was the only trajectory 
to growth (Worsley 1999: 34). Certainly, the West is no longer a 
privileged interlocutor in definitions of development and modernity 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2001a; on Japan, see Goodman 1999; Sen 2004: 
48-9). Yet attributing a broad historical influence to culture was 
ultimately unsatisfactory as it attributed a coherent cultural web over 
highly diverse meanings, practices, and social relations (Ong 1999). 
Analysis began to focus instead on daily performances of cultural 
economic practices that underpin, say, Japanese business behavior, 
such as the "after-hours sessions in the bars and nightclubs ... 
where the vital personal contacts are established and nurtured 
slowly" (Lohr, quoted in Granovetter 1985: 67). In other words, the 
Asian Tigers demonstrate variable organizational and social cultures 
through which economic transactions and values are expressed and 
reproduced. In Singapore for instance, a complex interaction between 
social Darwinism, Confucianism, and specific leadership styles 
contributed to its development experience (Chang 2002). By focusing 
on the state and the firm as locales for culture, distinctive practices 
and meanings have been identified in the forms of governance, 
workplace dynamics, and education that are now thought to 
contribute to economic growth. By examining culture as a mode 
of organization at a number of levels therefore, the selectivity and 
flexibility of cultural relations across spheres of production and 
reproduction have been highlighted without reducing culture to a 
"catch all" category ( also James, this volume). 
Another agenda behind development's cultural turn is the objective 
of overcoming tensions and potential conflicts between human 
groups. Departing from the insight that the resource of culture is held 
by every individual and social group regardless of their economic or 
political power, a number of different strands of policy have 
emerged. Emphasizing the non-economic facets of development, the 
right to freedom of cultural expression represents a development goal 
that depends upon security, democratic openness, and accountability 
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(Friedmann 1992; Sen 1999). One of the first contexts for 
development's explicit attention to culture was in conflict resolution, 
where tension and violence were attributed to a lack of cross-cultural 
understanding, and where the rebuilding of post-conflict societies 
departed from the cultural resources of local groups (Davis 1999: 37; 
compare Watson, this volume). In this vein, UNESCO promotes an 
agenda of social cohesion to attempt to overcome potential conflicts 
and inequalities along a number of axes of social difference (UN 
Report 1998). 1 Such approaches offer a constructive response 
to heightened global security concerns that are wrongly reduced to 
culturalist explanations (see below for a discussion on culturalist 
explanations). "Dialogue between ... flexible, multiple and open 
identities and cultures should become the basis for a concord to 
cultures rather than a 'clash of civilizations"' (UN Report 1998: 23; 
Rao and Walton 2004: 10). The promotion of social cohesion and 
rights to cultural expression has recently been at the heart of 
measures to recognize the cultural capital of the poor. Whereas 
impoverished people may have little more than cultural identities, 
this cultural capital is viewed in recent policy as the launch pad for 
transforming their relative position in multicultural societies. 
However, the means of achieving a change in status is far from 
straightforward (UNESCO 2003), as the following chapters illustrate. 
As Bjorn Hettne argues, the new emphasis on culture has far-
reaching implications and constitutes a major challenge to the 
rethinking of development (Hettne 2001: 9). Moreover, the varied 
engagements of development with cultural questions outlined above 
give rise to different trajectories for theorization and policy-making. 
If cultural development is a response to anxieties about globalization, 
then policy measures to enhance cultural diversity in global world 
become adopted, as illustrated by various United Nations initiatives. 
Tackling discrimination raises different challenges for policy, not 
least the difficulty of transforming the terms of knowledge, power, 
and hegemony of Western ( colonial and contemporary) cultures of 
modernity and development into more plural, open, and empowering 
mechanisms. If, by contrast, the development agenda is informed by 
the Asian Tigers' case, policy questions are oriented to bring about 
the necessary managerial, work culture, and political transformations 
within a capitalist political economy. Yet each distinct concern 
brings us back to the fact that development thinking and practice has, 
over the past 10 to 15 years had to rework its understandings of 
development while refining its conceptualization of culture. 
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What is culture? What is development? 
Debates across disciplines 
Culture has come out of the seminar room discussions and gone 
into the manuals for development fieldworkers and institutions. 
Yet the term "culture" has no universal or agreed meanings, and 
indeed varies in its significance and theoretical background across 
anthropology, development studies, geography, and cognate 
disciplines. Drawing on recent debates in a number of theoretical and 
substantive fields, this section outlines a broad-based characterization 
of culture. We explore in detail the ways in which culture and 
development have been defined and used by key disciplines in order 
to work towards an interdisciplinary understanding of how culture 
and development can be conceptualized in relation to one another. 
Anthropology and development studies - focused on issues of culture 
and development respectively - start off this discussion, before 
turning to critical approaches (including feminist and post-
development work) and then to economics and economic geography. 
The aim of this section is to work towards multidisciplinary 
definitions of development and culture that are mutually 
comprehensible. 
Anthropology 
Although central to the discipline of anthropology, culture remains a 
highly ambiguous concept and one that arouses much controversy 
(Gardner and Lewis 1996; Fox and King 2002; Mitchell 2002). 
Whereas historically focused on small-scale societies with contiguous 
cultural boundaries, anthropology increasingly has to engage with a 
global stage in which cultural mixing, hybridity, and multiple and 
crosscutting flows of people, meanings, and artifacts are taken 
for granted (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Buroway, Blum, and George 
2000). Anthropology's own complicity in the hierarchical labeling of 
Other cultures has been traced back to colonial times (Abu-Lughod 
1999). Under colonialism, although "Western civilization" was 
pronounced to be the model for non-Western societies, in practice 
non-Western culture was selectively regularized to facilitate colonial 
rule and early postcolonial politics (Worsley 1999: 35-6). Colonial 
models of power attributed culture with a central significance in the 
ordering of the world. 
However, to attribute culture with the ability to determine all aspects 
of social life is to fall into the trap of culturalism whereby any social 
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feature is linked causally and directly back to a broad category of 
"culture" (Worsley 1999: 37). Culturalist explanations tend to assume 
that culture is an unchanging "bundle" of beliefs and practices that 
are coherent and homogeneous across a large population. In recent 
years, culturalist explanations have gained widespread media and 
popular prominence; broad-brush associations between religious or 
historical identifications have been offered as the explanation for 
political attitudes and responses to modernity. Culturalist frameworks 
including Islamic/Christian and East/West binaries claim to 
differentiate between groups yet they suppress long-term historical 
patterns of connection and internal cultural diversity in their search 
for headline "explanations" (Ong 1999; Hart 2002; Berger 2003). 
In such binary frameworks, cultural difference is reduced to being 
a source of conflict or a source of functional integration (Huntington 
1996; Harrison and Huntington 2000; Landes 2000), although in each 
case culture is accorded a unity and primacy that anthropologists 
abandoned long ago. 
Culturalist explanations in effect ignore the key dimensions that 
anthropologists now place at the heart of the culture concept, namely 
its flexibility, its strategic deployment by different actors to make 
interventions, its contested content, and the interplay between 
material and symbolic components.2 By taking culture for granted 
- as a "traditional way of life" (Werlin 2003: 337) or as a template 
for action - culturalist approaches ignore struggles over cultural 
meaning, the state's role in shaping culture, and the coexistence of 
different cultural registers. In practice, culture is used flexibly, each 
variation in meaning and each social relationship passed - or not -
through time or over space, mobilized or forgotten in turn (Fox and 
King 2002). Hence in order to retain a robust definition of culture, 
its limits need to be recognized. While culture does include a broad 
range of components such as the discursive understanding of 
contested meanings ( e.g. elite versus popular culture), material 
culture (which embodies socioeconomic organization, meanings, and 
inequalities), structures of feeling, and forms of social organization 
(such as kinship, religion), it does not explain or control everything 
in social life. 
One key limit of culture's power came with the recognition that in 
the past the concept was too often equated with - or treated as a 
coded word for - racial difference. From the colonial period into the 
1920s, the term culture became to be interchangeable in the West 
with the new notion of ethnic group, and both concepts substituted 
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for race (Visweswaran 1998: 76). In such a way, today culture can 
operate as an alternative term to race. However, race/ethnicity and 
culture cannot be collapsed down into each other, despite the 
concepts' entangled history in Western thinking and policy. Instead, 
the separate yet interconnected realms of culture and race need to be 
acknowledged, and in each case the historical and power-infused 
relationships that underpin a society's "culture" and its racial 
relations have to be acknowledged (Trouillot 2002: 41). Racial 
categories are not biologically given; rather, "the social process by 
which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and 
destroyed" comprises a society's racial formation (Omi and Winant 
1994: 56). Racial formations influence how resources are distributed 
among groups, yet are contested in and through different racial 
projects (projects carried out by the state, or by social movements). 
Thus culture in development requires an analysis that reconnects it 
with class, history, and racial formations. Just as political racial 
projects combine systems of meaning with the allocation of 
entitlement, so too does development (White 2002: 416). For 
example by reworking the meanings of racial identity and the 
distribution of development aid, pro-indigenous development projects 
in the Andes represent new racial projects that reconfigure national 
racial formations (Radcliffe and Laurie, this volume). 
Development studies 
Separating out culture from race occurred in development studies 
only recently (White 2002) as for much of the twentieth century, 
the discipline relied upon culturalist frameworks to explain 
underdevelopment of former colonies and countries in the global 
South. In the mid-twentieth century, the main development paradigm 
was modernization. While Walt Rostow's modernization paradigm 
implied that American cultures of consumerism represented the 
epitome of development, Talcott Parsons argued that certain habits 
of mind and behaviors would benefit modernization. In this way, 
development thinking took on board the notion that culture can be 
acquired, and results from a learning process. Non-Western -
"traditional" - cultures were perceived as fading relics that would 
inevitably and unproblematically be replaced by modem forms of 
culture and identity as people learnt Western ways. Mainstream 
accounts through much of twentieth century assumed that people 
learn about Western modernity, and acquire characteristics that favor 
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them in a capitalist, state-ordered society. Particular local cultural 
features were treated by modernization thinking as barriers to the 
expansion of western cultural attributes and development.3 In 
different contexts and times, agricultural involution, over-close ties 
with family and kin, cognitive maps, and the culture of poverty were 
all perceived in modernization thinking as blocks to (Western) 
development (Allen 2000). Yet Gunnar Myrdal, a key development 
thinker through the mid-twentieth century, recognized Western 
approaches' lack of universality. For many years following 
modernization debates, development's engagement in questions 
of culture was denied due to its colonial legacy and then 
modernization's culturalist explanations (Worsley 1999: 30). 
In recent years, development studies has moved away from these 
approaches to embrace a critical and globally informed perspective 
on the nature of development and its interventions. Key to this 
change has been the recognition that Western notions of change are 
discontinuous and divergent as different social, political, and 
economic interests are bundled up into any one policy (Nederveen 
Pieterse 2001a: chapter 3). At the same time, the ideas and practices 
of development - as immanent process of socioeconomic 
transformation and as specific interventions - are re-embedded in 
locally situated practices (Arce and Long 2000: 1 ). This creates a 
highly nuanced picture of development as it works its way over 
variable situations and encounters variable combinations of actors 
and their interests. Moreover, strategic actions to counter the 
dominant development trends exist in every society, comprising what 
Arce and Long call "counter-tendencies." These counter-tendencies 
rework notions of modernity and development, departing not just 
from "traditional" culture but through recombining old and new 
modes of working and meaning (Arce and Long 2000: 21). Focusing 
on the middle ground of interactions between actors and institutions, 
development studies is concerned with how interpretations of 
development and modernity, along with strategies to deal with them, 
are worked out across a multiplicity of interconnected sites (Arce 
and Long 2000: 21 ). In this approach, understanding development 
engages what Nederveen Pieterse terms a "critical globalism" that 
involves "theorizing the entire field of forces in a way that takes 
into account not just market forces but also interstate relations, 
international agencies and civil society in its domestic and 
transnational manifestations" (Nederveen Pieterse 2001a: 46). By 
re-engaging with the social field in which development operates, 
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development studies has offered a persuasive account of the actors, 
institutions, and multiple sites through which development is thought, 
operationalized, and experienced. 
Critical accounts 
Critical accounts of culture and development challenge the ways 
in which mainstream categories and relations underpin relations 
of inequality and exclusion. Using a post-structuralist critique of 
discourse and articulating the possibility of more equal societies, 
critical accounts during the course of the 1990s provided key 
insights into the relationship between culture and development. 
Post-structuralist analysis of the discourses of development has 
documented the numerous cultural assumptions that underpin 
development thinking (Crush 1995; Schech and Haggis 2000). 
They have had an impact across a number of disciplines including 
anthropology, development studies, geography, and sociology. Key 
to these critical and post-structuralist approaches are Third World 
feminist accounts and post-development writings respectively. 
Third World and postcolonial feminisms were among the first critics 
of the underlying Western normative frameworks that underpinned 
much development in the twentieth century. Critiquing accounts of 
Third World women as homogeneous passive victims of patriarchal 
local cultures whose liberation would occur through development 
(Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991), Third World feminists reinserted 
women's agency, diversity, and cultural distinctiveness into 
development thinking (Schech and Haggis 2000, Chapter 4). Many 
women in the global South have less secure access to the uneven 
opportunities of development than their male counterparts, due to 
the way that hegemonies of political economy, law, kin relations, 
religion, and cultural tradition come together to shape local social 
relations and structures of feelings (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). While 
gender and development agendas to introduce feminist concerns into 
development do address issues of women's inequality and represent 
an improvement on earlier policy approaches (Kabeer 1994), they 
remain implicitly modernizing and Western (Bulbeck 1998). New 
practices are required in order to recognize and encourage the 
creation of diverse path-dependent and non-linear opportunities for 
gender equality that avoid Western norms (Jolly 2002). Treating 
culture as lived experiences, structures of feeling and the relationship 
between production and reproduction, postcolonial feminist 
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approaches resonate closely with new anthropological definitions 
of culture, yet additionally stress the ongoing significance of gender 
difference in determining individual development outcomes (Chua, 
Bhavnani, and Foran 2000). Development interventions can 
challenge, rework, or reinforce the cultures of gender within which 
women and men live (Jolly 2002). Reworking connections between 
culture, women and development entails a focus on women as agents 
of change in diverse spheres oflife and recognition of women's 
class, ethnic-racial and social diversity (Chua, Bhavnani, and Foran 
2000; Bhavnani, Foran, and Kurian 2003).4 
Culture and power are placed at heart of development debates by 
post-development writers (Worsley 1999: 39). Attacking the Western 
enlightenment binary forms of thinking (First W odd/Third World; 
rich/poor; white/black) which entered into development thinking and 
practice, post-development brings a useful critique to the implicit 
cultural assumptions that underpinned development thinking 
through from colonial times to the present. In searching for 
alternatives to the hierarchies in development paradigms and practice, 
post-development writers highlight the role of culturally distinctive 
actors in contributing to a "post-Western" development model. Post-
development tends to focus on the analysis of social movements 
and grassroots actors, who are often viewed as culturally distinctive 
to national culture (Escobar 1995; Apffel-Marglin 1998). Yet in 
celebrating local cultures as alternatives to "standard" development, 
post-development writers risk overemphasizing the difference 
between the West and the "Rest," while ducking the question 
of how to engage with useful definitions of culture and its complex 
local connections with race, economics, and politics (see Lehmann 
1997). Postcolonial approaches that analyze the complexities of 
recent political economies and attendant cultural meanings are better 
placed to deconstruct changing development paradigms. 
Economic geography and development economics 
Although the Washington consensus on neo-liberal policy 
frameworks became hegemonic globally during the mid-1980s, 
its ascendance was matched by the increasing recognition of how 
varieties of capitalism exist across the world, rooted in different 
historico-geographies of cultural practice and institutional settings. 
At the same time, the taken-for-granted idea that the economy and 
culture referred to separate spheres of activity was increasingly 
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questioned (Trouillot 2002: 55; Amin and Thrift 2004: xii). "From 
the standpoint of economics, cultural activities have been regarded as 
a secondary field foreign to the central line that economic growth 
should follow" (Kliksberg 1999: 96). Previous models of the 
economy had treated individual actors as either free of cultural 
reference or totally subordinate to social norms. Yet, it was 
increasingly recognized, "actors do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories 
that they happen to occupy" (Granovetter 1985: 58). Drawing on the 
notion of culture as changing and embedded in specific institutional 
and social relations, Britain's "complacent traditionalism," for 
example, was blamed for its poor economic performance (Hickox 
1999: 137). 
The ongoing dynamic influence of institutional and sociocultural 
context became increasingly recognized, as the fractured and 
unpredictable turns taken by cultural change, social relations, and 
meanings became visible (Clague and Grossbard-Shechtman 2001; 
Sen 2004). Understanding the economy's social and institutional 
embeddedness opened up new questions and tentative answers about 
trust and its downside of corruption, the specific social practices 
(gossip, socializing, networking) through which business got done 
and labor was recruited (Granovetter 1985). Uneven economic 
development was no longer a question of management of profit goals 
in financial terms; it was attributed to the dynamism of regional 
cultures where face-to-face contacts, trust, and stable social networks 
underpinned ease of access to business information, labor, and credit 
(Putnam 1993). For example, whereas Silicon Valley, California, is 
held up as an icon of the synergies of culture and economy, the 
"Silicon wannabes" - that is, places wanting to repeat Silicon 
Valley's success - are seen not to combine the "right" cultural 
features (James 2006: 7). 
Recognition of cultural embeddedness of economies pinpoints the 
institutional and regional dimensions of economic growth processes, 
yet often underestimates the complexity of spatial connections and 
the non-institutional sociocultural processes that contribute to 
economic behavior (Barnes 2002). By rejecting an individualistic 
homo economicus actor, Granovetter's approach underplayed the role 
of specific actors - firms, financiers, nation-states, unions, individuals 
among others - in determining the interplay between pursuit of 
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prosperity and other goals. Regional dynamics thus became a 
function of abstract processes "rather than ... the deliberative human 
agents, bureaus and groups responsible for those processes, along 
with the spatial structures that shape their actions" (James 2006: 5). 
Redressing the lack of focus on multiple institutions and actors, 
attention has been paid to cultural entrepreneurs, who - it is 
argued - mobilize and support productive trends and the 
emergence of new consumption patterns. Within this policy model, 
the cultural entrepreneur plays a key role creating alliances between 
"the new entrepreneurial middle class, potential winners, [ and] 
opinion formers" to create dynamic economies (Hojman 1999: 180, 
177). Yet cultural entrepreneurship occurs within wider 
socioeconomic transformations that are moving towards fragmented 
working lives and the loss of welfare systems. Precarious 
employment conditions, work fragmentation, multiskilling, and 
multitasking are the experiences of many workers in the global 
post-Fordist economy that relies upon just-in-time production and 
adaptable workforces to maximize the flexible accumulation of 
capital (Harvey 1989). For example, in the European Union, artists-
tumed-cultural workers are expected to be entrepreneurial (raising 
finance, seeking out new markets) all the while maintaining high 
standards of cultural production (Ellmeier 2003). Embedded within 
similar processes, Bolivian musicians touring Japan to give school 
concerts are not mere entrepreneurs riding the wave of global 
economic opportunity, but work to time and to others' standards 
in order to make a living (Bigenho, this volume). 
Furthering these accounts, economists today view the two 
dimensions of culture and economics as equally important and as 
intrinsically and simultaneously co-influencing. Just as economic 
transactions and dynamics increasingly came into focus, so too the 
ways in which culture and economy were to be brought together 
conceptually gained attention. To overcome the limitations of the 
notion of cultural embeddedness,5 culture and economy can be 
conceptualized as coequal and coterminous elements as they "exist 
in dialectical relation, based upon their perpetual and simultaneous 
(re )construction by human agents whose economic motives and 
logics derive from their own socio-cultural identities" (James 
2006: 2). The pursuit of accumulation is simultaneously the 
pursuit of many goals, symbolic and pleasurable, responding to 
"imaginaries of desire and desirability" as much as profit (Amin and 
Thrift 2004: xiv-xv). If culture is appreciated as economic practice 
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and the economy as cultural practice (Amin and Thrift 2004: xviii), 
then development may be considered as projects to set up processes 
of accumulation that exist within multiple projects for pursuing other 
( social, cultural, political, symbolic, pleasurable) goals. By adding in 
an anthropological understanding of how institutions and hierarchical 
social relations frame individual actors' sociocultural identities, the 
concept of cultural economy can be used to frame the terrain within 
which development engages with culture. 
* 
In summary, culture comprises the material products, patterns of 
social relations, and structures of feelings produced by multiple 
actors, who are differentially positioned in power relations, political 
economies, and social reproduction. Viewing culture in this way 
recognizes the contested nature of cultural meanings, artifacts, and 
social relations that are coproduced by diverse actors in their ongoing 
daily and generational interactions. The spatial and social limits of 
culture are thus dynamic, reflecting the ways in which social 
interactions are rarely bounded, while the fields within which 
meanings and social relations are produced go beyond the local 
or indeed national arena. We can thus view "culture as a terrain in 
which politics, culture and the economic form an inseparable 
dynamic" (Lowe and Lloyd 1997: 1). Economies are not separate 
from the sociocultural field in which they occur, as the transactions, 
values, and institutions often bundled up into the concept "economy" 
are intrinsically connected - and owe their meanings, reproduction, 
and contestation - to culture. The cultural economy of development 
interventions thus encompasses the geographically variable priorities 
and social transactions by which social life is reproduced. Culture in 
this sense is intrinsic to the various projects of development. Whether 
in the form of uneven political economies or planned interventions, 
culture as a terrain of material production, structures of feelings and 
patterned social relations imbues development with a wide repertoire 
of resonance and a social backdrop which analysts have only recently 
begun to recognize. In a world living through the after-effects of 
colonialism and the diverse racial projects enacted by nation-states, 
culture exists within complex historically and geographically 
variable racial formations. Similarly, development's culture is 
embedded within a postcolonial global racial formation and interacts 
with national cultural economies of development. By locating 
culture in this broad terrain, development actors and paradigms can 
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be analyzed fruitfully as interacting to produce cultural meanings, 
social relations, and material cultures across a number of spaces. 
Bringing culture into issues around development, we come to a 
working understanding of culture in the field of development that 
underpins the subsequent chapters. 
A new development paradigm? Culture and development 
Development in the 21 st century will be cultural or nothing at all. 
(UNESCO 1997, quoted in Carranza 2002: 36) 
Culture has become a significant - and widely acknowledged - facet 
of development thinking in recent years, as it focuses attention on 
diversity and complexity and deals with issues of cohesion (Worsley 
1999: 30; Kliksberg 1999). Although the conceptual starting points 
for this acknowledgement of culture's significance are highly diverse 
(see above), and in many cases theoretically incompatible, it 
demonstrates that culture and development are now widely perceived 
as dialectically related. While it is premature to claim there is a new 
and coherent paradigm around this pair of concepts, it is nevertheless 
useful to mark the terrain shared by a number of different disciplines 
and actors and which takes the terms jointly into the heart of 
mainstream development debates (Worsley 1999: 41). In this context, 
"culture and development" refers to the fact that culture is not 
primordial but is reworked and reproduced around and through 
development, just as development ( as political economy and as 
planned intervention) is embedded in "imaginaries of desirability," 
material culture, and social relations. Placing development in a 
terrain beyond the unidimensional measure of GDP or the 
multidimensional measure of capabilities (Sen 2004), the paradigm of 
culture and development captures the recognition that culture is 
intrinsic to development as the priorities, goals, and outcomes of 
social life/development arise at the interface between development 
and culture. Culture and development, what Nederveen Pieterse 
terms C&D (2001a), thus goes beyond the question of whether 
culture is taken seriously in development (that is, whether it has been 
"added in"), to examine where, when, and how (specific historico-
geographical formations of) culture and development interact. 
Culture and development departs from the premise that cultural 
values such as expectations of material culture and structures of 
feelings underlie the paradigms and policies of development. 
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However, it also recognizes that the enactment of cultural 
development depends on the configuration of local, national, and 
global power relations that shape projects or interventions (Schech 
and Haggis 2000; Power 2003). (The term cultural development is 
used here in the spirit of the concept of cultural economy, discussed 
above.) For a number of distinct actors, culture increasingly 
represents a key factor in development outcomes, increasing 
the meaningfulness of interventions for project beneficiaries and the 
social sustainability of projects for their administrators and donors. 
In East Africa, the ways in culturally specific local institutions play 
a role in natural resource management works from the culture and 
development premise that particular local configurations of meaning, 
structure, and reproduction are linked to potential improvements in 
development outcomes (Watson 2003). In the Ecuadorian Amazon 
region, a regional NGO attempts to create a ceramics industry and 
tourist attractions, arguing that culturally appropriate models are 
more sustainable and promote local participation (Wilson 2003). In 
the face of destructive cultural and economic reforms, culture 
appears as the "missing link" in African development (Prah 2001). 
Launching the Agenda 21 of Culture, mayors from over 400 cities 
and towns around the world met in Barcelona in May 2004 to protect 
public spaces as spaces for multicultural encounters between locals 
and non-local groups (Cia and Marti 2004). These examples 
highlight the multifarious ways that grassroots and development 
actors and institutions view culture and the diverse means at their 
disposal to "use" culture for development ends. 
Culture and development also engages diverse actors at scales 
ranging from the local through to the global and international (see 
section below). The United Nations Decade for Cultural 
Development, which ran from 1988 to 1997, raised international 
awareness of the issues, initiating international debate around cultural 
priorities to be brought into policy. The Decade stressed the 
importance of acknowledging the cultural dimensions of 
development, enhancing cultural identities, broadening participation 
in cultural life, and promoting international cultural cooperation 
(UNESCO 2003). In January 1998, 20 major development 
organizations created a network on "Cultural heritage and 
Development" to exchange strategies on building from cultural 
heritages. At the end of the United Nations Decade, conferences and 
symposia provided a forum in which to provide guidelines, by 
integrating cultural policies into human development strategies at 
international and national levels. 
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Development thinking now "contain[ s] a more pro-active vision of 
incorporating a cultural dimension into the development process 
itself" (Davis 1999: 27). Such a "cultural lens" places culture at the 
center of development, viewing it as neither inherently damaging 
nor beneficial (Rao and Walton 2004). A critical engagement with 
culture and development paradigms adds greatly to our 
understandings of development institutions, processes, and practices 
without distracting our attention from the materialities of poverty, 
inequality, power relations, resource distribution, and the vagaries of 
the global economy (McEwan 2003: 2). Nevertheless, as argued by 
development economist Amartya Sen, the "import of culture cannot 
be instantly translated into ready made theories of cultural causation" 
(Sen 2004: 55). As the chapters in this volume illustrate, taking 
culture seriously as a factor in development does not automatically 
lead to a policy template to be applied across the diverse and 
constantly cultural contexts of the impoverished world. 
Geographies and actors in culture and development 
Culture has always been central to our understanding of the 
development processes and their impacts across the globe. Yet 
many development interventions have failed because of a lack 
of understanding of local cultures. Nation-states have intervened 
systematically in postcolonial countries to shape the racial formations 
and cultures in their territories, often tying national objectives to 
development targets and imaginaries (Gupta 1998). For these 
reasons, a detailed understanding of the ways in which diverse actors 
bring culture into development and where they do so, is required (in 
addition to how and when). If actors and institutions remain invisible 
in accounts of development, responsibility for change cannot be 
attributed to actors with agency, while an aspatial account of cultural 
development's terrain limits our understanding of innovative policies 
and practices which can be made more widely available. 
Development and culture are defined crucially by the openness and 
contested nature of the social terrains over which they operate. Yet 
the specific configuration of development and culture in operation 
occurs together in specific locales and spaces. Development and 
culture are hence intrinsically constructed, reconstructed, and 
deconstructed at multiple scales simultaneously. As the following 
chapters show in detail through diverse case studies, development is 
adapted in national-regional contexts, varying greatly with political 
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economies, histories, and geographies (Crush 1995). Similarly, global 
notions of what development should comprise are given local and 
regional inflections and interpretations as they become "indigenized" 
in different localities (Nederveen Pieterse 1998: 365; Gupta 1998). 
In some cases, development models are highly specific to regional 
contexts within which they are elaborated and applied via policy. 
Urban inequalities and massive rural-urban migration in Latin 
America for example, became the context for notions of the "culture 
of poverty" in the mid-twentieth century (Lewis 1959), whereas 
the rural itinerant herding societies in sub-Saharan Africa were 
brought into policy concerns via the concept of the "cattle complex" 
(Allen 2000). 
As connections between localities and regions in a globalizing world 
reflect power relations and deliberate differentiation between scales, 
the chapters show how scale, space, and connections shape the 
debates and practice of culture and development. The challenge is to 
retain a multi-scalar framework that identifies the relevant scales -
and their associated actors - involved in any one example of cultural 
development on the ground. Economists and geographers have 
analyzed the locally bounded social relations and cultures of 
communication and trust among business people, who belong to the 
same country club or exchange information over a drink in the pub 
(Granovetter 1985). Such cultural economic practices are pictured 
primarily at the local level; they exist within or alongside the working 
cultures of firms or a specific economic sector. Anthropology has 
long contributed to our understanding of social relations and cultural 
meanings of localized societies in the global South, highlighting the 
ways in which "local" beneficiaries of development are positioned in 
complex hierarchies of class, gender, generation, and race-ethnicity 
(Ferguson 1994 ). 
At a different scale, development agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, nation-states, and firms each have their own ( often 
unique) institutional working cultures, cultures that profoundly shape 
the ways in which development priorities can be expressed, gain 
support, and be implemented inside and outside the organization. 
Organizational cultures, reflecting the societies in which they are 
embedded, are characterized by ongoing attempts to influence 
resource distribution, priorities, and agendas (Lewis et al. 2003). 
Although development agencies have long been staffed by 
economists (and in the UK at least, former colonial officials [Kothari 
and Minogue 2002]), the staffing - and hence the agendas and 
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debates - in agencies is beginning to change. Multilateral 
development agencies' recent enthusiasm to employ anthropologists 
in order to further agency work on cultural development raises new 
questions about the role of networks of anthropologists in institutions 
dominated by economists (Gardner and Lewis 1996). By the late 
1990s, the World Bank social development office employed over 100 
social scientists, most of them anthropologists and most of them from 
the global South, while in the UK development agency the number 
of anthropologists went up thirtyfold (Davis 1999; Eyben 2000). 
At a broader scale again, multilateral development agencies play a 
significant role in shaping the nature of cultural development 
paradigms and policies (Arizpe 2004). The World Bank under 
President James Wolfensohn from the mid-1990s worked on the 
principle that there was a "need for greater sensitivity to and 
investment in national and local culture in the Bank's new 
development agenda" (Davis 1999: 26). Establishing a social 
development taskforce in 1996, the World Bank began to consider 
how effective economic development was rooted in "institutional 
decision-making, civil society participation, gender, ethnicity, and 
other forms of diversity" (Davis 1999: 25; Alkire 2004). While this 
agenda prioritized economic wealth above other "imaginaries of 
desirability," it led to institutional reform in the Bank and the 
appointments of social anthropologists. Fierce debates raged in the 
Bank as a result about how culture - framed by the concept of social 
capital - could be used to inform policies and practice (Bebbington, 
Guggenheim, Olson, and Woolcock 2004). The Bank also began to 
think in terms of cultural learning, prioritizing loans that would 
encourage flexibility and new sources of knowledge and economic 
activity. Treating learning as a means to transmit culture in non-
linear and institutionally specific ways reinscribed culture-as-a-
discrete-unit models, yet framed Bank loans to Peru and Bolivia in 
the mid-1990s. Multilateral development agency treatment of culture 
draws on understandings that inserting culture into development will 
increase the participation of civil society actors, guarantee social 
cohesion and regularize decision-making (Rao and Walton 2004). 
Yet while the non-bounded and deterritorialized cultures and 
meanings that circulate in a global field have been increasingly 
recognized (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Buroway, Blum, and George 
2000), their role in shaping culture and development relations 
remains little studied (but see Arce and Long 2000). 
Culture produces, and in turn is produced by, interactions at different 
levels which complicates the ways in which we might attribute 
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culture a role in development thinking and policy. Whereas policy 
tends to identify a specific target area for development interventions, 
the factor of culture in this designated area might not correspond 
to those policy geographies, with unforeseen consequences for the 
outcome of interventions. Moreover, policy knowledges are often 
not attuned to the subtle interactions between scales and differently 
positioned actors in the development beneficiary region. In order to 
unpack these mutually influential scales and patterns of culture, the 
chapters here analyze the ways in which constructions of culture 
are scalar and intersect with policy agendas in complex and 
unpredictable ways. Al James (this volume) analyzes the interactions 
between corporate cultures, regional industrial cultures, and broader 
regional cultures to understand the impact of Mormon culture 
on high-tech firms in Utah. Sarah Radcliffe and Nina Laurie 
(this volume) examine how regional cultures interact with new 
development institutions' concepts of cultures and local patterns 
of ethnic society to produce development projects. Development is 
always site specific and culturally distinctive yet is always 
and everywhere inserted into broader cultural and geographical 
groundings, which makes it ineluctably "cultural geographic" (Warts 
2002: 435; also Hart 2002). 
Culture and development thinking: new paradigms, 
recent concepts __ ®' ____ _ 
Development thinking could not take culture seriously without 
having some key concepts and frameworks for understanding how 
culture and development "fit" in any given development context. 
These concepts underpin and provide theoretical justification and 
practical frameworks for thinking about cultural development and 
practice. Three key concepts are participation and governance, as 
well as social capital. During the 1990s and into the twenty-first 
century, they have provided the talisman and framework for much 
cultural development thinking. As such, the concepts appear in 
various ways in the specific case studies discussed in the chapters 
here; below, the relationship between governance, participation, and 
culture are outlined, before moving on to a brief discussion of social 
capital. 
In the context of neo-liberal reworkings of political economy, the 
state's role in ordering and managing accumulation has been 
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downplayed in favor of the "free hand" of the market. As a result, 
the political infrastructure of the state has undergone a deep 
restructuring, with civil society being granted a relatively larger role 
in organizing reproduction and production (Nelson and Wright 1995). 
Combined with dissatisfaction around the previous top-down models 
of development, in which stereotypically the state owned key 
resources and devised Five Year Plans to be met by industry, 
agricultural sectors, and resource extraction enterprises alike, the 
governance of developing societies underwent a sea change during 
the 1980s (Martinussen 1997). The impetus to involve ordinary 
people in project design and implementation arose from a rethinking 
of the politics of development, to favor greater participation for its 
own good and to reorganize the power relations between expert and 
beneficiary (Chambers 1997). Yet as this was occurring under the 
umbrella of neo-liberal restructuring of governance, participation was 
appropriated into measures to provide technically efficient policing 
practices through which the relationship between state, civil society 
and the market could be recast (Cooke and Kothari 2001). As with 
any aspect of development, participation and forms of governance 
remain highly contested and politicized (Hickey and Mohan 2004; 
Watts, this volume). 
The concept of social capital - that is, embedded meaningful forms 
of social organization and networks - has become widely used in 
the development field, especially by economists and neo-liberal 
development policy-makers (Fine 2001b). Social capital appears to 
offer a linking concept, a concept around which conversations can 
occur between economists, political scientists, and anthropologists 
(Bebbington 2002; Watts 2002). Social capital models aim for 
economic development via the encouragement of a robust civil 
society and social trust. Although referring primarily to social 
relations, social capital is at times equated with culture as if they 
were two sides of the same coin. Culture, in the words of a 
development economist, comprises "all dimensions of social capital 
in society, underlying its basic components" (Kliksberg 1999: 88). 
By coming close to a culturalist explanation, these frameworks risk 
treating social capital as a "black box" by celebrating visible 
elements of the sociocultural without examining the power relations, 
silences and exclusions upon which they are erected (Radcliffe 
2004). In this context, social capital risks being treated as separate 
from the political, racial, and contested social relations that 
contextualize it, just as in the broader concept of culture from which 
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it gains so much power. Where social capital is tied much more 
closely to the notion of organizational cultures, it may offer a greater 
insight into the types of social relationships that underpin successful 
development (Staber 2003). The conversation initiated by social 
capital would be usefully directed towards the analysis of class, 
gender, and racial-ethnic relations that underpin social networks and 
forms of inequality. The challenge is to maintain this conversation 
around culturally meaningful interactions embedded in complex 
articulations of politics, power, race, and global-local ties (Porter and 
Lyon, this volume; Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). 
Culture and development in context: an introduction 
to the chapters 
Drawing on the above discussion about development and culture (and 
its contributing debates), the chapters in this volume examine the 
dynamics of socioeconomic change and development projects in a 
number of different contexts around the world. The chapters address 
the question of how specific development projects and broader 
socioeconomic processes engage the diverse applications of ( diverse 
notions of) culture, while identifying processes that might provide 
insights into where and when culture is associated with beneficial 
development outcomes. Development's cultures are not at a remove 
from the market and the state, but constructed at the interface 
between political economies and racial formations, in relation to a 
combination of global, "Western," national, and local agendas. 
Understanding culture and development thus necessitates the analysis 
of the specific content of development's cultures that prevail at a 
particular time and place. Culture has to be situated firmly within an 
analysis of development's grids of power where hierarchies between 
world regions, races, cultures, and modernity/tradition act to 
differentiate social actors. Culture has always been present in 
development, but has been defined, managed, and fought over in 
diverse ways at different times and in different spaces. Accordingly, 
development's cultures are defined and negotiated in a multicultural 
field, constructed in the unequal interactions between contingently 
defined groups (Mitchell, D. 2000). Development is intrinsically a 
field of social interaction between multiple conceptions of culture, 
tradition and modernity. 
The chapters that follow show how different understandings 
of "culture" have been taken on board in development thinking in 
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specific contexts and development projects. In addition to describing 
the way that culture is conceptualized in each case, the chapters 
analyze what difference the new "paradigm" of culture and 
development - in all its regional and local varieties - makes on 
the ground. Questioning the assumption that culture is a simple or 
singular factor to be "added in" to development thinking, the 
chapters examine the ways in which culture and development 
thinking plays out in relations of power, inequality and strategic 
essentialism while having uneven impacts on groups' livelihoods and 
empowerment. By means of theoretically grounded and substantively 
detailed accounts, the chapters provide a critical examination of the 
complexities and unintended consequences of taking culture seriously 
in development. They highlight the ways in which culture comes 
together with development across multiple scales and in relation to 
diverse actors, institutions, and imaginaries of desirability. 
Michael Watts' chapter provides an overview of development's 
history since 1945, and how culture has played a constitutive role 
in development changing over time with shifting development 
paradigms and varying expectations about the cultural economies 
of developing societies. Development theory has always borne the 
traces of culture and a theory of the modem. Postcolonial theory 
and the new historicist studies of development theory have been 
especially attentive to such cultural traces, to what Charles Taylor 
calls a cultural theory of the modem. After modernization theory's 
assumption of cultural convergence to culturalist accounts, current 
approaches to cultural development are explored in terms of how 
they reframe three key arenas of development: the state, the market, 
and civil society. Drawing on a cultural theory of the state, the 
market, and civil society, Michael Watts focuses specifically on the 
ways that concepts of community and scarcity underlie much of 
the debate around cultural development today. 
Elizabeth E. Watson's chapter departs from examples of projects on 
the ground in Ethiopia where the cultural "resource" of existing 
sociocultural relations, authority, and meanings has recently been 
reinserted into development thinking and practice. Arguing that 
participation paradigms draw on specific understandings of culture, 
Watson shows how, in the case of natural resource management 
projects in Ethiopia, "traditional" institutions have been placed at 
recent projects to establish management of people, places, and 
resources. The chapter carefully traces the changes in development 
thinking that lead to these projects, and then evaluates the ways 
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in which the projects work out on the ground in the context of a 
post-conflict society living with a new constitution and urgent 
environmental issues. 
Indigenous people in Latin America have long been perceived by 
their co-nationals and external observers as having distinctive 
cultures, yet due to their political and sociocultural marginalization 
from national development processes in the region, these cultures 
have often been treated as historic relics that would disappear with 
modernity. Sarah A. Radcliffe and Nina Laurie's chapter shows how, 
by contrast, recent development thinking in the Andean countries has 
begun to treat indigenous cultures as an asset rather than a burden, 
responding to indigenous political mobilization and changing patterns 
of state rule. However, indigenous empowerment and livelihoods 
are not guaranteed by recent policy, in part due to the discursive 
and practical restrictions placed on indigenous places, activities, and 
relationships with other places and groups. 
Paradigms of Andean indigenous development rely heavily on the 
assumption that Indian groups have high levels of social capital but 
lack other forms of capital. Two chapters here engage critically with 
the concept of social capital, which has underpinned several culture 
and development policy initiatives and development thinking in 
many areas of the global South. Jan Nederveen Pieterse's chapter 
asks how social capital relates to cultural difference, questioning 
the standard account of social capital as being culturally bounded. 
He furthermore unpacks the notion of "ethnic economy," thereby 
furthering the anthropological deconstruction of the concepts of 
culture and race (see above). By unpacking these notions, he comes 
to focus on the cultural practices and cultural economies by which 
immigrant enterprises become established, not least by working 
cross-culturally whereby "immigrant economies are embedded within 
intercultural economies" (p. 141 ). He ends this chapter with policy 
considerations, stressing the importance of intercultural 
communication, and access to capital of various kinds. 
Also furthering our understanding of the cultural implications of 
social relations is Gina Porter and Fergus Lyon's chapter. Drawing 
on extensive fieldwork with a variety of development initiatives in 
Ghana, Porter and Lyon explore the role of civil society groups 
in development and critically engage with the development studies 
literature on social capital. While the latter emphasizes the virtues 
of citizen groups (in generating trust and empowerment), local 
development practitioners highlight the role of culturally defined 
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sanctions and shame in maintaining group cohesion. The chapter 
goes to the heart of recent debates about the role of civil society 
institutions in the delivery of development. Arguing that recent 
World Bank interpretations of social capital equate it with group 
cooperation, the chapter details two grassroots projects where this 
interpretation of social capital has guided development practice. The 
chapter concludes that beyond the identification of social capital as 
"groups," development policy has not grappled with the historically 
and geographically nuanced relationships in society that give rise 
to different degrees of cooperation and development success. 
The collection's focus then shifts to places outside the global South, 
away from the areas predominantly associated with development 
concerns and policy interventions. Yet as this introduction highlights, 
the debates around capitalist market development and the experiences 
of East Asian cultural economies have blurred the boundaries 
between development and other disciplines. The musicians described 
by Michelle Bigenho work to bring Bolivian music to Japanese 
school children, exemplifying the kinds of culturally distinctive 
services and products mentioned in Sarah Radcliffe's and Nina 
Laurie's discussion of Andean indigenous development. What 
Bigenho makes clear, however, is how Japanese expectations 
of authentic Bolivian culture are produced and reproduced in a 
multiethnic and multicultural interaction (which includes Bigenho 
herself playing fiddle). Under late capitalism's culturalization of 
economic life, the music group meshes well with a Japanese cultural 
economy that values the Bolivians' flexible acceptance of lengthy 
touring contracts, multiple skills, and the ability to embody cultural 
difference. Critiquing celebratory accounts of cultural entrepreneurs, 
she shows how the labor involved in music performances involves a 
lot of hard work that permits small gains in living standards "back 
home" and no simple access to global stardom: 
In the context of policy promoting Silicon Valley-like clusters of 
dynamic firms, the example of the Mormon region in Utah, in the 
United States, offers a prime location from which to explore in depth 
the impacts that regional economy have on the dynamism of 
capitalist economic sectors. In his chapter, Al James unpacks the 
notion of cultural economy by exploring how and in which practices 
regional culture conditions firms' innovative behavior and economic 
performance. By exploring the interactions and overlaps between 
regional, firms', and industries' cultures, James demonstrates how 
Mormon regional culture both enables and constrains innovation. 
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Notes -
The last substantive chapter returns to the majority world, 
specifically to South Africa, where cultural development must be 
seen in the context of post-apartheid settlements and tensions. 
In South African majority rule, various efforts to revalue specific 
cultural practices have been made. For example, legislation to 
recognize the skills of around 200,000 traditional healers or sangoma 
has been introduced (Diaz 2005). Cheryl McEwan's chapter 
addresses how the memories of apartheid violence are being 
reworked culturally by women's embroidery, in order to claim a new 
voice in development decision-making and practices. In situations 
where civil war and extended periods of violence against subsections 
of populations have destroyed social patterns and disrupted cultural 
meanings, culture has been pinpointed as a potential bridging activity 
across tense social divides. Having the necessary security and peace 
to undertake a cycle of ritual events indicates the end of hostilities in 
a civil war, yet in many cases the meanings around rituals will have 
been transformed by experiences of violence and disruption. 
In the context of rising global inequalities and the pervasiveness of 
culturalist international politics that pit "the West" against "Islam," 
culture represents a urgent arena through which development issues 
and the geopolitics of development assistance can be considered. 
While culture is far from being a panacea, the insights to be gained 
by taking it seriously in development thinking and practice offer new 
horizons for the world's culturally and materially disempowered 
people. 
Mozambique and Peru were early adopters ofUNESCO's recommendations, 
both being countries with recent histories of destructive civil strife and where 
particular policy attention was awarded to social cohesion and poverty 
reduction (Davis 1999). In Mozambique, bounded (ethnic) cultures were 
the basis of post-conflict cohesion building on what was assumed to be a pre-
existing organizational culture (see Black and Watson 2006). In Peru, 
development had to address indigenous peoples' historic marginalization in 
racist rural development (compare Radcliffe and Laurie, this volume). 
2 The persistence of culturalist explanations in everyday life rests upon precisely 
this quality. Hence, in the case studies that follow, authors may identify 
culturalist explanations among development actors on the ground yet their 
own understanding of the concept is quite different. 
3 This perspective has not disappeared; see Kuran, who argues "cultural barriers 
to material growth, where they exist, are generally neither unalterable nor 
insurmountable" (2004: 120). 
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4 Compared with accounts of development that downplay the hierarchies of 
multiracial society, Third World feminism addresses race-ethnicity and gender 
as key dimensions of social difference, shaping development outcomes through 
their interaction (Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991; Alexander and Mohanty 
1997; Chua, Bhavnani, and Foran 2000). Challenging the racial and cultural 
hierarchies that marginalize women and ethnic-racial populations involves a 
critique of the power relations in international development and how they play 
out at national and local levels, as well as a recognition of how these relations 
are constructed in multiethnic and multiracial settings (Bhavnani, Foran, and 
Kurian 2003). 
5 By treating culture and economy as separate, the concept of cultural 
embeddedness implies that inunanent economic laws are played out in the 
cultural realm, or that culture is mobilized for economic gain (Amin and 
Thrift 2004: xiv). 
~ Culture, development, and 
global neo-liberalism 
Michael Watts 
[L]arge related bodies of thought appear, at first like distant riders 
stirring up modest dust clouds, who, when they arrive, reproach one 
for his slowness in recognizing their numbers, strength and vitality. 
(Glacken 1967: xi) 
In every culture there is something that works, and the thing is to find 
out is what that is. Is it the headman, the religious leader, community 
pressure, or the police? Find out what it is and use it. 
(USAID operative, Cairo, 1995, quoted in 
Elyachar 2002: 509) 
How did it come to pass? The notion - captured perfectly by the 
USAID trainer offering micro-entrepreneurial counsel to Egyptian 
NGOs - that culture is the indispensable stuff of development. The 
museum of culture is to be ransacked by the development 
practitioner (and by implication the development theorist) in search 
of things that "work." In the name of development, culture must 
be instrumentalized - what we might more properly call the 
"economization of culture." At stake is yet one more expression 
of the colonization of the life world by the deadly solicitations of 
the market. In Elyachar' s example, the headman becomes the 
enforcement mechanism for Grameen banks Egyptian-style. The 
pursuit of some cultural form capable of being put to work presumes, 
however, another aspect of the complicated dialectics of economy 
and culture. Namely, the idea that economic practices are necessarily 
culturally "embedded"; the economic is represented ( or materialized) 
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through the symbolic (what we might gloss as the "culturalization of 
the economy"). 1 Here economic determination is reversed; markets 
cannot function without culture. The dull discipline of the market 
requires its own cultural conditions of existence: to operate, in other 
words, the market requires trust, networks, norms and values, and 
various institutional prerequisites including law. 
How is it, then, that the Berlin Wall separating economy and culture 
has collapsed - or at the very least, the boundaries between them 
are ever more blurred and porous? Lash and Urry put it this way: 
"the economic and the symbolic are ever-more interlaced and 
interarticulated ... the economy is increasingly culturally inflected 
and culture is more and more economically inflected" (1994: 64; 
compare James, this volume). These inflections are apparently as 
compelling for the development establishment - the US Agency for 
International Development and, as we shall see, the World Bank -
as they are for the purveyors of contemporary social theory. And 
who were culture's "distant riders" (to invoke Clarence Glacken's 
magnificent tum of phrase) who battered down the walls and 
punctured the boundaries, the horsemen whose numbers, strength, 
and vitality now surprise us? These are the questions I should 
like to briefly reflect upon in this chapter. 
To recognize the centrality of culture in the world of development at 
this moment - in the realm of ideas and institutions, that is to say as 
system and practice - is, of course, to pose a paradox of sorts. Let 
us recall that the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl neo-liberal agenda was 
already in high gear by 1985 and the IMP-Wall Street-Treasury 
complex had succeeded, to a remarkable degree, in not only 
discrediting the old Keynesian doctrines but in delegitimizing 
anything that might inhibit the free movement of capital. "Getting 
the prices right," global competitiveness, the new realism, shock-
therapy, freedom through trade, "there is no alternative": these 
were the heady prescriptions screamed by the multilateral circus 
barkers from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
What they celebrated was not simply the prospect of a "neo-liberal 
grand slam" (the language is taken from Perry Anderson [2000]), but 
more profoundly a new kind of universalism - an epistemological 
counter-revolution - at the very moment that postmodernism claimed 
master-narratives to be dead. The laws of economics, said then 
Clinton Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, are "like the laws 
of engineering"; there is only one set and "they work everywhere." 
So why has the rising tide of neo-liberal orthodoxy brought with it 
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a flotilla of cultural imperatives? Even within the heart of the World 
Bank there are now voices for whom development is "getting 
the social relations right" (Woolcock cited in Harriss 2002: 81). The 
paradox is that the cold, universal calculus of free-markets - the 
( universal) instrumental logic of mean and ends (Sayer 1997: 17) -
at its moment of triumph has spawned a cultural counter-revolution: 
a widely held recognition that the market economy is no less a site 
of culture than the household or the mosque. The "monologic" of 
the economy can never escape the "dialogic" of culture. 
None of this is to suggest that the hard-nosed economists in the 
structural adjustment division of the World Bank are now fully 
immersed in Jacques Derrida (but there are certainly program and 
operations officers who are sufficiently self-reflexive to incorporate 
the latest ethnographies of development into their arsenal [ see 
Li 2005]). Culturalist thinking, nevertheless, has scaled the walls of 
the most orthodox of development institutions.2 And it has done 
so against a backdrop of momentous - and intuitively rather 
inhospitable - change in the policy climate (Duggan 2003). To have 
proposed in 1945 the sort of conservative revolution we have 
witnessed over the last two decades - predicated as it is upon appeals 
to science and reason to endorse the radical application of the laws 
of the market - would have been the quickest way to the mad house 
(Giroux 2004). Yet this passive revolution from above - made in the 
name of a ruthless American hegemony - has rekindled the fire 
of culture. One only need think of three powerful bastions of 
development convention: the transnational corporation (TNC), the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. 
TNCs and corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Corporate culture - the "ensemble of material practices, social 
relations, and ways of thinking" (Schoenberger 2002: 378) within a 
corporation - is as much a part of the business world as it is an 
academic object of scrutiny. But there is another cultural arena in 
which the conduct of TNCs has generated an entirely new policy 
arena: corporate social responsibility ( or corporate citizenship) 
(Hopkins 1999; Smith 2003; Kotler and Lee 2004). The World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR as: 
"the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality 
of life of its workers ... as well as the local community and society 
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at large" (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
2005). At one level CSR is nothing more than good business sense, 
endorsing corporate policies that any company should have in place 
(not lying to employees, not paying bribes, conforming with national 
labor legislation, and so on). But in its most ambitious form CSR 
attempts to make binding commitments upon companies to ethical 
investment and to embed corporate activities - as a locus of 
enormous non-state power - more fully in the architecture of the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the UN Codes on Conduct for Law Enforcement 
and basic principles on the Use of Force and Firearms. Modem 
CSR was born during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio as an explicit 
endorsement of voluntary approaches rather than mandatory 
regulation. What moved CSR forward in the 1990s was a 
combination of corporate disasters (Shell and the Ogoni, for example 
[Okonta and Douglas 2001)) and the growing role of the human 
rights advocacy network. In North America it was the anti-sweatshop 
movement, the anti-dams movement, and efforts to make the 
extractive sector more transparent and accountable (the case of 
"blood diamonds" is a key case) that proved to be the catalysts for 
the proliferation of corporate codes of conduct. Virtually all major 
TNCs, for example, now have some code of conduct, and have 
revamped (on paper at least) their approaches to community 
development, environmental responsibility, labor relations, and 
corporate conduct (Watts 2005). Much of this remains voluntary 
and what one might call "para-legal" (the codes often have limited 
enforcement). Nevertheless, the rise of CSR has moved hand in 
hand with new corporate development initiatives operating under 
its banner. Community development - "sustainable community 
development" is the current moniker - places corporations in 
the business of doing development, working with NGOs and 
development agencies, and hiring rafts of anthropologists 
and development practitioners. It is not so much that TNCs ( or 
development institutions for that matter) have their own culture but 
rather a parallel privatization of development through community 
initiatives that has thrust TNCs into the complex territory between 
economy and culture (Prahalad and Porter 2003; Sullivan 2003). 
Corporate practice depends upon - and aspires to build ( or deepen) 
- those sociocultural relations that constitute community. One can, 
of course, be critical or suspicious of its CSR's efficacy but nobody 
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should mistake the extent to which corporations are in the business 
of making and breaking culture as a way of making development 
good for shareholders. 
UNDP, democracy, and human rights 
One of the striking new developments within the world of 
multilateral developments institutions is the extent to which we have 
witnessed, over the better part of 20 years, two rather different 
structures of knowledge for discussing, measuring, and assessing 
development. One is the World Bank's annual compendium (the 
World Development Report) of statistical data typically organized 
around a policy theme - the environment, service provision, 
inequality. The production of these reports is complex and 
multifaceted, and often contested as the infamous ( and public) 
debate over the 2000 Attacking Poverty report revealed. But in 
general it is clear that the Bank privileges national accounts data 
and a raft of conventional economic measures (GNP, GDP, and so 
on). The measures (World Bank Indicators) are typically deployed 
in normative terms to serve the interests of a particular vision of 
development in which free markets and economic growth figure 
centrally. The forms of developmental classification are 
conventionally around income (low, middle, high, and so on). None 
of this is to suggest that the measures and concepts are static - the 
introduction of purchasing power parity is a case in point - or that 
getting the prices right always crowds out other concerns like 
governance or environment, but the commitment to the neo-liberal 
model is surely incontestable. The UNDP Human Development 
Report conversely has emerged as a sort of ideological and 
conceptual counterweight to the Bank's annual inventory. Its central 
index is not GDP per capita but the Human Development Index and 
the Human Poverty Index - both of which depend upon rather 
different measures beyond income or market-valuated output. Here 
it is longevity, knowledge, standards of living, and social exclusion 
that matter. The rankings that are of consequence are the anomalies 
between expected development achievements based on GDP and 
actual human development. 
If the theoreticians and stenographers of the Bank are the partisans of 
the neo-liberal counter-revolution, the UNDP, one might say, has 
been captured by Amartya Sen (1999), the women's movement, and 
the NGO world. UNDP highlights entitlements, capabilities, and 
freedoms as its preferred building blocks; its concerns are deepening 
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global inequality, the relations between human rights and 
development, the failures of markets, the need to build safety nets 
( consolidating and deepening entitlements) through empowerment 
and power mobilization. Nowhere in the Bank compendium is one 
likely to see - as is the case in the Human Development Report -
tables depicting who owns the media, or the relations between 
democracy and equity, whose voice counts at the World Bank and 
the IMF, corporate influence on policy, and the relations between 
gender and legal process. The UNDP's ideological vision is in no 
simple sense Left; it is perhaps Polanyian. The notion that left to its 
own devices unregulated markets are massively corrosive and their 
tendency to "disembed" (to commodify all aspects of social life) will 
always throw up institutions and movements to protect society from 
its ravages (Polanyi 1944, 1945; Burawoy 2003). My point is that 
UNDP represents one enormously influential trend whose vision of 
development - and means for measuring it achievements and failings 
- are culturally inflected. 3 This is true in at least two senses. First, is 
that development is always culturally constituted (UNDP's admirable 
commitment to minority rights, gender justice are cases in point). 
And second, what the twin UNDP-World Bank programs represent 
are not just different ideas but a struggle between the ways in 
which the world of development practitioners is shaped by particular 
systems of knowledge. One can do no better than quote cultural 
anthropologist James Ferguson from his ethnography of an African 
development project: "what [development bureaucrats] do and do not 
do is a product not only of the intense interests of various nations, 
classes and international agencies, but also of the working out of ... 
[a] complex structure of knowledge" (1994: 18). Development as a 
structure of knowledge is, broadly construed, a cultural question 
- or perhaps one should say a cultural achievement ( or a form 
of hegemony). 
The World Bank and social capital 
What began as a meditation on Italian democracy and on the decline 
of the American bowling club (Putnam, 1993; 2000) now has its own 
glossy location on the World Bank website. The meteoric rise after 
1995 - the "big bang" as Harriss calls it (2002: 75) - of social 
capital as the "missing link" of development is one of the most 
striking aspects of contemporary development theory and practice. 
Two books (Fine 2001b; Harriss 2002) have already appeared 
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documenting its institutionalization within the World Bank, and its 
ability to travel far and wide within conventional development 
practice. Social capital should be seen as the twin sister of another 
development discourse (also recent in provenance and now an 
important part of what is called the "post-Washington Consensus"), 
namely governance. Both are products of the rise of civil society, 
especially in the wake of 1989, as a development arena and of the 
growing recognition that corrupt and unaccountable states could 
compromise the purported benefits of "emerging markets." The story 
of social capital is how a notion with a long history within the 
academy during the twentieth century ( and exhibiting more or less 
radical iterations), and fed by strong communitarian currents in 
contemporary philosophy, found a receptive audience within the 
World Bank. which in tum lent its authority and legitimacy to an 
idea - "getting the social relations right" - that is now nothing less 
than a small-scale research industry. For some entrepreneurs within 
the Bank, social capital was a Trojan horse; it represented an 
opening, a way of sneaking in a challenge to a fundamentalist 
commitment to markets as an end in themselves (without a 
recognition that markets do not automatically give rise to the "right" 
institutions and getting markets to work better requires something 
more than price setting). Social capital, on this account, attempts to 
"socialize" the economists: "The broad and most encompassing view 
of social capital includes the social and political environment that 
shapes social structure and enables norms to develop" (http//www. 
worldbank.org). 
In the Bank's lexicon, social capital can "bond," "bridge," and 
"link." Norms, networks, trust, forms of association ... this is the 
raw material of social capital which, it turns out, is key is keeping 
government honest, to making institutions work, in securing access 
to markets. Social capital confirms "a growing body of evidence 
that incorporating the poor into the design and implementation of 
... projects" (World Bank cited in Harriss 2002: 94). In tum, social 
capital - networks, associations, norms, and values - must be 
identified, used, invested in, and enabled. There are perfectly good 
reasons for assuming that the critical tradition within the genealogy 
of social capital - the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1980) or the research 
of Peter Evans (1996) to take two examples - has been evacuated or 
lost as it is has been "domesticated" within the Bank. What is lost 
sight of is the wider process of democratization within systems of 
structured inequality and power that determine whether social capital 
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and community development is anything more than another 
palliative, another "anti-politics machine" (compare Porter and Lyon, 
this volume). But social capital turns, nevertheless, on a cultural 
breaching of the wall that surrounds the economy. Culture again 
raises its head. Norms, values, associations: we may differ as regards 
their capacities in the way the Bank envisages their deployment. 
But their status as culture is unassailable. 
* 
These three brief illustrations are drawn from what we might call the 
bastions of orthodox development practice. If we turn instead to the 
enormous ocean of non-profits, social movements, and civic groups 
operating under the banner of Port Alegre - including the so-called 
"movement of movements" (Mertes 2003), and the motley 
transnational community of activists, academics, and public 
intellectuals that collectively constitute the "post-development" or 
"alternatives to development" school (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; 
N ederveen Pieterse 2001 b) - then the shift away from a crude 
economism is clearly complete. Two geographers - Dennis Cosgrove 
and Peter Jackson - penned something like a manifesto for cultural 
geography in the mid-1980s in which culture was no longer residual, 
it was the "very medium through which change is experienced, 
contested and constituted" (1987: 99). From the vantage point of 
the new millennium, there is nothing here that would surprise 
any development specialist. Culture, one might say, has become 
"normalized" within large swaths of development discourse. So how 
did culture emerge in these ways, how and why did it envelop 
development and with what consequences? 
One must immediately note, of course, that there is an important 
sense in which development has always - and sometimes self-
consciously - been construed in cultural terms. The very notion of 
ending poverty was a product of the late eighteenth century (Stedman 
Jones 2004) - the confluence of scientific progress, the Revolution in 
France, and the promise of the new international economy - and it 
was debated ( and ultimately defeated) in cultural terms. The moment 
at which such a notion was extended to the non-West in the 1890s as 
part of a colonial project - what Cowen and Shenton (1997) call 
"trusteeship" - was wrapped up with the disenchantment associated 
with capitalist destruction (it emerged, in sum, from the 
contradictions of modernity). What was on offer then - and again in 
Truman's 1949 invocation' of "a program of development ... based 
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on democratic fair dealing," or the postcolonial energies unleashed 
at the Bandung Conference - was a sort of utopian vision based, as 
Alexander Gerschenkron once noted, on the need for a "New Deal of 
the emotions" (cited in Watts 2000). If culture was present, so to say, 
at development's inception, it has retained its historical appeal even 
in the face of the high economism of development theory. Colonial 
development, after all, was in large measure a cultural project. The 
British and French in their African colonies governed through culture 
("decentralized despotism," as Mamdani 1996 calls it), they fretted 
over the "tribal" problem and the social disintegrative effects of 
urbanization, they rooted improvement in custom and tradition, and 
sometimes even came to value local peasant knowledge and practice. 
Even within the "age of modem development" in the wake 
of World War II, culture was not overrun by the economists and 
engineers armed with slide rules and talk of savings rates and 
capital accumulation. Modernization theory in the 1950s was self-
consciously cultural. Not simply because its founding text -
Rostow's non-communist manifesto -was an unashamed projection 
of the West as a global norm, but because its conceptual tool kit 
latched on to culture as measure of backwardness: how else to 
explain the "culture of poverty," the mountains of paper devoted to 
explicating peasant irrationalities, and the phalanxes of consultants 
put to the task of inculcating "need achievement" among the natives 
(see Cooper 2005)? And not least, the first generation of postcolonial 
nationalists sought to indigenize development for their own 
purposes, tailor-made for local conditions: Nyerere's ujamaa rooted 
in African traditions, Nehruvian socialism, socialism with "Chinese 
characteristics," to say nothing of the cultism of Mbutu or Sun 
Yat Sen. 
What I am calling the "cultural revolution" in development - and 
what has elsewhere been called the "cultural tum" in the social 
sciences (Jameson 1998) - marks something more than a sort of 
latent recognition of symbolism, meaning, and ideas (which is to say 
culture showed up in development theory as modernity's other: 
tradition). One way to grasp this shift is to start with the recognition 
that development theory and practice turns on discursive - by which 
I mean systems of meaning and practice - and normative battles over 
the weighting of states, markets, and civil society in the design of 
human improvement. The new President of the World Bank (Paul 
Wolfowitz), Amartya Sen, and the leaders of MST in Brazil 
represent quite different positions with regard to, say, the centrality 
of free markets or state regulation in development. If each leg of this 
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tripod - crudely put polity, economy, and society- constitutes 
the stuff of development theory and practice, then the power of the 
cultural revolution is reflected in the extent to which the meanings 
of each of these three spheres has been "culturalized." 
Culturalization is something more than Sewell's (1999) observation 
that in the last three decades or so culture has emerged as an 
autonomous realm; it is that the economy (to take one example) has 
been construed in cultural terms (the notion, with which I began, that 
the economy-culture boundary has been punctured). But the same 
holds for the state - the rise of cultural politics, of the politics of 
recognition is a case in point - and associational life. One measure 
of this culturalization is the fact that each realm has been explored 
ethnographically (see Mitchell, T. 2000; Hansen and Stepputat 2001) 
- the methodological hallmark of cultural study; another would be 
the extent to which (and I shall return to this point) development is 
seen now as a form of modernity ( and often as a catastrophically 
failed modernity). There is no simple way in which polity, economy, 
and society are rendered in cultural terms. Crang (1997) properly 
notes that the economy-culture binary has been (re)read as: an 
economic determination of culture, an economic operation to 
culture, an economic colonization of culture, an embedding of the 
economic in the cultural, a representation of the economic through 
the cultural, or a cultural materialization of the economic. What 
matters, however, is that the cultural turn has indisputably colored -
colonized might be a better term - all the human sciences. 
Culture in development 
To posit a cultural revolution begs the question of what exactly it is 
that has colonized development discourse and practice. Definitions 
are in order but one runs up immediately against a word of 
formidable complexity. It has been said, with good reason, that 
nature and culture are perhaps the two most complex words in the 
English language. They carry, as Raymond Williams (1976), once 
said, an enormous amount of human history. Taken together the two 
words are often assumed to be opposites - the material and the ideal, 
the biological and the semiotic, a realm of law and a world of 
contingency - but on closer examination their polarities are tangled, 
difficult, and intractable. As Terry Eagleton puts is, culture inherits 
the imposing mantle of religious authority but also has "uneasy 
affinities with occupation and invasion" (Eagleton 2000: 2). Culture 
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is obviously not reducible to nature, but their referents are not stable 
either. They are shifty, tangled, and mixed up; antinomies seem to 
proliferate. Culture may be nature's other but there is much traffic, a 
veritable information highway, between them. Culture is built out 
of the "ceaseless traffic with nature which we call labor" (Eagleton 
2000: 4; see also Bigenho, this volume). 
How might we grasp culture's historical semantics and its relation to 
contemporary development? Raymond Williams (1976) has charted 
three major modem senses of the term culture: as utopian critique, 
as a way of life, and as artistic creation. The first must be situated 
against the horrors of industrial capitalism, as a sort of anti-capitalist 
impulse. The word first comes to mean civility and later civilization 
(understood as progress), but around the tum of the nineteenth 
century the descriptive and normative aspects of the word, as 
Eagleton says, "fly apart" (2000: 10). Civilization appears 
increasingly debased, predatory, and culture appears as a response 
to "radical and painful change" (Williams 1993: 60). The second 
shift marks culture as a way of life and is implicitly a critique on the 
universalism of the Enlightenment. Culture is rendered multiple to 
encompass, for example, the Romantic anti-colonial desire to reclaim 
the exotic and the traditional in the face of industrial triumphalism. 
Cultures are organic and rooted and could furnish, in the hands of 
Johann Herder or Edmund Burke, a radical critique of Eurocentrism 
or the notion of industrial capitalism as universal civilization. And 
third, Williams charts culture as a gradual specialization to the 
arts whether broadly construed as intellectual pursuits or science, 
or more narrowly confined to literature and the imaginative arts. 
Culture figures here, above all else, as refinement, impartiality, and 
"agreeable manners and an open mind" (Eagleton 2000: 180). 
In Williams' language, culture is a "binding" word which sutures 
these differing activities and their interpretation, and is also what he 
calls an "indicative" word appearing in specific forms or lineages of 
thought (for example, nationalism or racism). These complex and 
shifting modem meanings cannot be identified, so to speak, in 
advance; rather they are philosophical and historical texts, always 
deployed in particular ways, and inextricably bound up with the 
problems they are being used to discuss. 
Here lies culture's complexity, its perplexing doubleness; it is "both 
synonymous with the mainstream of western civilization and 
antithetical to it" (Young 1995: 53), and "both material reality and 
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lived experience" (Eagleton 2000: 36). Culture's polysemic qualities 
are perfectly captured in a new geography handbook (Anderson, 
Domosh, Pile, and Thrift 2002): culture, the authors point out, can be 
a distribution of things, a way of life, a universe of meaning, a way 
of doing, and a field of power. The multiple meanings of culture are 
part of its appeal and durability, and its ability to travel into 
development. Culture can and does mean differing things to differing 
constituencies. 
So how might we trace the lineages of culture in relation to 
development, at least since the Cold War, to identify meanings that 
have particular traction in the age of development? This is an 
enormously difficult question - compounded by the fact that it is 
discursive, operating at the level of both ideas and texts (theories, 
policy statements) and practices (the institutional use of cultural 
ideas). All that I am able to do here is to sketch some broad ideas. A 
fundamental starting point has to be the sociology of knowledge, and 
more precisely a wide ranging "cultural turn" in the human sciences 
over the last 30 years or so (Jameson 1998; Bonnell and Hunt 1999). 
There is no simple account of this turn ( a phenomenon largely of the 
academies of the trans-Atlantic ). Cultural studies in Britain -
associated with Marxist critics (Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall) 
and social historians (Edward Thompson) in the 1950s - struggled 
with the limits of Marxist economism and the ways in which the 
concept of class could be retained through notions of "experience," 
"structures of feelings," and "cultures of class" (Nelson and 
Grossberg 1988). In the United States, the birth of the turn is 
typically traced to Hayden White's Metahistory and Clifford Geertz's 
The Interpretation of Cultures both published in 1973; in France to 
Pierre Bourdieu (Outline of a Theory of Practice) and Michel 
Foucault (Discipline and Punish) and their canonical work on 
cultural capital and governmentality published in the late 1970s. The 
problems and questions to which culture was put in these differing 
national settings - and the tool kit developed in response to them -
was obviously not of a piece: cultural capital here, thick description 
there; discourse and habitus in one locale, semiotic texts and poetic 
acts in another. What one can say, I think, is that what was at stake 
was first, a questioning of the social ( as a category and as a style of 
explanation), and second, a concern with language and interpretation 
as the means by which social categories came into being. 
William Sewell has captured perfectly the broad outlines of what 
the cultural turn produced: 
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[C]ulture should be understood as a dialectic is of system and practice, 
as a dimension of social life autonomous from other such dimensions 
both in its logic and in its spatial configuration, and as a system of 
symbols possessing a real but thin coherence that is continually put at 
risk through practice and therefore subject to transformation. 
(1999: 52) 
The effect was to question the established anthropological sense of 
culture as consistent, integrated, consensual, coherent, resistant to 
change, and bounded. Rather as worlds of meanings, cultures were 
unstable, contradictory, loosely integrated, porous, and contested. 
I think that there are two especially significant ways in which this 
constellation of ideas about culture provided a framework for 
"culturalizing" politics, economy and society, taken from Crang 
(1997) and Sewell (1999). The first is culture understood as the 
meaningful mapping of the world (worlds of meaning or social 
imaginaries) and the positionings of culture bearers within it. It 
speaks to identity, meaning, and signification as forms of practice. In 
the second, culture turns more on difference than identity, that is to 
say, the ways in which mappings can produce distinctive social 
groups and the institutions that are central to their constitution and 
reproduction (recognizing that the old sense of cultures as bounded, 
coherent social units must be abandoned). Inevitably these two broad 
articulations overlap and intersect in important ways. Both contributed 
to the idea that the world might no longer be neatly cut up into 
bounded societies with their own cultures yet retaining a powerful 
sense in which, as Sewell noted, there are particular consistencies in 
the ways in which, in particular places and times, worlds of meaning 
"hang together." I want to turn to each of these broad meanings -
which I shall gloss as social imaginary and community - insofar as 
they help frame the cultural turn in development. 
Culture as [developmental] community 
[Community] is not primarily a geographic space, or social space, a 
sociological space or a space of services, although it may attach itself 
to any or all such spatialization. It is a moral field binding persons into 
durable relations. It is a space of emotional relationships through 
which individual identities are constructed through bonds to micro-
cultures of values and meanings ... in the institution of the 
community a sector is brought into existence whose vectors and forces 
can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programs and techniques 
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and harness active practices of self-management and identity 
construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances. 
(Rose 1999: 172-6) 
Deployed in the English language for at least 500 years, 
community has carried a range of senses denoting actual groups 
(for example, commoners) and connoting specific qualities of social 
relationship (as in communitas). The complexity of community 
therefore relates to the difficult interaction between two historical 
tendencies: 
[On] the one hand the sense of direct common concerns; on the other 
the materialization of various forms of common organization, which 
may or may not adequately express this ... Community can be the 
warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of relationships, 
or the warmly persuasive word to describe an alternative set of 
relationships. What is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other 
terms of social organization ... it never seems to be used unfavorably, 
and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term. 
(Williams 1973: 76) 
Community spoke to membership and identity in which interests, 
property, and shared meanings were at issue. There were signs, 
however, from the seventeenth century of a sort of rupture in its 
usage - which was to become especially important with the advent 
of capitalist industrialization - in which community was felt to be 
more immediate than society. By the nineteenth century, of course, 
community was invoked as a way of theorizing modernity itself ( and 
here is, as we shall see, a key connection to the idea of culture as a 
social imaginary). Community - and its sister concepts of tradition 
and custom - stood in sharp contrast to the more abstract, 
instrumental, individuated, and formal properties of state or society 
in the modem sense. A comparable shift in usage, which has 
occurred in the twentieth century, was also noted by Williams in 
which community came to be invoked as a way of discussing a 
particular sort or style of politics distinct from the formal repertoires 
of national and local politics. Here the reference is direct action, 
direct community participation, and organization embracing, 
typically, a populist notion of working with and for "the people." 
One can recognize immediately how culture as community has a 
deep presence in development practice ( whether capitalist or 
socialist): Indian cooperatives, native administration, the commune 
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(Kitching 1980). In its contemporary iterations, however, it is the 
empowered and self-governing community that has the deepest 
resonance. Empowerment represents one major way in which the 
community has entered, or perhaps re-entered, development 
discourse but along two rather different trajectories. One emerges 
from anti-systemic movements. Much of what now passes for 
grassroots anti-development initiatives, or the new sorts of anti-
system or ant-globalization movements, starts from the notion of a 
radical empowerment from below (Mertes 2002). Another iteration 
of community as empowerment appears within more conventional 
development circles: for instance corporate community development, 
social capital, and community-based resource management 
(see Watson, this volume). Its source is neo-liberal theory itself. 
Pre-existing communities must be enabled and enhanced in 
their institutional capacities in order that they can assume the 
responsibility for their own self-improvement by tapping market 
power, conducting themselves in a competitive arena, and acting 
in a calculated manner. Both the community, and the civil society of 
which it is part, must be subject to the rule of the development expert 
and rendered through technical knowledge (Mitchell 2002). The vast 
explosion ofNGOs and the civil society boom of the post-1989 
period, represents a vast new cultural terrain on which donors and 
governments now operate in the name of "enabling environments" 
(Li 2005). 
There is another important line of communitarian theory within 
development that centers on the now vast body of work on 
nationalism. The idea of "new nations" and development was, 
of course, central to 1950s modernization theory but it was Benedict 
Anderson's Imagined Communities (1983) that marked a brilliant 
rethinking of the nation around the social imaginary and cultures of 
community ( another point of connection between the two meanings 
of culture). Nationalism - the imaginary word of horizontal 
comradeship organized around space - was unleashed by print 
capitalism (and later the virtual world, what he dubbed fax 
nationalism). The nation was the cultural community par excellence, 
a particular "style of imagining" out of which postcolonial 
development was to be fashioned (Coronil 1999; Goswami 2004; 
Apter 2005). In the postcolonial world the ways in which certain 
forms of entho-nationalism won out (often violently) and how such 
political processes were central to nation-building as an institutional 
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project has had the effect of refiguring what had been until the 
1970s a rather anodyne (and Panglossian) view of the creation of 
the modem nation-state ( compare Bigenho, this volume). What 
was central to this cultural tum turned out to be the shallowness 
of nationalism in many postcolonial settings, and how particular 
development regimes failed in their imagining of what Laurent 
Berlant (1991) called a "national fantasy," and conjured up in its 
place a crisis of secular nationalism - that is, a profound sense of 
the bankruptcy and failure of modernity. In some cases the very idea 
of state building and national identity imploded - Somalia, Congo 
Brazzaville, Afghanistan - while in others, different styles of 
development - Islamism is the obvious case - substituted for the 
catastrophic failure of the modem nationalist development project. 
What is distinctive, of course, of the current moment is that an 
imperial power - the US - has embarked upon a process of forced 
nation building imposed militarily from without. Messrs Feith, 
Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld discovered that their full-spectrum 
dominance and the export of democracy - Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Adam Smith - ran straight into a ferocious 
wall of cultural politics (RETORT 2005). 
Community, in other words, pays fidelity to its modem political 
usage and at the same time must be located with respect to modem 
capitalisms. Community is an expression of modem rule (it is in the 
business of disciplining the liberal subject) but it is simultaneously, 
as Joseph (2001) puts it, a "supplement to capital" (it is in business). 
There is no simple genealogy to the modem deployment of 
community, either in the advanced capitalist states, within 
development discourse, or within the global South. It has come 
to provide a common currency across the differing expressions 
of modem justice as Nancy Fraser sees them: the egalitarian 
redistributive sense of justice on the one side ( communities of class 
or social strata) and the politics of recognition or recognitive justice 
on the other (communities of identity and difference) (see Fraser 
and Honneth 2003). But throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries the idea of the community was "a fundamental political 
institution within European colonial systems" too (Kelly and Kaplan, 
2001: 5). Community is an integral part of the construction of the 
modem. Communities, not just of the modem imagined nation 
(Anderson 1983) but all manner of local communities, are "political" 
and "represented" communities to be read against the modem state, 
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the nation, and history. Communities demand visibility, legibility, 
and enumeration as a precondition for claims-making and thereby 
entry into the modem - and the modem world of development 
( compare Radcliffe and Laurie, this volume). 
It is, of course, a defining feature of modem capitalism that its 
competitive and ceaseless search for profitability unleashes periodic 
waves of "creative destruction," and round upon round of uneven 
development, through which communities are both destroyed and 
remade (Hart 2003b). Marshall Berman's magisterial account of the 
relations between modernization and modernity starts precisely from 
the contradictory experiences of being modem, its vitality promises 
"adventure, power, joy growth, and transformation of ourselves 
and the world" and yet "threaten to destroy everything we have, 
everything we know, everything we are" (1980: 23). Over the last 
two centuries much utopian populist thinking - often but not always 
draped in nostalgia for a community lost - can only be grasped 
as a counterweight to the destructive consequences of industrial 
capitalism and what passes as development. Working-class 
communities in Delhi, peasant systems of common property 
management in the Andes, the moral economy of Islamic schools 
in Nigeria, and so on, are crushed by the unfettered powers of the 
market and yet these selfsame conditions of destruction provide a 
fertile soil in which the endless search for alternatives can take root 
and :flourish: 
The construction of collective identities arises out of broader practices 
of defining and delimiting communities. As a rule ... these dissolve 
internal differentiations within any given collectivity in favor of a 
common external demarcation ... The spread of such claims is only 
possible in communities where religious ( or traditional) norms and 
affiliations have become shaky or uncertain. Surrogate constructions 
then offer magical formulae that suggest hidden ways of belonging, 
delimiting and persisting ... Formulaic constructions of collective 
identity have become a symptomatic signature of the present. They are 
ubiquitous wherever societies, regardless of their actual differentiation, 
are transfigured into seamless communities, and assured of continuity 
by symbolic demarcation and fabrication of meaning. 
(Nietharnmer 2003: 80-3) 
In the making and remaking of communitas, whatever its local or 
historical circumstances, the new community must always address 
questions of representation (how they represent themselves and what 
forms of political representation they hold to), forms of rule, means 
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of internal discipline, membership and "purity," styles of imagination 
and their relation to accumulation and the economy. 
Within the maelstrom of capitalist modernity - and global 
development - the possibilities for community making are almost 
endless. At this historical moment we are awash in communities, and 
the "self-governing community" is one of the defining articulations 
of neo-liberal rule (Osborne and Rose 1998; Rose 1999; Schofield 
2002). Li's brilliant new work (2005) properly notes that the 
community resurgence of the 1980s and 1990s in the trans-Atlantic 
economies is now far wider - from community policing in 
Birmingham to community partnerships in the Niger Delta - and 
cannot be grasped outside of the collapse of socialism and the rise of 
what Keane (2003) calls "turbocapitalism." Here a new generation 
of communities arises from the ashes of state withdrawal and 
speaks the name of civic renewal, associational democracy, and 
empowerment. Communities are, therefore, bound up with modernity 
but they are also complicit with modem capitalism itself, and rooted 
in the operations of the marketplace. It is in this sense that the entry 
of community into current development discourse must be evaluated. 
And yet paradoxically community is an exemplar of what Ernesto 
Laclau (1996) calls an "empty signifier" - something that no political 
actor can claim to hold the truth about for very long. For these 
reasons, three aspects of the developmental community should be 
clear: first, the fact that community making can fail ( often 
dramatically) by which I mean that a particular world of meaning 
disintegrates (fails to maintain its social appeal, its ideological 
function, and its social cohesiveness), and erodes to the point where 
a base coherence dissolves. The famous Ogoni movement in Nigeria 
is a case in point. Community can fail to be defined and stabilized 
(Jensen 2004). Second, that communities typically contain both 
reactionary ( despotic or disciplinary) and emancipatory (liberatory) 
expressions that are, as it were, in perpetual struggle with one 
another; communities are not always warm and fuzzy. Development 
in the name of political Islam is an exemplary case. And third, 
communities (with their attendant forms of identity, rule, and 
terrritorialization) can be produced simultaneously at rather different 
spatial levels and within different social force-fields, and to this 
extent may work with, and against one another, in complex ways. 
People, in short, belong to multiple communities (a women's 
credit association, an ethnic movement for resource control, and a 
transnational green movement), navigating among them in a way that 
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works against the communitarian presumption that individuals hold 
fidelity to only one community. 
Community is - or shall we say has become - a powerful (but also 
dangerous) way in which the cultural tum enters development 
practice and thinking. There are political and material circumstances 
in which a round of aggressive and destructive global neo-liberalism 
- let's call it primitive accumulation (Harvey 2002; RETORT 
2005) - has been enormously generative for community-based 
claims making and for what Edward Said called the endless search 
for alternatives. I shall return to this later. What I have tried to 
sketch here is the need to retain a critical cultural sense of 
community in its deployment in development theory and practice: 
communities are not always warmly persuasive, they can emerge as 
forms of modem political discipline, they may be cut across by all 
manner of strong and violent political currents. They can also be 
the source of generative politics, struggling against and undermining 
what Ludden (1992: 252) has named "the development regime 
as an institutionalized configuration of power." 
Development as a social imaginary 
Development in other words is Orientalism transformed into a 
science for action in the contemporary world ... Postcolonial settings 
provide the rationale for the idea of alternative modernities ... where 
incommensurable conceptions and ways of life implode into one 
another ... into strangely contradictory yet eminently "sensible" 
hybridity. 
(Gupta 1998: 45, 219) 
Culture as worlds of meaning: what sort of opportunity did this 
second lineage of cultural theory linking system and practice offer 
for development? Its most powerful - and most inclusive - iteration 
is contained within Gupta's twinned observation: that "Development" 
is a form of Orientalism - that is to say it rehearses "in a virtually 
unchanged form the chief premises of the self-representation of 
modernity" (Gupta 1998: 36) - and that postcolonial states rarely 
swallow the West's self-representation but fashion a hybrid 
modernity of their own. One of the standard claims of postcolonial 
theory - a cultural theory par excellence - is that the hybridized 
postcolonial subjects "continuously interrupt the redemptive 
narratives of the West" (Gupta 1998: 232). This is a line of thinking 
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that tends to be both critical of Enlightenment thinking and often 
apocalyptic in its rejection of the development business (Escobar 
1995; Rist 1997). It is at base a cultural theory: 
A cultural theory directs one to examine how the "pull of sameness 
and the forces of making difference" interact in specific ways under 
the exigencies of history and politics to produce alternative 
modernities at different national and cultural sites. 
(Gaonkar 2001: 46) 
One could say, then, that the cultural move was to posit development 
as a modernist project (and often a failed or incomplete one at that). 
Development was to be construed as the cultural constitution of the 
social order (see Povey 1998). 
Perhaps the most sophisticated account of this position has been 
provided by Charles Taylor (2004). Modernity for Taylor is a 
historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutions, 
new ways of living and new forms of malaise. Western modernity 
on this view is a certain kind of social imaginary, that is to say to 
focus on the ways people imagine their social existence, "how they 
fit together with others, how things go on between them and their 
fellows, the expectations that are normally met and the deeper 
normative expectations and images that underlie these expectations" 
(Taylor 2004: 23). These may be self-serving and full of repressions 
but they are at the same time "constitutive of the real" (Taylor 
2004: 183). The social imaginary has three modes of narrativity-
progress, revolution, and nation - and three important forms of self-
understanding, what Taylor calls cultural formations: the economy, 
the public sphere, and self-rule. 
Taylor simultaneously paints the cultural constitution of the 
modem order - while all the time holding open the project of other 
modernities - and at the same time perfectly captures the framework 
within which so much of the critical work on development by the 
social sciences over the last 15 years has turned. Ludden's (1992) 
model of the India development regime, for example, is defined by 
(i) ruling powers who claim progress as goal, (ii) "people" whose 
conditions must be improved, (iii) an ideology of science to measure 
progress, and (iv) self-declared enlightened leaders who deploy state 
power for development and self-rule. Much of the cultural work has 
been precisely to prize apart this quarter of "configurations of 
power." This meshes perfectly, of course, with critical theorists of 
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development like Timothy Mitchell (2002), Sharad Chari (2004), 
Tania Li (2005), or Anna Tsing (2005). 
There has been no single way in which development as worlds of 
meaning has been explicated (see Crush 1995; Cooper and Packard 
1997; Watts 2003). Some have taken the high road of development 
modernism and the legibility and visibility required by the state 
(Scott 1998); some have traced the lineages of the notion of the 
economy (its "invention") and the discursive construction of 
economic theory (Mitchell 2002; Gibson-Graham 1996). Perhaps 
most effective has been the ethnographic exploration of development 
institutions starting from Ferguson's (1994) highly generative 
account of how social problems are converted into technical 
considerations, thereby creating an anti-politics machine 
(normalization in Foucault's language). In his wake has appeared a 
raft of important studies examining, for example, the "greening" the 
World Bank and the deconstruction of its "literature" (Kumar 2003; 
Goldman 2005), forms of green govemmentality and economic 
regulation (Drayton 1996; Agrawal 2005; Roitman 2005), the 
epistemic communities that help create discursively durable accounts 
of common development problems (Leach and Fairhead 1996), and 
the sorts of knowledge ( conventional and subjugated) made in the 
name of development science (Latour 1991; Leach, Scoones, and 
Wynne 2005). On the other side is a body of work - generally less 
successful in my view - seeking to shed light on the alternative 
modernities under construction in Mumbai or Johannesburg (Gaonkar 
2001; Simone 2005). 
There is no easy way of characterizing this body of work. One part 
locates itself explicitly on the ground of development policy, using 
post-structural approaches to tease out the taken for granted 
assumptions of rural development programs of the operations 
Departments of the World Bank. Others are more concerned to paint 
with a larger brush on the canvas of world history. What they have 
in common I think is the sense in which development's many 
worlds of meaning can be construed as an ensemble or assemblage 
of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections," a social 
imaginary of "calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of ... 
[a] very specific albeit complex form of power which has as its target 
population ... its form of knowledge political economy" (Foucault 
1991: 102). In this sense culture turns out to be a powerful weapon, 
not just talking truth to power but of pulling apart the "contingent 
lash up" (Rose 1999) that is development. 
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The making of a cultural revolution 
We are way ahead of the protestors. 
(James Wolfenson, President of the World Bank, 
2000, cited in International Herald Tribune, 
April 19, 2000: 19) 
[N]eoliberalism is more than an economic theory. It also constitutes 
the conditions for a radically refigured cultural politics. 
(Giroux 2004: 107) 
My account of the ways in which culture understood as the dialectics 
of system and practice has reshaped development discourse - has 
broken through the tough carapace of conventional accounts of the 
state, the economy, and civil society - has for the most part operated 
in an historical vacuum. Mapping cultural ideas and their institutional 
points of entry is one thing, providing an account of the material 
circumstances in which the cultural turn emerged and the social 
forces that might go some way toward explaining the rapidity with 
which culture entered development theory and practice is quite 
another. The broad historical contours of such an explanation are 
provided by neo-liberalism.4 Its realities are plain to see. The world 
has endured two decades and more of radical reconstruction made 
in the name of a new/old capitalist orthodoxy - repeated rounds of 
privatization and deregulation, tight money (for some), free trade (for 
the defenseless), "adjustment programs," attacks on welfare and on 
big (that is, corporate-unfriendly) government. (Ninety-five percent 
of all regulatory changes during the 1990s, as inventoried by the 
UN World Investment Report, were aimed at liberalizing capital 
controls. The tripling of bilateral investment treaties in the first half 
of the same decade was almost wholly aimed at removing "barriers" 
to foreign investment.) 
Suffice to say that the origins of neo-liberalism date to the 1970s, 
and to the challenges confronting US economic hegemony as a result 
of a crisis of over-accumulation (Brenner 2002). Faced with growing 
competition from Western Europe, Japan, and East Asia, the United 
States under Richard Nixon freed-up international financial markets 
to "liberate the American state from succumbing to its economic 
weaknesses and ... strengthen the political power of the American 
state" (Gowan 1999: 23). The institutional complex that permitted 
this "gamble" of projecting US financial power outwards was the 
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IMF-WTO-Treasury-Wall Street nexus. Right at the heart of 
neo-liberalism's strategy was an assault on the state-centered 
development strategies of postcolonial states: markets were to be 
forced open, capital and financial flows freed up, state properties sold 
at knockdown prices, and assets devalued and transferred in crises of 
neo-liberalism's own making. For the Third World, the tyranny 
of "there is no alternative" ruled supreme; for the post-1989 socialist 
bloc, it was simply dubbed "Shock Therapy." What proved to be so 
extraordinary about the neo-liberal counter-revolution was neither its 
zealotry nor its bourgeois mission to create "a world after its own 
image," but rather its singular hyper-nationalism: that a single nation 
imposed its own self-description as a global norm. Its definitive 
statement, we can now see, was the 2002 National Security Strategy 
document: its absolutist modality - "full spectrum dominance." At 
first the neo-liberal offensive was, as Antonio Gramsci might have 
said, a passive revolution from above: conservative, defensive, and 
despotic (Silver and Arrighi 2003). Now it is coercive, military, 
and imperial. 
What all of this amounted to was another round in the ceaseless 
process of primitive accumulation, what Harvey calls "accumulation 
by dispossession" (Harvey 2002). And the cultural tum in 
development, I think, must be framed by the Great Arch of modem 
global neo-liberalism. In this sense much of what I have described 
in this essay has as its reference point Karl Polanyi, who famously 
pointed out in The Origins of Our Time (1945) that markets cannot 
create social order, indeed they can colonize and ultimately destroy it. 
The market destroys the social character of three foundational 
but "fictitious" commodities (land, labor, and money); its corrosive 
effects underwrite class-based communities such as Chartism, the 
co-operative movement, and Owenism, each is a reaction to the 
destructive process of commodification (see Burawoy 2003). 
Re-embedding of markets, or the reactions to disembedding, produce 
forms of association that serve to maintain capitalist accumulation (the 
civil society counterweight to the anarchy of the market). Naturally, it 
would be too simple to posit all cultural inflections of development as 
the product of the giant servomechanism of market-capitalism. Robert 
Putnam's concept of social capital or corporate social responsibility 
cannot be fully reduced to market re-embedding and the violence of 
neo-liberalism (though neither are inexplicable without them), any 
more than civil society or culture is simply a "reaction" to the 
unregulated market. To do so would return us the bad old days of 
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"base and superstructure" that was precisely one of the things 
that the cultural turn sought to redress. 
So neo-liberalism and the horrors of primitive accumulation are 
indispensable framing devices. So too is the rise of global civil 
society - and it is at the intersection of these two global vectors that 
the culture as a "traveling theory" can be productively located. 
Rampant neo-liberalism - understood as a global constellation of 
capitalist accumulation under American hegemony rather than 
simply as the realm of "the economic" - and the "dynamic non-
governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions" 
(2003: 9) that Keane calls global civil society, created a global 
forcing house within which development could be culturalized. 
Global civil society- Keane notes that there are 50,000 NGOs that 
operate "at the global level" (2003: 5) - was itself born of a complex 
confluences of ideas and socio-political transformations, including 
of course the revival of civil society in the wake of the crashing of 
the Prague Spring, the socio-political effects of the new virtual 
technologies, the deep crisis of the postcolonial state (not unrelated 
of course to the devastating effects of neo-liberal "adjustment") 
marked by the moniker "rogue" or "failed," and the panorama of 
conflicts emerging in the wake of the end of the Cold War. We may 
differ, naturally, as regards whether global civil society represents a 
new global public, or a coherent effort to civilize the global order, 
or a new cosmocratic form of politics. Global civil society is, as 
Keane ( one of its major boosters and theoreticians) notes, a work 
in progress. At the very least it foregrounds the prospect of differing 
ways of democratic living and of rethinking what passes global 
markets. 
To put the matter sharply, the confluence of global neo-liberalism 
and civil society over-determined the extent to which the dialectics 
of system and practice forced itself onto the development agenda. 
Contained within this confluence is a vastly complex set of 
movements and ideas; let me simply flag five: 
• the global human rights movement; 
• the global women's movement; 
• indigeneity and the politics of recognition; 
• anti-systemic movements and the crisis of the postcolony; 
• the Image World of Consumer Capitalism. 
Each of these properly requires a full accounting that I cannot 
provide here. My point is simply to confer their significance as 
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force-fields within which worlds of meaning acquired a powerful 
resonance. How could such matters as patriarchy, ethnic violence, 
indigenous struggles, the "anti-globalization" movements (whether 
the revolutionary impulses of the Black Bloc or militant Islam), the 
volcanic eruption of locally improvised alternatives emerging from 
the tectonic shifts of postcolonial failure, and unmatched imperial 
powers of consumer capitalism be fully apprehended without the 
deployment of cultural categories? The extent to which intellectuals, 
activists, and practitioners of various stripes latched on to culture was 
surely shaped as much by this heady cocktail of cultural politics as 
by the new theoretical productions emanating from the Left Bank 
ecoles, Oxford, or Harvard. 
The neo-liberal moment: culture as a form of rule 
[T]he recognition of cultural domination as just as important as, and 
perhaps as a condition of possibility of, political and economic 
domination is a true "advance" in our thinking. 
(Buck-Morss 2003: 103) 
[P]ower often makes its presence felt through a variety of modes 
playing across one another. The erosion of choice, the closure of 
possibilities, the manipulation of outcomes, the threat of force, the 
assent of authority or the inviting gestures of a seductive presence ... 
(Allen 2003: 195-6) 
I want to end my remarks with some reflections on the relations 
between the cultural and neo-liberal revolutions in development 
practice. To do so I want to briefly return to a period when questions 
of poverty, scarcity, and rule were the compelling political questions 
of the moment, namely the debate over the Poor Laws in Britain in 
which Thomas Malthus (1798) figured so centrally. The Malthusian 
debates the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries represented 
a debate with "popular radicalism" (McNally 1995). Paine's 
Rights of Man appeared in 1791 and it is to be recalled that it was 
enormously popular, selling 200,000 copies within a year. The Rights 
of Man politicized poverty - it accepted the logic of the free market 
but provided a program for political reform. At the heart of the 
popular radicalism and its opposition to political economy was a 
debate within the English ruling class over the paupers and what 
to do about them. 
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Malthus' ideas, whatever their class provenance, transcend 
demography, since his ideas were put to work at a moment of 
political crisis. The figure of the pauper was constituted as a social 
problem to be regulated, a discourse central to the shift from 
an Elizabethan moral economy (a paternalist system of policing to 
relieve and employ the poor) to a liberal mode of government of 
poverty fostering a space of individual autonomy and minimal state 
action. The "discourse of the poor," as Mitchell Dean (1991) calls it, 
had three new components: the emergence of a strong abolitionist 
strain toward the poor laws, the insistence on voluntary charity as 
morally superior to the compulsion inherent in the poor rates, and the 
substitution of make-work schemes by various contributory methods 
(life annuities, insurance plans, and mutual assistance). Here was a 
redefinition of the field of action of the state: a withdrawal of the 
state responsibility for relief to categories of the property less, and the 
centralization and bureaucratization of the state apparatus of relief. 
At stake was a liberal mode of government "distinguished by its 
aim of incorporating self-responsibility and familial duty within 
the lives of the propertyless ... by multiplying the institutional and 
administrative networks which surround poverty" (Dean 1991: 18). 
The liberal mode of government, scarcity as an object of regulation 
and discipline, and Malthus' bioeconomic laws can be productively 
understood as expression of modem rule, what Foucault (2000) calls 
the "conduct of conduct," a more or less calculated and rational 
set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule through a 
multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state 
and at a variety of spatial levels. Foucault was concerned to show 
how the analytics of government constituted differing expressions 
of governmentality, which he articulated in terms of the pastoral 
( classically feudal in character), the disciplinary ( the institutions 
of subjection from the prison to the school), and biopower (the 
administration of forms of life). Modem govemmentality was 
rendered distinctive by the specific forms in which the population 
and the economy was administered, and specifically by a deepening 
of the "governmentalization of the state" (that is to say, how 
sovereignty comes to be articulated through the populations and 
the processes that constitute them). 
How then do Malthus and liberal government speak to the question 
of scarcity and modem development? Malthus' achievement was to 
help construct a discourse of poverty and scarcity which challenged 
the radical Paine-ites and their theories of rights and to this extent it 
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reflected both a voice of the status quo and a fear of the 
enfranchisement of the popular classes ( of social disorder from 
below). In this way scarcity became central one might say to 
the conduct of conduct. Scarcity shifted from a pre-modem sense 
of periods of necessary dearth to a generalized condition of 
insufficiency. By the mid to late nineteenth century, after Malthus' 
pessimism lost some of its power, scarcity came to hold what Xenos 
(1989) calls "the promise of abundance." But this promise required 
choice, discipline, and above all a rational economic man capable of 
"economizing": making choices to allocate scarce resources among 
competing ends. But scarcity had a much broader discursive 
resonance. It became central to economics, which of course was 
significant not simply in the rise of neoclassical free market thinking 
but in the entire arena of economic policy and the very idea of a 
national economy (Mitchell, T. 2000). Scarcity became, one might 
say, a condition of possibility for modem rule. It represents a 
discursive formation precisely because it operates across many 
domains in and beyond the state ( think of the army of family 
planning NGOs or famine relief agencies). Scarcity cross cuts 
and informs all of the analytics of modem government. One aspect 
of the cultural tum has been to shed light on how this logic operates 
within contemporary development theory and practice. 
The relations between rule, scarcity, and poverty can be traced across 
the entire history of development. An important body of work -
driven by the cultural tum - has shown precisely how development 
operates as a realm of calculation, expertise, enframing (Mitchell 
2002; Li 2005). Yet the culture question plays a contradictory role 
in this process of global neo-liberalism. On the one hand, it has 
opened up the possibility for a critical assessment of the analytics of 
government in the developing world in the development institutions 
of neo-liberal rule. On the other, culture has itself become part of the 
arsenal of modem neo-liberal development rule. This is quite clear 
in the way in which community operates in relation to development 
projects and the debate over governance in the global South. The 
danger is of course that quite sophisticated senses of culture - social 
capital, community governance - became the basis for a sort of 
normalization, for the further fuelling (ironically) of the anti-politics 
machine. The extent to which culture in this sense is capable of 
securing hegemony for ruling classes of all sorts is always an open 
question. What are the limits then to a global neo-liberalism armed 
with the sophisticated ( and self reflexive) deployment of culture? 
Notes 
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One might say that this neo-liberalism has in the past few years 
begun to look rocky; fights within and between global regulatory 
institutions, resistance to free trade within the global South, and the 
slide into war. The ruthless underbelly of "globalization" was now 
exposed. America - partly in response - shifted from consent to 
coercion, to military neo-liberalism that in a sense compromises a 
certain vision of self-government. A limit to the neo-liberal project is 
that in large parts of the world the market-based secular nationalist 
project has catastrophically failed (the 2 billion dwellers of the slum 
world, as Mike Davis [2005] notes). It is out of this crisis of course 
that militant Islam, to take one example, has grown. The anti-politics 
machine can create the most explosive sorts of politics. And here is 
the rub. Some of these oppositional movements - anti anti-politics -
assume cultural forms (al-Qaeda for example) that are not terribly 
desirable. They will require what Williams (2005) calls a "generative 
politics" that must inevitably be cultural but will place civil society 
in a dominant position by working with and through 
the state. 
For useful discussions of the dialectics of culture and economy, see Crang 
(1997), Sayer (1997), Ray and Sayer (1999), as well as Chapter 1 and James 
(this volume). 
2 A brief perusal of Tim Forsyth' s admirable new Encyclopaedia of International 
Development (2005) reveals not only that culture has its own long entry but 
that development's "keywords" - its fundamental lexicon - are totally saturated 
with cultural thinking. Poverty - the eradication of which is the foundation 
stone of development - is now widely understood to be as much about "social 
relations" as "economic conditions." The Encyclopaedia properly sees poverty 
in terms of a panoply of needs, processes of sociocultural exclusion (gender 
most obviously), human rights, and capabilities. 
3 The World Bank is not totally immune, of course, to such cultural analysis (this 
is the heart of the social capital question that I discuss here) but its center of 
gravity lies elsewhere. 
4 This was written before the appearance of David Harvey's much fuller and 
sophisticated account of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). 
-» Culture and conservation 
in post-conflict Africa: 
changing attitudes and 
approaches 
Elizabeth E. Watson 
There is no Western solution or blueprint that will solve African 
problems, and, unless both Africans and the West realize that, all 
efforts to address them will continue to fail. Peace, democracy and 
stability are the key for any attempt to "save" Africa, but they must be 
rooted in African realities and traditions. All societies, no matter how 
poor, have resources. The trick is to recognize them and harness them 
effectively ... Africa has the potential to "take off," but it will only 
do so if it listens to its own beats and its own logic. 
(Manuel de Araujo, President of the Mozambican 
Association, 2004) 
This chapter explores the way in which participatory development 
projects in the environmental field have recently turned towards 
what their proponents refer to as "traditional institutions," including 
"traditional leaders" or "traditional tenure systems," and attempted 
to use them instrumentally in their work. It argues that these features 
illustrate the wider shift in attitudes and approaches to culture on 
the part of development actors in government and non-governmental 
organizations, and reveal the way in which that shift is manifest on 
the ground. In Africa, approaches to development that are trying 
to build on indigenous culture are far from unusual, and they can 
be seen as growing in popularity because they serve a variety of 
different interests. For some policy-makers and campaigners 
searching for a postcolonial future, they represent the possibility of a 
return to a more African way of life, after years of colonial and 
modernizing regimes in which local African cultures were devalued 
Culture and conservation In post-conflict Africa • 59 
(see epigraph p. 58). Nationalists in the post-independence period 
often equated forms of local culture with ethnicity, and it was their 
project to replace them with new, nationwide, "modem" identities. 
In the words of Samora Machel, Mozambican President from 1975 to 
1986, "for the nation to live, the tribe must die." Missionaries, both 
foreign and indigenous, also had, and continue to have, a powerful 
influence, frequently presenting African cultures as replete with 
dangerous superstitions and as forms of heathenism. In recent years, 
as I show in this chapter, some development actors have seen culture 
as providing a potential refuge and form of protection from a new 
wave of threats to identity and to livelihoods from globalization 
(see also Chapter 1, this volume). 
On the ground, there has been a convergence in the approach 
of many different development organizations including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), international development 
organizations, and government organizations. Many share the desire 
to integrate culture into development, and some, as I will show, see 
a focus on the community as a way to achieve this ( on community, 
see Watts, this volume). Questions remain, however, about how 
to define, access, and form partnerships with the "community." 
Many actors see "traditional institutions" as providing a bridge 
to the community, and a means through which their ideals can be 
transformed into practice. Some have turned to traditional institutions 
for pragmatic and expedient reasons. They see them as representing 
strategic entry points into communities, through which they can 
achieve the highly idealistic policies of improving the environment 
while also empowering the community. By building on cultural 
institutions, it is thought that a "culturally appropriate" development 
can be stimulated, thus answering many of the major criticisms 
of development as exporting Western ideas. 
The material presented here suggests that these approaches are 
frequently shallow and tokenistic. They tend to conflate concepts 
such as culture, tradition, community, and participation in ways that 
fail to recognize the contested nature of the institutions, practices, 
and sets of rights to resources. They ignore the way in which 
tradition is the product of a particular political history and continues 
to play its part in struggles for power and resources. Culture is given 
a prominent place in the rhetoric of development and empowerment, 
but development projects tend to extract and employ an idea of 
culture, vested in "traditional institutions," which does not 
necessarily correspond to the reality that exists on the ground. 
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Tensions and conflicts result when "traditional institutions" fail to 
live up to expectations or to behave as expected, and rapid U-turns 
in policy-making result. In the post-conflict situations, instead of 
providing development and improved environments, such tensions 
can also lead to further conflicts. 
In this chapter I draw on research material from Mozambique and 
Ethiopia, but in order demonstrate the outcome of these projects in 
more depth, I focus on one case study of community-based natural 
resource management from Borana in the south of Ethiopia. 1 The 
example provides a grounded and specific illustration of the way 
in which culture is being objectified, valued, and integrated into 
development projects, and demonstrates the problematic outcomes 
of some of these approaches. 
Community-based natural resource management 
in post-conflict situations 
Over the last two decades there has been a proliferation of 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects 
in Africa, particularly in remoter rural regions where many of the 
poorest people have depended historically on natural resources 
for their livelihoods (Hulme and Murphree 2001 ). Many of these 
CBNRM projects seek to redress, explicitly or implicitly, some 
of the problems caused by processes of immanent and intentional 
development during the twentieth century. Although pre-colonial 
societies should not be seen as unchanging, or as living in harmony 
with nature,2 it is evident that patterns of access to and use of natural 
resources have been disrupted and undermined by external factors. 
People have been displaced from resources that they previously used 
by the establishment of commercial, sometimes colonial, farms or 
ranches, or by wildlife parks and other conservation areas. Conflict 
too has taken its toll, as part of struggles for independence from 
colonial powers, and throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War 
period. There are few continent-wide studies of the extent of the 
conflict, but much-cited statistics suggest that "since 1970, more 
than 30 wars have been fought in Africa. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 
53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting 
for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting 
in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons" 
(Annan 1998). Although conflicts are continuing in many countries, 
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such as Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Congo (where in the latter alone, 
3.8 million human fatalities are estimated from 1998 to 2004),3 
other countries, including Ethiopia and Mozambique, have been 
experiencing periods of relative peace, and have been engaged in 
post-conflict reconstruction, resettlement of returned refugees, and 
the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. 
In terms of natural resource management (NRM), post-conflict 
countries have been forced to cope with the way in which conflict 
has impacted on people's access to and use of natural resources in 
direct and indirect ways. The resources themselves may have been 
destroyed, and populations may have been displaced ( and are now 
returning). Most insidiously, conflict may have impacted upon the 
social fabric and the institutions that regulate the access, use, and 
distribution of the benefits of those resources. Whereas in the past 
natural resource management projects focused mainly on the 
technical aspects of natural resource management, these social 
institutional dimensions are now understood to be vital to the 
sustainable use and management of resources, determining who is 
able to benefit from those resources, and they represent particular 
challenges in post-conflict situations. 
CBNRM projects are participatory. They attempt to tackle some of 
the problems discussed above by including those who have been 
displaced and/or excluded by the top-down modernizing development 
projects of the past. CBNRM projects are also based on the premise 
that environmental degradation and poverty are linked; if the 
management of natural resources can be improved to the extent 
that they contribute successfully to securing livelihoods, then, 
it is theorized, communities will have incentives to invest in and 
so conserve their resources. Improving the environments will also 
contribute to the health and enjoyment of local people, and reduce 
destitution and environmentally induced migration. The participatory 
dimension of involving the community in decision-making and 
management procedures will, it is thought, ensure a sense of 
ownership over the development process and therefore a degree of 
sustainability. It will also allow the project to draw on the knowledge 
and skills of the local people who are thought to know best what 
their problems and solutions are. A great deal of work in the field 
of "indigenous knowledge" has demonstrated that local people 
frequently have rich environmental knowledge that can be integrated 
into a project. Finally, theories of participation argue that by 
involving the community, the process can contribute to its 
62 • Elizabeth E. Watson 
empowerment. All of these arguments have fed into the rise of 
CBNRM, which is thus conceived as a win-win-win scenario: the 
environment, economic well-being, and empowerment of the 
community are seen as interrelated and benefiting. 
CBNRM and culture in decentralizing states 
The focus of development and conservation programs on 
the community exists within a broader movement towards 
decentralization in many African states. Decentralization has taken 
place as the resources and structures of government have been cut 
back in the post-Cold War, post-socialist period, as a result of the 
rise of neo-liberal market-oriented policies and the influence of 
international organizations with conditional aid programs (Larson 
and Ribot 2004). However, in Ethiopia and Mozambique, the post-
conflict, post-Cold War, post-socialist periods have not only been 
viewed as situations in which new leaner structures of government 
must be instituted and the legacy of conflict must be overcome, but 
also have been presented by governments as times of opportunity in 
which it is possible to bring about unprecedented empowerment for 
people at the grassroots. There is also a new emphasis on the rights 
of people to practice their own local cultures and religions. Whereas 
governments previously viewed local practices as obstacles to 
development, now they are seen as a resource that has the capacity 
to promote it. 
In Mozambique, the idea of community has been central to the 
government's conceptualization of the newly decentralized state, 
which aims to give more power to those at the grassroots. In the 
post-conflict period (1992 onwards), a great deal of attention has 
been paid to preparing laws through which the community can, for 
the first time, register as the legally recognized manager of resources, 
of land, forests, or wildlife.4 These policies combine ideas of 
generating improved tenure security to meet the needs of local 
people and investors, with ideas of working with - instead of against 
- customary institutions, including customary tenure systems, 
customary NRM practices, and customary - or more commonly 
termed "traditional" - leaders. 
In Ethiopia, the decentralization policies that have been implemented 
in the post-conflict period (1991 onwards) have been, if anything, 
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more radical. The new, post-1991 government has federalized the 
country using ethnicity (or nationality, as it is referred to in Ethiopia) 
as the organizing principle of the new federal state. The aim of this 
policy is to reverse the social and political hierarchies embodied in 
the previously highly centralized Ethiopian state. Prior to the 1974 
revolution, the Ethiopian Empire was dominated by northern ethnic 
groups, especially the Amhara. Amharic culture was equated with 
the culture of the Ethiopian nation, and the religion of the north, the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian Church, was the religion of the state. 
Non-Amharic and non-Orthodox groups were expected to aspire to 
a northern Ethiopian way of life (Krylow 1994; Baxter, Hultin, and 
Triulzi 1996). Following the 1974 socialist revolution, the equality 
of different ethnic groups in the country was promoted as the 
official doctrine of the state, but in practice the superior position of 
northerners was sustained. The Ministry of Culture was active at this 
time but their work was very much in the style of other socialist 
approaches to local culture. The folklore and customs of the local 
people were celebrated, but situated in the context of a modernizing 
revolutionary socialism that viewed local cultural institutions with 
distrust, and which tended to represent forms of local culture as 
"backward" and potentially oppressive (Donham 1999). 
By contrast, in the post-1991 period "Every Nation, Nationality and 
People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, 
including the right to secession" according to the 1995 Constitution 
(Article 39.1 1995: 13).5 A "nation, nationality or people" is defined 
in the constitution as "a group of people who have or share a large 
measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual 
intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a 
common psychological make-up and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominantly contiguous territory" (Article 39.5 1995: 13). Each 
"nation, nationality or people" now has the constitutional right to 
its own local governing institutions and to make its own policy 
decisions. This decentralization policy is thought, like 
participatory development programs, to enable policy decisions to 
be more effective, locally appropriate, and empowering, as they can 
build on local knowledge and involve people directly. They have also 
been accompanied by explicit policies aimed at promoting culture. 
The preamble of the 1995 constitution refers to "our rich and proud 
cultural heritages" (1995: 1), and Article 39.2 states that "Every 
Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to 
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write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and 
to promote its culture; and to preserve its history" (1995: 13). 
The decentralized states' approach to local communities and their 
culture is an important key to understanding the way in which 
development project planners have started to see local cultural 
institutions, not as something to be overcome, but something that can 
be legitimately harnessed for CBNRM. For these states, the emphasis 
on culture and community provides positive meaning to the structure 
of the decentralized state by portraying decentralization as a kind of 
second wave of decolonization. It contends that the countries were 
not liberated after the dissolution of the empires of which they were 
a part (Portuguese and Imperial Ethiopia respectively). Both of these 
imperial regimes were replaced by top-down modernizing socialist 
regimes, which also attempted to impose another set of values 
and a particular order. The new emphasis on the community and 
on culture is no doubt in part influenced by global discourses of 
multiculturalism, but is also part of the post-1990s governments' 
attempts to distance themselves from previous regimes and present 
their own as having a fresh and attractive approach and rationale. 
Community and "traditional institutions" 
In "the field," the tum towards forming partnerships with "traditional 
institutions" for CBNRM has emerged in part because of innate 
difficulties with implementing community-based projects. The 
rhetoric of CBNRM implies that the community is homogeneous, 
that it knows what it would like, and what would be in its interest. 
It implies that the community is easy to identify. On the ground, 
though, all communities are made up of socially differentiated 
interest groups, and they are not always clearly bounded or easy 
to locate and demarcate (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1997; Guijt 
and Shah 1998; Agrawal and Gibson 1999). In Mozambique, 
for example, one government development worker explained 
in an interview, "[when we started] we wanted to work with the 
community, but when we went there, we found there was no 
community, the people were living all over the place" (Author's 
interview, Manica Province, 1999). Given the heterogeneous nature 
and blurred boundaries of the communities, many development 
workers have employed "traditional institutions" as the signifiers 
of community. 
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"Traditional institutions" are portrayed in some development 
literature as ready-made grassroots institutions. They are also thought 
to be repositories of indigenous environmental knowledge, and, as 
their decision-making responsibilities extend to matters concerning 
forests, land or water, they are thought to be key institutions for 
NRM. When they are given the label "traditional," they obtain what 
Weber described as the legitimacy of the "eternal yesterday" (Weber 
1978). In Africa where written records are particularly poor, they 
are considered to have been in existence, unchanging, from "time 
immemorial," and, therefore, to be authentic representatives of 
their communities. Although it may not always be made explicit, 
it is generally assumed that, through "traditional leaders," the 
multiple aims of improved environmental management, economic 
development, and empowerment can be achieved. In the post-conflict 
situation they are thought to bring a valuable sense of continuity, 
of social cohesion and social security: they can therefore help a 
community recover from the conflict experience. 
For example, in Mozambique, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, F AO, was heavily involved in developing 
the land, forestry, and wildlife laws that recognized the communities 
as legitimate resource holders, decision-makers, and managers. It was 
also involved in programs that trained local communities to use 
Global Positioning Systems to delineate and register community 
resources. Excerpts from a 1996 FAO news report about community-
based projects in Mozambique in their early stages (see Box 3.1) 
exemplify in a classic way how African agricultural communities 
are repeatedly portrayed in development literature, "struggling" 
from "dawn to dusk" with only a "simple hoe." The excerpts also 
highlight the expectations placed on these community projects: they 
are seen as enabling communities to overcome the disruption caused 
by war, and to protect them from being further displaced by the 
expansion of commercial farming. It also shows the way in which 
working with the community is translated into supporting "traditional 
land tenure systems," and the involvement of "traditional leaders." 
From interviews with those involved in F AO-backed projects, it was 
evident that community resources were understood by them in terms 
of the territories under the jurisdiction of a local traditional chief, 
known in Mozambique as a regulo. Those involved in mapping 
community lands, in order to delimit, demarcate, and certify 
community rights, were engaged in the difficult task of establishing 
the boundaries between the territories of neighboring regulos. 
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Box 3.1 
Excerpt from "News and Highlights," United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
New land law entitles people to security in 
Mozambique6 
A simple hoe is the only tool with which Elisa Matlombe keeps her five 
children alive. From dawn to dusk, she struggles on her tiny patch of land in 
the southeast comer of Mozambique, growing a little maize and groundnuts. 
Nor is there a Mr Matlombe to bring money home from the mines 
in neighbouring South Africa or a job in nearby Maputo, the capital 
of Mozambique. Her husband was beaten to death by Renamo insurgents 
during the country's 16-year war. As if this was not enough to endure, Elisa 
faces the constant threat of eviction. She has no clear title to the land and 
a local developer has laid claim to it. 
But help may be on its way for Mrs Matlombe and the hundreds 
of thousands like her who fled from their fields during the war, if the 
Mozambican Parliament passes a new land law drafted with assistance from 
an F AO project. 
The new law, taken up by Parliament in November, would give legal 
backing to a land policy designed to recognize both current realities and 
traditional land tenure systems ... 
"We came up with a new concept called a rural community, which would be 
defined by customary occupation," said the F AO team leader. "This covers 
a bigger area than what they're using at the moment. It includes areas in 
fallow or which are still uncultivated, forests, water rights, grazing land, 
areas which are being held for future generations or those which are sacred 
or culturally important. Within these areas, the local community is free to 
allocate, inherit or transmit land among its members according to local 
practices ... " 
While the draft law still allows investors to gain access to community land, 
this can no longer be done behind the community's back. "The new law 
gives rights to traditional leaders, and no land can be ceded to developers 
without consulting first with the community," said Joao Muthombene, 
coordinator of ORAM, an organization that defends farmers' rights in land 
disputes. 
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From the World Bank, Shelton Davis has written how there have 
been increasing attempts globally over the last two decades to bring 
culture into the development arena. He cites Mozambique as one 
of the earliest countries to take up the challenge of integrating 
culture and development, with a "National Conference on Culture" 
in Maputo in 1993. The culture and development "strategies" are 
summarized as focusing on the fields of "material culture, expressive 
culture, intercultural communication, and the protection of cultural 
and natural heritage" (Davis 1999: 29). Its aim is to "buffer some 
of the turbulent effects of the globalization process, strengthen 
community pride and social cohesion at the local and national levels, 
and contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable development 
through the fostering of more peaceful societies" (Davis 1999: 29). 
These broader national and international policy contexts have 
influenced the way in which community-based projects have been 
developed, but, in the field of CBNRM, culture has been interpreted 
much more narrowly and instrumentally. There is little discussion of 
the arts or of the exploration of cultural meanings here. Instead, the 
aim is to identify the cultural institutions, the "traditional leaders" 
and forms of "customary tenure" that "work," and build partnerships 
with them in order to achieve particular ends; that is to improve 
NRM and reduce poverty ( compare Elyachar 2002). In the next 
section, I explore one case of CBNRM from Ethiopia to illustrate 
some of the problems that can arise. 
CBNRM and "traditional institutions" in Borana, 
Southern Ethiopia 
An analysis of the CBNRM projects attempted in Borana since 
the late 1990s can reveal in detail how policy attitudes towards 
culture have changed in recent years. The projects show the specific 
ways that culture, in the form of "traditional institutions," are thought 
to be integrated into development projects as a way of mobilizing 
the community and improving environmental management. 
Borana Zone in Ethiopia is situated in the region known as Oromiya 
because it is the area inhabited by those of the broader ethnic family 
group known as Oromo (see Figure 3.1). These people share the 
same language, Afaan Oromoo, and also have a belief in a shared 
history, together with some similar customs and institutions. The 
Borana people inhabit the lowlands on the Ethiopia-Kenya border; 7 
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the lowland Borana region is an area of grasslands with pockets of 
bush and forest used mainly for pastoralism, although grazing is 
limited by the availability of water for animals. There are different 
sources of water that vary throughout the year: deep wells; rain-fed 
ponds and reservoirs; seasonal surface water and rivers; and 
boreholes. Most important are nine deep well complexes, known as 
tulaani saglaani, that contain water throughout the year. They are 
as old as, if not older than, the Borana residence in the region, and 
they are of great ritual, as well as practical and material, significance 
to the Borana (Helland 1997). The Borana are mainly cattle-keeping 
pastoralists, although they combine this with the rearing of small 
stock and, increasingly, with the rearing of camels. They think 
of themselves as pastoralists first and foremost, but agriculture is 
becoming more common. 
The case of the Borana illustrates the way in which any recent 
promotion of culture represents a reversal of previous attitudes. The 
culture of the Oromo-speaking groups was demonized in Ethiopian 
kilometres 500 
Figure 3.1 Map of Ethiopia showing location of Regional States and approximate location 
of Borana Zone. 
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historiography, which reflected the particular dynamic of the 
dominant views and power structures of the Ethiopian state and. 
its personnel in the twentieth century: 
In much Ethiopian historiography the historical migration and 
expansion of Oromo-speaking groups has been imagined as the 
culmination of a series of barbaric - that is Cushitic and Muslim 
or "pagan" - invasions of an ancient Semitic-speaking, Christian or 
Judeo-Christian, monarchical, literate civilization in the heart of 
darkness. 
(Hultin 1996: 83--4) 
The people of the Ethiopian borderlands (including the Borana ), who 
were incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire by Emperor Menelik II 
at the end of the nineteenth century, tended to be referred to by the 
pejorative appellation, shanqilla. This term had racial connotations, 
meaning people who were black and physiologically of a more 
African appearance than the lighter-skinned northerners. The term 
was also used to mean slave. 8 Through the use of cultural signifiers 
such as this, the people of the margins in general, and their cultural 
practices in particular, were constructed as inferior to those of their 
northern counterparts.9 In this context, the attempts of CBNRM 
projects to work with culture in the form of its traditional institutions 
represents a radical departure, and has been seen as having the 
capacity to reverse many years of prejudice. 
In Borana, at the end of the 1990s, there was broad-ranging 
agreement among both government and non-government 
organizations, that previous development projects had not only 
failed, but that they had actually undermined livelihoods and caused 
environmental degradation in the area because they did not take into 
account the institutional dimensions of NRM. Governmental, World 
Bank, and NGO organizations had built reservoirs and ponds, 
and sunk boreholes in the area, with the aim of improving the 
productivity of the region with little success. Little or no attention 
was paid to regulating access to the grazing lands surrounding the 
new water points, resulting in an over-concentration of people and 
animals around water points, and environmental degradation. 
In contrast to this picture of environmental destruction, the 
Borana rangeland management system has been recognized in 
the international literature as one of the most productive in the 
world (Scoones 1995: 12). Thus, in the 1990s, many development 
organizations in the region started to argue that the environment 
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had been degraded as a direct result of the way in which the Borana 
traditional institutions were overlooked and undermined under 
previous prejudicial and modernizing regimes. A report of SOS Sahel, 
a UK NGO, explains: "[A] fundamental misunderstanding of pastoral 
land management, and in particular pastoral tenure systems, has 
undermined traditional institutions and the environment for which 
they were once responsible" (Boku Tache and Irwin 2003: 5). A 
recent review of the Borana situation by GTZ/BLPDP (a collaborative 
project between the German government organization, GTZ, and 
local Oromiya government) explains that the "core problem" in the 
region is that the establishment of modem government structures has 
"weakened indigenous decision-making structures in NRM" and 
caused "inappropriate utilization of rangeland," "reduced livestock 
condition," and, ultimately, the "death of people" (author's interview 
with GTZ/BLPDP 1999; see Watson 2003). 
From the end of the 1990s, the literature and attention of 
development organizations in the area started to argue that if the 
"traditional" Borana practices and institutions that had managed the 
environment so well for so long could be understood, located, and 
integrated into development projects, then successful CBNRM could 
be achieved. Improved NRM and improved environments were seen 
as within reach by drawing on - or returning to - the traditional 
Borana way of doing things. The Project Manager of Save the 
Children US, explained: 
The failure of water development projects in the past was due to big 
ponds which were dug by machine. The capacity of the ponds was 
too big to be managed and maintained by local people, and the 
traditional knowledge was not taken into account. Instead, to reverse 
this trend we identified community water managers. The SCF-US team 
consulted the community water managers and decided that a Resource 
Management Committee should be elected. The people elected were 
often knowledgeable elders and indigenous leaders. Most of the people 
chosen were people close to the traditional leaders, if not the 
traditional leaders themselves. 
(Author's interview, 1999) 
Most prominent and important of the Borana "traditional institutions" 
is the gada generation system that organizes all adult men into 
particular generation-grades, each with certain responsibilities to the 
wider society. The generation-grades are led, administratively and 
ritually, by a council of men, who remain in office for a period of 
eight years, and who themselves are led by one appointee known 
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as the aba gada, or "father of the gada." Halfway through this 
council's term of office, men from all over Borana come together 
in a meeting known as the "meeting of the multitude," at which 
those who will serve in the next council are elected. Matters of 
concern to the Borana people including security issues, practical 
environmental issues (for example, the use of and access to land 
and wells), and ritual issues are all discussed at this meeting. A set 
of principles known as the aada seera that summarize the principles 
delineating expected behavior in relation to everything from Borana 
style of dress, to land and water use, to interethnic relations, are 
also discussed, amended or ratified at the meeting; although largely 
unwritten, they have a relatively formal status. At a more local level, 
there are also men who hold positions that relate more directly to the 
access to and use of particular water wells or who are responsible 
for a particular group of households, and their movements. Again, 
these decision-makers are expected to act in accordance with the 
aada seera. 
Many development organizations cited the gada system when they 
were explaining how they worked with the community in their 
CBNRM projects. For SOS Sahel, stress was placed on the way 
in which the gada and other institutions were participatory and 
democratic. They therefore were seen as compatible with current 
development priorities and values: "The Borana society achieves 
consensus on important community issues through open and 
participatory systems of management" (Huqqe Garse 1999). In a later 
publication, SOS Sahel go further and emphasize the way in which 
the gada is a pan-Oromo institution, that is, a cultural institution 
shared by all Oromo-speaking groups. Such a framing places the 
CBNRM initiatives within the context of an Oromo-wide identity 
and cultural consciousness, shared by all people in Oromiya (see 
Figure 3.1): 
The Gadaa is a pan-Oromo organization. It is an enduring institution 
that has been in operation for at least the last 600 years. Long 
historical and political processes in Ethiopia have weakened it in the 
central parts of Oromiya. However, in spite of all this, the Borana 
Gadaa remains one of the most intact traditional institutions in 
Ethiopia today ... The project has therefore started to work with the 
Gadaa as an entry point for the representation of local resource users 
and interest groups, who have been omitted from modem Government 
management structures and systems. 
(Boku Tache and Irwin 2003: 33--4) 
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On the ground, these approaches were employed through meetings 
with traditional leaders such as gada council members and the aha 
gada. 10 Attempts were made, as in the SCF US case, to use these 
meetings to set up CBNRM committees. In addition, the existing 
structures such as the gada could also be drawn upon to provide 
decisions on certain environmental matters, and to advise the 
community after discussions with these state and non-state 
organizations. 
These approaches, however, have failed to live up to the expectations 
that were placed upon them. Within a year of starting their program 
of working with traditional institutions, by 2000, GTZ/BLPDP had 
already abandoned it, commenting that the "traditional system" had 
been undermined by the processes of history, and that it was no 
longer possible to go "back" to it: 
Now the traditional situation is not well-functioning. In all places 
the aba dheeda 11 has been replaced by the PA Chairperson [head 
of the lowest rung of administration in the post-1974 state]. We don't 
try to bring back the traditional system. If the community thinks the 
traditional system is functioning then well and good, but if not then no. 
It is difficult to bring back the traditional system. Things have already 
turned 180° - it doesn't make sense to try and turn it back again. 
(Author's interview with GTZ/BLPDP 2000) 
My discussions with local people about attempts to work with local 
cultural or "traditional" institutions revealed that, far from being 
experienced as empowering as the rhetoric suggests, the initiatives 
have been viewed with intense suspicion. In the next section I 
examine the reasons why these approaches have proved problematic 
from the perspectives of the majority of development organizations 
in the region and of the local people themselves. 
Politics of culture 
There are several reasons for problems with the traditional 
institutions' approach to development. In general, they are connected 
to the way in which, in order for organizations to argue that these 
previously overlooked institutions are valuable and can have a role 
in development, their roles are exaggerated and they are idealized. 
Working with "traditional institutions" is presented as "going back" 
to a condition that existed before the establishment of the modem 
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state, and all that the state brought with it (see Watts, this volume). 
Culture, tradition, participation, and empowerment are linked in a 
way that conjures up images of an autonomous people living in 
harmony with each other and their environment, in a world mediated 
by custom and culture. This rhetoric not only fails to acknowledge 
the political contestation that is contained within each of these terms, 
but its feel-good language can also be seen to disguise some of the 
political processes taking place. When these traditional institutions 
are viewed in their historical context, and in their wider geographical 
context, which acknowledges that there are other ethnic groups in the 
region, a very different and more political picture of these institutions 
emerges. 
In the area in question, the access to and use of natural resources 
has in fact been dominated historically by competition and conflict 
between the Borana and their neighboring ethnic groups (Helland 
1996; Gufu Oba 1996; Bassi 1997). Other people in the area include 
the Gabbra, who are a minority Oromo camel-keeping group, and 
various Somali-speaking groups who are also specialist camel-
keepers, including the Garri people. The Borana have controlled the 
majority of the territory and the most precious water sources since 
at least the seventeenth century. The Gabbra, Garri, and some other 
Somali groups have been able to use water, forest, and grasslands in 
return for paying ritual tribute to the Borana sacred leader, qallu, and 
thus demonstrating respect and allegiance to the Borana (Gufu Oba 
1996). Despite this, violent conflict has flared up between these 
groups from time to time and has worsened in recent decades. 12 
The conflict is frequently and popularly understood as being based 
on historical and tribal enmity. This is worth noting, as it 
demonstrates that although culture in the form of "traditional 
institutions" is now thought to have the capacity to help communities 
recover from conflict, culture has often been blamed for that conflict 
(in the past, but also today). The term "ritualised killer complex," 
coined by the anthropologist Schlee (1994: 135) to describe the way 
in which killing an enemy in Borana culture had ritual and social 
significance, has been extracted from the context in which it was 
written and used indiscriminately by politicians as a "sound bite" 
to explain the conflict (Gufu Oba 1996; Baxter, Hultin, and Triulzi 
1996). The Somali are also frequently portrayed as people who are 
unpredictable and in whose culture violence plays a central part. For 
example, Besteman's study explores the similarity between different 
accounts of Somali conflict: "the predominant explanation included 
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claims about Somali history ('ancient rivalries'), culture ('traditional 
weapons' used while Somalis 'raided,' 'warred,' and 'roamed the 
arid plains'), and politics ('feudal fiefdoms,' 'autonomous clan 
states')" (Besteman 1996: 122). 
To view the conflict between the Borana and the Somali as purely a 
cultural matter is to ignore the political processes at local, national, 
and international scales that have shaped it. The region is often 
thought of as remote and as having escaped from the impact of 
foreign colonialism or international politics, but the Borana and the 
Somali groups have both had particular relations to the Ethiopian and 
Somali states respectively. These have impacted on their relationship 
with each other, and on the way in which they relate to the natural 
resources in the region. This political history has proved crucial to 
the way in which CBNRM projects have unfolded. 
The history of the impacts of the modem states in the region is, in 
fact, a story of three things: the progressive drawing of lines around 
fixed areas of natural resources, exclusive allocation of access to 
those natural resources to particular groups often defined by 
ethnicity, and the contestation of those definitions. Bassi ( 1997) 
describes, for example, how the British boundary commission, 
drawing up the boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya, divided the 
land used by Borana and other people into two, but then designated 
the land on the Ethiopian side as Borana, and on the Kenyan side as 
Gabbra and Garri. In the 1930s, the Italians recruited Somali peoples 
to help them in their invasion of Ethiopia, and the Somali groups 
used their access to arms to consolidate their access to and control 
over land and water resources (Helland 1998). In response, the 
Ethiopia-British alliance recruited and armed Borana to oppose them. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a similar power struggle was played out, as, 
in a prelude to the Ogaden war of 1976-8, the Somali government 
supported a Somali irredentist movement in Southeast Ethiopia. 
Again, the Ethiopian Empire armed Borana to resist them. Thus the 
relations between Borana and Somali groups became entangled with 
international and Cold War politics, the competition for territory, 
and the contestation of the Ethiopia-Somalia border. 
From the time when northern Ethiopia incorporated Borana into its 
Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, the ritual leaders, qallu, 
were made balabbats, intermediaries between the Borana people and 
the Empire. Their responsibility was to collect and provide tribute to 
the state. Borana people also had to give labor tribute to the soldiers 
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and administrators of the Empire who were located there. This rather 
loose form of control and extraction was made much firmer under 
the Derg regime that followed the revolution in 1974. Under this 
government, the madda, described by Helland (1996: 144) as "a 
vaguely defined [Borana] unit with a permanent water source, such 
as a well complex at its centre" was used to designate the area and 
to describe people living within Peasant Associations. These were 
the lowest level units of the revolutionary state, through which the 
"development and co-operation" of people, as well as their taxation, 
were organized: 
Peasant associations, as agents of the state ... played a much more 
active role and interfered much more in local affairs than had been the 
case with balabbat. Initiatives were probably generated by a need to 
maintain control over possible opposition and subversive activities 
directed against the state, but occasionally they had more direct effects 
in the local context. For example, attempts were made to take over the 
management and control over the water, to require local pastoralists 
to apply for permission to move from one association to the next, 
or to use the judicial committee of the peasant association to resolve 
conflicts. Increasingly, the peasant association also became the main 
instrument to extract resources form the Borana, first in the form of 
taxes and various membership fees, later "voluntary" contributions 
and delivery quotas of livestock at state determined prices, as well as 
recruits for military service. 
(Helland 1996: 145) 
The geography of the Borana, like that of many other mobile 
pastoralists, is not structured into bounded and fixed spatial areas. 
As movement is important to seek pasture and water, their mental 
maps are structured around focal places and paths (Ingold 1986; 
Schlee 1992). Thus using institutions such as the madda as a 
bounded institution, involves a fundamental change in the nature 
of that institution. Helland, for example, stresses that the madda 
refers only to "all the people and all the animals who use the wells, 
in addition to all range resources served by the well complex ... 
There is no evidence, however, that the people who happen to 
reside within this unit are organized in any way with reference to the 
territorial unit" (1996: 144). The madda was used to divide land into 
particular territories and the people into fixed groups within them. 
This established firm boundaries that may not have existed before, 
limited the movement of the people, and furthered the state's control. 
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The period that followed the end of the Derg regime, with its 
emphasis on decentralization, self-determination, and cultural 
freedom, might therefore have been expected to represent a positive 
change for the Borana. Unfortunately this has not proved to be the 
case. This period, like those before it, has been dominated by the 
process of drawing lines across the land, and the delineation of 
territories, but the process has become, if anything, more fraught. 
The establishment of the new ethnically federalized state has required 
a boundary to be drawn across an area where Somali and Borana 
used to share water and grazing lands, to some extent. The area on 
one side of this line has been designated Oromiya, and exclusively 
for the Oromo (including Borana) people. The area on the other 
side has been designated Somali. Such a designation is problematic 
enough in itself, but it has been accompanied by two processes that 
have exacerbated the situation. 
The first process relates to refugee resettlement programs in the 
region. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been involved in 
resettling refugees from conflict into the Borana region discussed 
here. Most of these refugees are Gabbra, Garri, and other Somali 
people. According to Bassi, the "UNHCR registration and 
repatriation procedures were based simply on each individual's own 
statement of identity" and "the incentive of the repatriation grant 
[ and further future assistance to refugee communities] no doubt 
opened the way for the 'return' of people not originally belonging 
to Borana province" (Bassi 1997: 39-40). In the post-1991 period of 
ethnic decentralization, Somali and Oromiya regions were designated 
in terms of the ethnicity of people in the region. Areas with large 
numbers of Somali peoples became Somalia; where large numbers 
of Borana, Oromo. Many Borana people claim that the actions of 
UNHCR and other development organizations have led certain areas, 
and the valuable water points within them, to be designated Somali 
Region, because of the large numbers of returned refugees. As Bassi 
summarizes: "by transferring as many Garri-Gabbra 'returnees' as 
possible into the administrative units of Borana zone, the old goal 
of getting access to Borana-controlled resources may, in fact, be 
achieved" (1997: 40). This situation erupted into violent conflict 
throughout the 1990s, and in 1999-2000 when my research was 
being carried out. 
The second process relates to the way in which the relations between 
the Borana and the government have worsened in the post-1991 
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period as the Borana have been viewed as a potential source of 
support and protection for the Oromo Liberation Front (OLP). This 
movement declared war on the post-1991 government, whom they 
consider to be dominated by northern groups (particularly the Tigre ). 
This, they argue, continues the subordination and exploitation of 
southern Ethiopian groups in general, and the Oromo in particular. 
The Oromo groups together form the single largest ethnic group in 
Ethiopia, and the OLP thus presents itself as a significant threat. 
Although the OLP "had not, however, established themselves in any 
significant way among the Borana and their pan-Oromo ideology had 
not made much of an impact on Boranaland" (Shongolo 1996: 267), 
the perception remains that the government views the Borana 
with distrust because of the Oromo connection. The Borana are 
symbolically important to the Oromo ethno-nationalist movement, 
as they have the most "intact" Oromo traditional institutions, and 
are considered by many to represent their cultural homeland. 
These two processes together have meant that during the post-1991 
period, rightly or wrongly, there is a perception among the Borana 
that the government is pro-Somali and anti-Borana. It is in this 
context that the CBNRM projects in Borana have failed to live 
up to the high expectations that its proponents held for them, and it 
is not surprising that local people view them sceptically. Many of 
the organizations discussed above (such as GTZ) work in direct 
partnership with the state. Other NGOs find it difficult to work 
independently from the state, and it seems unlikely that local people 
perceive them as independent. Two of the most important principles 
identified by theorists for CBNRM in areas where resources are 
shared are the necessity for a clear definition of the boundaries of the 
natural resources and for a clear definition of the membership of the 
group who use them (Ostrom 1990; Agarwal 2001). Thus, the first 
stages of a CBNRM involve a decision regarding the unit which will 
be used for natural resource management, a decision on how the 
boundaries around those resources should be defined, and a decision 
on who comprise the legitimate community of users. 
This exercise to some extent mirrors some of the processes that have 
gone before, such as the establishment of the Peasant Associations, 
which were set up in the name of development but were a prelude 
to the control of people and the extraction of resources. Moreover, 
the exercise is reminiscent of, and draws immediate attention to, the 
way in which the contested boundary between Oromiya and Somali 
Regions has been drawn, and areas allocated to the Oromo or Somali 
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respectively. In this context, the CBNRM activities are viewed as 
similarly political, as they too have the potential to be part of the 
ongoing struggle of different groups to extend their control over 
resources. When discussions are held with "traditional leaders" about 
Borana life and culture, they take place in a context in which the 
culture of the Borana has been objectified and appropriated by the 
OLF. Such discussions and attempts to form partnerships are seen, 
therefore, as being full of political intent. They are not viewed as 
being concerned with genuine empowerment or culturally appropriate 
development, but as motivated by the desire to monitor the Borana 
more closely, because of the suspicion that the Borana may be 
harbouring ethno-nationalists. Alternatively they are viewed as 
attempts by the state to capture and therefore neutralize the cultural 
capital of Borana institutions that is currently used to the advantage 
of the ethno-nationalists. The central principle of these CBNRM 
projects involving the partnership between external agents (including 
the state) and the traditional institutions is undermined by distrust, 
sometimes on both sides. One man's words reflect this suspicion 
of the government's intentions: 
The principles of the Borana are now becoming weaker. They are 
becoming weak because the government started interfering. They 
started to attend the "meeting of the multitude." They are putting 
pressure on the administrators of the wells, who are no longer 
permitted to punish those who do wrong. The system is still there 
but it is weaker ... The bad thing is that the whole thing is becoming 
political ... The hand of government is moving more and more into 
Borana and into the life of the Borana. People who used to live in 
peace together are being put against each other by the government. 
They plant fear in your mind, and then you don't speak freely. Even 
you can't speak without peering through the chink of light in the door 
to see who's listening. Most difficulties come from the government -
there are others, but most come from this. 
(Author's interview, Man B, 2000)13 
In this context it is not surprising that GTZ/BLDPD backtracked in 
their attempt to work with "traditional institutions." They found the 
"traditional institutions" did not constitute ready-made institutions 
that could be harnessed easily for improved NRM. They found that 
the institutions lacked a straightforward, bounded, spatial dimension, 
and that they were embedded in complex social and political 
processes that made them difficult to use. 
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SOS Sahel are continuing in their approach, as they do not see 
politics as having the potential to corrupt Borana institutions as 
the Borana man cited above appears to believe. There is a danger, 
acknowledged in my interviews in 2000, that in taking this approach 
they might be seen as pro-Borana and pro-Oromo; such a position 
would be highly problematic in this highly charged political 
situation. This danger is not ameliorated by some SOS Sahel 
literature, however, which makes scant references to non-Borana 
or non-Oromo people. In a 2003 summary, for example, non-Borana 
people are described as "returnees," relegating them to the status 
of refugees and implying that their rights to use resources are 
secondary. Although this may be the case for some people, the 
complex history of rights to resources and the way it has been 
contested over time shows that the claims of different groups need 
further exploration and sensitivity. 
Conclusion 
CBNRM projects in Borana turned to traditional institutions in the 
hope that they would provide a ready-made set of institutions that 
could be harnessed for more culturally appropriate development. The 
traditional institutions were seen as the legitimate representatives 
of the community, who could be used to define and to access that 
community. The traditional institutions had also historically been 
involved in the management of trees, land, and water resources, as 
well as in resolving conflict between people and groups. In the post-
conflict situation, at a time of social disruption and environmental 
degradation because of ill-conceived development projects, it was 
therefore hoped that partnerships could be formed with traditional 
institutions in order to achieve the multiple aims of social cohesion, 
improved livelihoods and improved environments. At a juncture 
when other approaches had failed, working with traditional 
institutions could be presented as a fresh approach. When many 
organizations needed to reach people stretched out over large areas, 
this approach built on existing institutions and knowledges. 
Although many of the development organizations active in 
Ethiopia acknowledged the cultural histories of the areas where 
they were working, the traditional institutions were rarely seen as 
being implicated in these political processes. History was seen 
as something that happened to institutions, undermining their roles 
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and responsibilities without involving them or changing them 
fundamentally. If traditional institutions are conceptualized 
as outside political processes, it is easier to think of forming 
partnerships with them and to strengthen them to facilitate 
development and create an improved environment. These 
development programs are themselves thought necessarily to be 
outside the realm of politics. 
Instead, the research has shown how historical-geographical 
processes unfolded in the region, so that the Borana, in common with 
other groups in the area, became involved in political struggles of 
various kinds. Assertions of identity and cultural practices were and 
are intertwined with struggles for natural resources. Claims to natural 
resources are fought in terms of claims to be the "traditional" 
inhabitants of an area, claims to the ritual tribute of other groups who 
wish to use those resources, and claims to have the "correct" set of 
rules to use those resources. Over time these struggles have become 
interwoven with national and international political processes, 
particularly the division of territories into states and regions. Identity 
and claims to access have become equivalent to each other and they 
are both political. 
CBNRM projects have experienced difficulties because they are 
inherently and inevitably political. The process of identifying which 
community to work with invariably means promoting one community 
over another. 14 Recognizing traditional institutions as the signifier 
and legitimate representative of a community is likely to mean 
promoting one ethnic group or clan over another. In a context where 
historically rights to resources are defined in terms of ethnicity, this 
possibility is heightened dramatically. In the Borana case, there had 
been some degree of resource sharing in the past. Recognizing only 
the Borana traditional institutions has the capacity to entrench their 
dominance in the region and produce an increasingly exclusive 
control over resources. This process is exacerbated by the way in 
which CBNRM projects delineate specific areas of natural resources 
over which traditional leaders are thought to have jurisdiction. 
A further reason why the CBNRM projects have proved problematic 
was the legacy of the distrust between the Borana and the 
government, a distrust that also extended to other development 
organizations working in the region. The political power plays that 
are part of the CBNRM processes are likely to increase these feelings 
of distrust. The Borana believe that the government and others are 
Notes 
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carrying out CBNRM projects due to political and security concerns, 
rather than philanthropic motives. The context of political struggle 
and mistrust means that there is little room for genuine partnership. 
Discussions about development goals and priorities are constrained 
by a focus on improved natural resource management, and by ideas 
that this can only be achieved by delineating certain areas and 
defined users. In this context, the local cultural relations that people 
maintained with natural resources take second place to these 
particular conceptions of natural resource management and 
conservation. 
In CBNRM projects, therefore, culture is interpreted in a narrow 
sense as a resource that can be used to achieve certain aims. The 
more creative open-ended idea of culture as "structures of feeling" 
(Williams 1977; also see Chapters 1 and 10, this volume) appears 
only in this case as a force of nationalism which has the potential 
to result in conflict. The development organizations are perhaps 
therefore right to be afraid of it, but if they ignore it, and portray 
some idealized notion of culture and traditional institutions then 
they will experience other problems. The projects that they 
promote become intentionally or unintentionally part of the 
very political struggles that CBNRM projects were designed to 
circumvent. Further breakdowns in trust and more suspicion may 
result, leading not to a culturally appropriate development, but 
to heightened animosities. 
The fieldwork on which this chapter is based was carried out as part of research 
project entitled "Reconstruction of Renewable Natural Resource (RNR) 
Management Institutions in Post-Conflict Countries," or "Marena project," 
funded by the Department for International Development, UK. Fieldwork 
was carried out in Mozambique in 1999, and in Ethiopia in 1999 and 2000. 
Each of the three visits was for between one and two months. The paper 
also draws on findings from fieldwork in Mozambique by colleagues Black, 
Serra, and Schafer. A more detailed and direct comparison of the Mozambican 
and Ethiopian post-conflict situations can be found in Black and Watson 
(forthcoming), which also discusses some similar elements of CBNRM projects 
in both countries. Mozambique and Ethiopia are two countries in East Africa 
which are rarely compared, but which experienced similar periods of civil 
conflict under socialist regimes from the 1970s to early 1990s. They have 
also both experienced periods of relative peace since the early 1990s. 
2 See, for example, Kopytoff(1987) or Spear and Waller (1993) for accounts 
of the high levels of change and mobility among pre-colonial societies. 
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3 Figures from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on http: //www.theirc. 
org/index.cfrn/wwwID/2132 (accessed May 2005). 
4 A new land law was implemented in 1997 and amended in 1998 and 1999. A 
new forest and wildlife law was put forward in 1999 and approved in 2002. 
5 This is referred to informally as the right to divorce. A nationality (defined by 
shared ethnicity) has the right to divorce if "a demand for secession has been 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council 
of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned" and certain other conditions 
are met (Article 39.4a, 1995: 14). 
6 Report by Leyla Alyanak (http: //www.fao.org/News/1996/961204-E.HTM, 
accessed, April 2005). 
7 The Borana in fact straddle this border, although they are the dominant ethnic 
group in the region on the Ethiopian side, and in a minority on the Kenyan side. 
Although Borana people may move across the border (freely in search of 
pasture or in response to political crises), many remain on either the Ethiopian 
or Kenyan sides. The policies with regard to CBNRM and governance more 
generally on either side of the border have been quite discrete. This paper 
focuses on the policies and experiences on the Ethiopian side. 
8 On the blurring of racial and cultural meanings and categories, see Chapter I 
(this volume). 
9 See Donham and James (1986) for more on the history of people of the 
Ethiopian borderlands. 
10 See Watson (2003) for excerpts of the discussion in one such meeting. 
11 The aha dheeda is an individual customarily responsible for access to an area 
of grassland (known as dheeda). 
12 Although the conflict was mainly between the Borana Oromo and Somali 
speaking groups, there had also been some conflict between Borana and 
Gabbra. The Gabbra people are viewed with distrust by some Borana because 
of what are viewed as their Somali traits: although they speak Afaan Oromoo 
like the Borana, they keep camels, make houses, and to some extent also dress 
more like Somali peoples. The label "post-conflict" only fits the Ethiopian 
situation in the sense that it refers to the situation and sets of policies that 
followed the end of the large-scale civil conflict in 1991. There has been 
localized conflict since then, and also a war with Eritrea, but neither have been 
on the scale or had the widespread impact of the previous protracted conflicts. 
13 Interview translated in situ from Afaan Oromoo by Adi Ruka. 
14 The process of recognizing one leader over another also may provide one leader 
with political recognition and power, while denying recognition and power to 
others. The process of recognizing a particular leader also assumes that they 
represent the community, but the act may strengthen their power and position 
over others in the community. This chapter cannot explore these processes, but 
some discussion can be found in Black and Watson (2006). 
.» Indigenous groups, 
culturally appropriate 
development, and the 
socio-spatial fix of Andean 
development 
Sarah A. Radcliffe and Nina Laurie 
Latin America's diverse and numerous indigenous peoples have 
historically had a problematic relationship with development, due 
to their subordination as cheap labor in market and non-market 
economic relations, and their marginalization from mainstream 
development interventions. 1 For the region's estimated 40 million 
indigenous peoples, 2 the experience of development has been one 
of racism and the predominance of non-Indian prioriti(?S, as 
development planners and states have largely seen Indians and 
indigenous cultures as an obstacle to modem and W estemizing 
development projects (Stavenhagen 1996).3 In this context, 
indigenous populations contest the cultural economies of which they 
form an integral part in order to rework unequal relations, resist 
changes that worsen their position, and become resilient in the face 
of discrimination (Pacari 1996; Katz 2004). In the words of a report 
on Latin America, "indigenous people demand an equal position with 
other citizens and full access to the results of development ... [but] 
they do not want to be developed necessarily within the framework 
of dominant development models" (Pirttijarvi 1999: 10-11). 
As a consequence of the repositioning of culture in development 
thinking and practice (Chapter 1, this volume; Watts, this volume) 
and sustained indigenous protest over the past two decades, 
indigenous engagements with development have recently been 
transformed, although not completely to many Indians' satisfaction. 
Indigenous development targets Indians as project beneficiaries, and 
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often includes them in the design or implementation of projects. 
Celebratory accounts of indigenous development view it as a way 
in which "participatory planning can contribute to decentralized 
decision-making; stimulate the participation of the grassroots in local 
planning, help rural communities formulate development strategies, 
and increase the sustainability of investment" (Uquillas 2002: 14). 
However although indigenous peoples' specific cultural and 
institutional contexts have been awarded greater acknowledgement 
in development thinking and practice, indigenous empowerment 
and secure access to livelihoods remain difficult to establish and 
guarantee. As we see below, indigenous development measures do 
not necessarily permit Latin American Indians to set the terms of 
interventions. One reason for this is that current development policy 
confines indigenous groups to restricting places, activities, and 
relationships with non-indigenous groups. Our chapter's argument 
is that, despite efforts to rethink the relationship between indigenous 
people and development, Indian culture is incorporated into 
development thinking and practice within particular imaginative 
geographies of policy.4 These developmental imaginative 
geographies fix indigenous development to limited scales, spaces, 
and social groups reflecting a spatially fixed vision of culture as 
localized, ethnically homogeneous, and founded on gendered 
divisions of labor. The concept of spatial fix originates in Marxist 
geographers' critiques of capitalist political economy, where capital 
seeks a spatial fix for its economic crises by disinvesting in one 
region and investing heavily in another place in dynamic 
topographies of redevelopment. One response to such processes is 
an increase in place marketing, as the uniqueness of certain places 
- expressed in cultural economic terms - are promoted to attract 
funding away from other areas. In the context of indigenous 
development, the commercialization of artisan goods or indigenous 
services (such as ethno-tourism and eco-tourism) attempts to 
attract foreign tourist capital and in turn diversify vulnerable rural 
livelihoods. In order to maintain profit levels, capital cyclically 
creates new built environments for expansion, while leaving other 
areas behind, thereby producing a constant process of creative 
destruction and uneven development (Smith 1984). Despite their 
distinct intellectual origins, we combine the concepts of imaginative 
geography and spatial fix in creative tension to provide a materialist 
critique of cultural relations, and a post-structuralist take on political 
economy. Together the concepts provide an insight into Andean 
cultural economies where development thinking and practice are 
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making productive use of the category of indigenous culture. 
Drawing on examples of indigenous development from Andean 
countries, our chapter explores the conditions under which 
development can bring greater benefits to indigenous peoples as 
well as the limits on development's transformation. 5 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we outline the diverse 
positions of Andean indigenous people vis-a-vis development, 
contrasting rare successful examples of indigenous controlled 
socioeconomic improvement with the majority experience of poverty 
and marginalization. In the second section, the chapter examines how 
development thinking and practice has transformed the treatment of 
indigenous culture in recent decades, particularly in its celebration 
of Indian cultural specificity. A more detailed analysis of projects in 
the countries of Ecuador and Bolivia in the third section permits a 
critical evaluation of the implications of such development thinking 
and practice for Indian people. Moving back to Latin American 
examples, the following section explores the socio-spatial fix by 
which developmental imaginative geographies shape the kinds of 
indigenous development available to transform Indian well-being. 
Indians in development: diverse positions and opportunities 
Due to the uneven landscapes of development across Latin America 
and differentiated experiences under colonialism and republican rule, 
indigenous people are positioned in political economies and projects 
in highly diverse ways. Small-scale Amazon societies' recent 
engagement with global oil companies brings them into very 
different development interactions to those of highland Indian 
peasants whose labor has been exploited by resource extraction (such 
as mining) as well as commercial agriculture over five centuries. 
Despite these disparities, highland and lowland Indian groups 
come together to propose improvements to government policy as 
exemplified by six Ecuadorian indigenous organizations' coordinated 
contestation of the neo-liberal Agrarian Development Law in 
the early 1990s. In spaces such as these, indigenous activism has 
worked across ethnic difference as well as frequently across national 
boundaries, making them interlocutors with donor, NGO, and 
government agencies where issues of culture and development are 
considered. It is possible to identify patterns of interaction between 
development and indigenous cultures, in order to distinguish between 
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conditions under which Indian groups perceive benefits from and 
control over development, and situations of development lack. In 
other words, although the majority experience of indigenous groups 
is one of poverty and cultural marginalization, there are situations 
within which improvements in living standards are compatible with 
retention of an ethnic cultural identity. 
Where - unusually - Indian groups have retained management of 
local resources and economies, they have been able to make social 
and economic gains while maintaining dynamic and resilient cultural 
identities. Independent craft production with Indian control over 
marketing and proceeds of sales is based upon secure tenure to 
sufficient land through the twentieth century and investment in 
community institutions (in terms of time, commitment, and money). 
The combination of independent craft production, non-capitalist 
social relations (including reciprocal labor and goods exchange), 
and high levels of ritual activity (supported by gains from capitalist 
economies) has beneficial impacts on cultural and development 
indicators (Stephen 1991). Whether among the Otavalo weavers 
of Northern Ecuador, or the Nahuatl bark painters in Guerrero state, 
Mexico, high levels of household and community involvement in 
market economies as producers and/ or merchants is balanced 
by active, sustained contributions to cooperative activities and 
non-market exchanges. Among Zapotec weavers in Mexico, for 
example, three-fourths of households contributed to, and drew upon, 
community-based interest-free loans of labor, cash, and goods, and 
actively participated in annual ceremonial cycles through which 
social ties were strengthened (Stephen 1991: 116). In the Bolivian 
Andes, Indian households treat community activities - specifically 
ritual events - as crucial to reproduction, spending around 10 percent 
of their income on these items while simultaneously engaging 
in migrant labor and product sales (Platt 1982: 45). Moreover, 
reasonable access to markets is a crucial precondition for indigenous 
productive enterprises (North and Cameron 2000). Where sufficient 
levels of infrastructure, information, and credit exist, Indian 
producers have been able to overcome problems of market access 
and control. In this context, Bolivian indigenous women for example 
have created international trade links for marketing their medicinal 
products (Sikkink 2001 ). The combination of independent forms of 
production and access to credit via indigenous kinship networks also 
underpins indigenous garment workshops producing fake designer 
jeans in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Here, the resilience of Quechua 
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cultural identities occurs via the transfer of skills from rural to 
urban places, and the social reproduction of key events in the rural 
communities' cultural calendar (Laurie 2005). A comparison across 
28 self-generated Latin American indigenous projects identified ten 
preconditions for success, some of which have been mentioned 
above. The preconditions include basic human rights, food security, 
secure land and resource rights, indigenous participation in planning 
and implementation, intercultural education, strengthening Indian 
civil organizations, diversification of production, appropriate financial 
and technical assistance, and state support for indigenous self-
development (Griffiths 2000: 16-17). When these factors come 
together, indigenous opportunities for self-managed and culturally 
enhancing livelihoods are greater; the rarity of this combination 
of factors too often results in material deprivation. 
Although highly diverse in language, ethnic identity, livelihoods, 
and political perspectives, the most likely development situation for 
an indigenous person to find her/himself in is one of relative 
marginalization and exclusion from development benefits. In the 
world's most unequal region, Latin America's Indians are found 
among the poorest of the poor. In the Central Andean countries 
of Ecuador and Bolivia, Indians are on average among the poorest 
groups, a situation reflected in low levels of monetary income, poor 
health and education indicators, and low life expectancy. Around 64 
percent of Bolivia's Indians are under the poverty line, compared 
with around 50 percent of the total population (Davis 2002). In 
Ecuadorian parishes with an indigenous majority, around 85 percent 
are poor, making these places 32 percent poorer than the national 
parish average and 14 percent poorer than the average rural parish 
(Uquillas 2002: 5). In Mexican municipalities with large numbers of 
indigenous people, four-fifths of residents live in poverty (Pirttijarvi 
1999). The reasons for Indian marginalization are numerous. The 
general lack of access to education is a common pattern for many 
indigenous individuals, due to the underfunding of rural and urban 
Indian areas and widespread racism in curricula, policy, and teaching 
staff. In Bolivia, indigenous individuals receive three years less 
schooling on average than non-Indian people, while in Peru, 
indigenous adults have one-fifth fewer years schooling than their 
non-indigenous counterparts (Pirttijarvi 1999: 9). 
High levels of poverty and marginalization reflect Indians' frequent 
subordination to unevenly developed political economies and their 
political exclusion from national and agency decision-making 
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processes. An agricultural census undertaken in Ecuador by SwissAid 
together with Indian confederations found that three-quarters of the 
country's basic foodstuffs came from small, largely indigenous, 
producers yet they controlled only seven percent of irrigation water 
(Authors' interview 2000). Global commodity chains involving 
Indian producers are often long and weighted towards end 
consumers. Ecuador's Otavalo weavers thus receive only I/400th 
of their products' final sale price when exports go via middlemen to 
the United States (Meisch 2002). Guatemalan Indian women weavers 
from San Pedro Sacatepequez were no better off in the 1990s than 
they had been in the 1970s when they first started producing cloths 
for sale (Ehlers 2000). Andean rural producers, many of them 
indigenous, provide indirect subsidies to urban consumers as they 
use more of their own labor and less capital than capitalist farmers, 
reinforcing the undervaluation of Indian labor and generating only 
low prices for their food products (Lehmann 1982). 
Indian groups have often been sidelined by state and international 
development programs as their "culture" - often defined in closed, 
static, and one-dimensional ways - has been blamed for their 
inability or unwillingness to engage in the activities associated with 
modem progress. In Latin American republics, Euro-American 
sociocultural features have been consistently valued above 
indigenous elements, a perspective long underpinned by racist 
explanations for Indian "backwardness" (Graham 1990).6 
Development agendas have thus been profoundly shaped by the 
regional racial formations within which they are debated and applied 
(White 2002; also Chapter 1, this volume on racial formations). Elite 
non-indigenous groups often expropriated indigenous communities' 
land while tying Indian labor to agricultural and workshop 
production by harsh debt peonage. During the twentieth century, 
Indian cultures and economies were treated as "problems" that 
required a combination of cultural change, assimilation into 
nationalist schooling and identities, and greater involvement in 
capitalist economies as consumers and laborers (Larson and Harris 
1995). As many Indians were located in rural economies, mid-
twentieth century development projects treated them as peasants -
rural producers whose productivity and agricultural techniques were 
to be improved along Western lines (Escobar 1995).7 Due to poor 
rural educational provision and limited political representation, 
indigenous groups had only restricted opportunities to take control 
of development projects and local political economies. For example, 
agrarian development funds and social development funds are 
The socio-spatial fix of Andean development • 89 
difficult for indigenous people to access (Authors' interview, 1999). 
Faced with racism, assimilating national cultures, and a lack of rural 
opportunities, many Indians abandoned indigenous identities and 
rural areas. During periods of rapid rural-urban migration during 
the mid-twentieth century, Indian families and individuals took 
advantage of more open urban economies and societies to rework 
social and cultural identities away from the stigmatized Indian 
category (Rowe and Schelling 1991; Larson and Harris 1995). It 
was widely assumed in Latin America, as in other world regions, 
that indigenous cultures would disappear as development progressed 
(Hettne 1996: 15). 
During the 1980s, however, a number of factors came together, 
prompting a rethink of indigenous culture and the role of Indian 
groups in national and economic life, in the context of shifting 
development paradigms. While some of these factors have their 
counterparts elsewhere in the world, some were specific to Latin 
America ( see Chapter 1, this volume). 8 The first of these factors 
was Latin America's 1980s reversal of development known as the 
"Lost Decade" when economic downturn and rising international 
debt levels caused increasing levels of poverty, unemployment, and 
worsening health and educational measures for most social groups. 
Disillusioned with modernization paradigms, Latin America went 
through a development crisis in the wake of which highly diverse 
options were pursued. While certain actors vaunted neo-liberal asset 
privatization, state budget cutbacks and globally oriented production 
(Dezalay and Garth 2002), others turned to romantic views of 
Indians, while others advocated "local authentic solutions," religious 
revivals or postmodern skepticism (Larrain 2000). 
A second factor was Indian political mobilization across a number 
of countries to demand more secure land titles, decision-making 
power, and an end to discrimination (Brysk 2000). Although 
some Indian federations had been established in earlier decades 
- Ecuador's Shuar Federation was founded in 1964, for example -
the 1980s saw the emergence of more numerous organized groups, 
an educated leadership, and growing coordination at national 
and international levels (Brysk 2000). In the wake of peaceful 
civil protest by indigenous organizations and other movements, 
nation-states established constitutional and legal rights to bilingual 
education, means to register land collectively and to cultural 
recognition (Assies, van der Haar, and Hoekema 2001; Sieder 2002). 
Most Latin American countries enacted varying degrees of economic 
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restructuring alongside multicultural reforms, which gave indigenous 
populations contradictory positions within which to rework or 
resist economic, social, and political reforms (Hale 2002). As a 
consequence of these simultaneous reworkings of Latin American 
cultural economies, many indigenous people became subjects that 
engage the cultural project of neo-liberalism: "neo-liberalism did not 
undermine indigenous cultural difference ... but instead engaged 
Indian difference to symbolize a different kind of subject - the 
Indian citizen - a subject who acts as a global rational being with 
rights and needs" (Valdivia 2005: 290). 
The third factor was the increasingly formalized set of international 
measures to protect the world's indigenous groups and their human 
rights (Tennant 1994; Brysk 2000). The United Nations and other 
multilateral bodies began to redress indigenous populations' unequal 
access to rights and security. Ratification of International Labor 
Organization (ILO) convention # 169 by a number of Latin American 
states established a baseline for the inclusion of indigenous 
development agendas, as it established Indian rights to collective 
territory, decision-making powers over development, and respect 
for cultures (Brysk 2000). 
As development projects that ignored the specific problems and 
concerns of indigenous people often failed, the events outlined above 
provided a new impetus to listen to indigenous people when they 
offered alternative development proposals. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and human rights networks who had been 
working alongside indigenous people for more culturally appropriate 
forms of development found themselves consulted and recruited into 
national and international initiatives (Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe 
forthcoming). In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organizations 
protested against harsh restructuring policies and called for a greater 
say in development planning and implementation (Pacari 1995). In 
Colombia's Pacific Coast region for example, logging, hydroelectric 
and mining activities damaged indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
livelihoods and the environment. Mobilizing a range of support 
organizations, diverse ethnic groups put together a series of proposals 
for indigenous and Afro-Colombian participation in decision-making 
and socially and environmentally sustainable development (Atkins 
and Rey-Maquieira 1996). In the northern Ecuadorian province of 
Esmeraldas, the custodial rights and management practices of Afro-
Ecuadorian groups to mangrove swamps have been recognized in a 
new ecological reserve (Ocampo Thomason in press). 
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During the late 1980s and particularly from the 1990s, bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies began to overhaul their policies 
systematically to take indigenous peoples into account. National 
governments wrote policy papers on indigenous development in 
order to direct overseas aid and assistance practice ( countries 
included Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Finland). In line with other European approaches, the Dutch 
policy is informed by the wish to hold national governments 
responsible for indigenous peoples' treatment and to maintain 
Indian cultural identity (van Schaik 1994). Responding to Latin 
American Indian confederations and indigenous government 
representatives, an international "Indigenous Fund" was established 
in 1992, based in the Bolivian capital La Paz, to make grants for 
indigenous development from a large endowment. Similarly, 
multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank, and 
Inter-American Development Bank established specialist groups 
and formalized policy on indigenous issues. The World Bank's 
operational framework on indigenous people, known as OD 4.20, 
shifted policy from a reactive to a proactive mode whereby projects 
affecting indigenous groups would work for informed indigenous 
consent and targeted development projects. Between 1992 and 1999, 
one sixth of the Bank's Latin American portfolio was in indigenous-
related projects in environmental, social, rural, and human 
development (Davis 2002: 234). Despite draft revisions of the Bank 
policy in 2004, after a decade's application of OD 4.20, indigenous 
and human rights groups remained critical of how multilateral policy 
gave Indians no right to self-identification nor to prior and informed 
consent to projects (Bank Information Center 2004). 
Development and indigenous culture: changing paradigms -
From the late 1980s, and with increasing speed, development 
began to take indigenous people into account to an unprecedented 
extent, seeking to bring economic development and cultural goals 
into harmony. In the words of the region's major international 
development agency, "strengthening cultural identity and sustainable 
development are mutually reinforcing" (Deruyttere 1997: 9). In Latin 
American culture and development thinking, the tendency has been 
to equate culture with indigenous culture, with both neo-liberal 
and Marxist economists viewing "traditional" cultures as positive 
instances of cooperation and as a means of resisting globalization 
(Hojman 1999: 175; Carranza 2002; compare Chapter 1, this 
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volume). In the (often ambivalent) contrast between a Western-
oriented modem national culture - including appropriations of 
Indian folklore (Bigenho, this volume) - and "backward" indigenous 
cultures, the search for cultural difference and authenticity leads 
back to indigenous forms (Rowe and Schelling 1991).9 In line with 
wider debates about globalization's threat to cultural diversity (see 
Chapter 1, this volume), the protection of "indigenous languages, 
cultures, values [and] use of indigenous knowledge" (Davis 1999) 
underpinned World Bank and environmentalists' responses to dam 
building and similar development. By contrast, many indigenous 
actors view themselves as "shuttling between discourses" (Valdivia 
2005) as well as cultural and development identities, seeking to 
make connections between cultural expressions and neo-liberal 
development and constructing multiethnic coalitions, rather than 
treating Indian cultures as merely vulnerable pockets of difference. 
Development's profound shift in the treatment of indigenous cultures 
has coincided with the dominance of the neo-liberal development 
paradigm. This is not the place to go into a detailed examination (see 
Watts, this volume), but suffice it to say that neo-liberal development 
thinking shapes the context for indigenous development paradigms 
and practices, albeit in highly diverse, uneven, and often contested 
ways (Lamer 2003). 10 Drawing on a wide repertoire of concepts and 
practices, neo-liberal development extends its core concerns with 
dynamic market economies, reworked governance, and deregulation 
into indigenous development. It views indigenous populations 
as exemplary representatives of the power of social capital, the 
dynamism of small-scale entrepreneurialism, and non-state forms 
of authority and leadership (Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 
forthcoming; also Watson, this volume). Acknowledging the 
persistence of indigenous poverty, neo-liberal approaches have begun 
to target programs at Indian groups ( and at other poor groups) and to 
recast development's racial formations around indigenous difference. 
Celebrating examples of indigenous "can-do" attitude, the current 
mainstream view argues that indigenous development 
is most likely to occur when indigenous peoples have access to 
basic resources for their social reproduction, including food security 
and basic health conditions; have achieved a high degree of social 
organization and political mobilization; have been able to preserve 
their cultural identity; have built strong linkages with outside 
organizations; and have productive patterns that allow for subsistence 
and earning cash income. 
(Partridge and Uquillas 1996: paragraph 20) 
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Social capital, that is the mobilizing networks and relations of trust 
that underpin a sense of community, has been identified as one of 
Latin American indigenous groups' key resources (Radcliffe, Laurie, 
and Andolina forthcoming; compare Loomis 2000). According to one 
multilateral assessment, "social exclusion, economic deprivation and 
political marginalization are sometimes perceived as the predominant 
characteristics of Ecuador's indigenous people. But as they often 
remind others, indigenous people also have strong positive attributes, 
particularly their high level of social capital" (van Nieuwkoop 
and Uquillas 2000: 18). Neo-liberal development presumes that 
social capital strengthening will expand other forms of capital while 
retaining indigenous groups' cultural specificity (Davis 2002: 232-3). 
Neo-liberal development thinkers argue that Indians' exclusion from 
development has negative economic impacts, and that consequently 
their inclusion in development will have beneficial impacts not 
only on Indian incomes but also on economically unstable national 
economies. According to a major World Bank report on indigenous 
development, Indian exclusion from the market economy represents 
"a massive waste of human and non-human resources; their inclusion 
would lead to a productivity boost, strengthen purchasing power and 
promote growth" (Partridge and Uquillas 1996, paragraph 17). 
In the context of neo-liberalism, indigenous development is often 
framed as one component of a vigorous market economy, freed 
from the shackles of the state and embedded within strong social 
norms. Accordingly, cultural diversity becomes an engine for 
economic growth as it is intrinsically connected to the market and 
has the additional advantage of operating within culturally specific 
institutional arenas outside the state (Radcliffe and Laurie 2006). 
Within this policy approach, indigenous groups' contribution to 
development is to come from their economic activity. Neo-liberal 
development emphasizes the need to make Indian goods and 
services available to markets and encouraging Indian groups' 
business acumen. As part of boosting of non-traditional exports, 
products such as organic cocoa, quinoa (an Andean grain), 
distinctive clothing, and wood products are encouraged by 
multilateral development projects. In 2004, for example, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) granted Guatemalan 
Indian producers of organic fair trade coffee US$461,000 to 
boost exports. 11 The IADB views the small-scale coffee farmers' 
association Manos Campesinas as a prime example of social 
entrepreneurialism, as the community-based enterprise combines 
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"sound business practices with a strong social commitment" (IADB 
2004). Likewise, Latin American governments together with non-
governmental organizations and international development agencies 
have initiated programs of ethno-tourism, eco-tourism, and 
"traditional" music exports in order to boost the earnings from/for 
indigenous groups. Although less market-oriented than neo-liberal 
ones, NGO-led projects also encourage indigenous populations to 
develop culturally distinctive activities, although these approaches 
often additionally have an empowerment agenda which engages more 
in challenging racist exclusion. However, the latter approaches tend 
to receive less funding and prominence in debates than neo-liberal 
programs. Indian groups are encouraged to develop ethno-agriculture, 
organic agriculture, indigenous crafts, inter-cultural education, and 
non-mainstream media and communication (Kleymeyer 1995; Healy 
2000; compare Kaplan 1995). Given the exclusion of many Latin 
American indigenous populations from core citizenship rights, there 
is much mileage in addressing the highly uneven coverage of health, 
education, banking, and technical assistance services in majority 
indigenous areas, issues addressed by indigenous political and human 
rights organizations (Stavenhagen 1996; Molyneux and Lazar 2002). 
Pro-indigenous development in Ecuador and Bolivia: 
the end of marginalization? 
--=•w@aw -•mm••----•mmam ,wwmm•mrn--~ 
[Andean Indians] really maintain their culture, their own identity. 
There's really a lot of vigor in their culture, their technologies, their 
wisdom. 
(Authors' interview with major international 
NGO, Lima 2000) 
Indigenous development projects in Ecuador and Bolivia illustrate 
the parameters of development thinking about indigenous culture, 
while also permitting an analysis of the implications of this version 
of culture and development for beneficiary populations. In Bolivia 
and Ecuador, indigenous development has galvanized the support of 
a wide range of development actors from local indigenous village 
associations through to multilateral agencies. However any 
celebration must be tempered by the recognition that the multiple 
actors involved in "culturally appropriate" projects have widely 
varying capabilities to shape the direction and extent of change, 
and the multiple geographies it engages. With large numbers and 
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percentages of indigenous populations, Ecuador and Bolivia grapple 
with the difficulty of profoundly reorienting a racialized development 
trajectory in more inclusionary ways and attempting to control an 
increasingly globalized economy around the diverse interests and 
cultures of their multiple ethnic groups. Around 40 percent of 
Ecuador's population speak an Indian language, self-identify as 
indigenous and/or live their lives by indigenous social organization, 
in one of nine major groups. In Bolivia, Indians comprise 59 percent 
of the population, in 36 linguistic groups, although Aymara and 
Quechua-speaking people comprise 25 and 33 percent of the 
highland population respectively. Andean indigenous development 
engages highly diverse actors, paradigms, and geographies although 
in the two countries examined here, the main actors are the nation-
state ( often in conjunction with multilateral development agencies), 
non-governmental organizations, and indigenous organizations and 
communities. 
Across the range of Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous 
development projects, two major approaches can be identified. On 
the one hand, culturally distinctive products and services are brought 
into development agencies' promotion of non-traditional exports and 
entrepreneurs, while on the other hand "traditional authorities" and 
institutions are rediscovered as the basis for reworked forms of 
governance (Radcliffe and Laurie 2006; also Watson, this volume). 
Indigenous cultural difference is recognized in Andean countries' 
development yet it is visible very largely in the terms constructed 
by the "Indian citizen" slot. Indigenous cultural economies are 
perceived in policy as culturally embedded yet are interpreted as 
incipiently capitalist: 
So in my view the indigenous people can actually enter the market 
and be successful, although it doesn't mean they follow the Protestant 
model of capitalist accumulation or into individualized businesses; 
they can follow a more community-oriented business. 
(Authors' interview, La Paz, 2000) 
Responding to international negotiations with indigenous peoples 
and non-governmental organizations, the Bolivian government 
passed indigenous rights legislation and made "development 
with identity" the basis of Indigenous Ministry policy. Given 
that indigenous development went national at the same time as 
governments established profound neo-liberal economic and social 
restructuring, it is no surprise that the predominant model adopted 
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was a market-oriented and institutional one. Preparatory documents 
detail how indigenous development needs to explore the "economic 
advantages of the live indigenous culture, whether native or 
vernacular, as it applies to urban and rural cultural goods and 
services ... and religious and folkloric practices. [ ... ] Other 
expressions of live indigenous culture are crafts, weavings, pottery, 
wood carvings, leather work, and Amazonian products" (World 
Bank personal communication). Indigenous development was to be 
the cornerstone too of participation and decentralization processes 
(that is, politico-administrative reform) (Calla 2001). In contrast to 
previous attempts to make Indians into W estem class actors as rural 
farmers, agrarian development funds now allocate 10 percent of 
budget to projects of cultural recuperation (Andolina, Laurie, and 
Radcliffe forthcoming). Bolivia's new Leaming and Innovation 
indigenous development Project aims to build on indigenous 
knowledge to generate projects in ethno-tourism, ethno-biology, 
and agriculture, all of which are designed to be marketable and 
competitive (World Bank personal communication, 1999). Following 
the agendas outlined above, many large donor inspired projects focus 
on promoting indigenous human capital and expertise through various 
professionalization programs (Laurie, Andolina, and Radcliffe 2005). 
A similar range of indigenous development initiatives exist in 
Ecuador, where the nation-state has coordinated with Indian 
confederations and multilateral agencies to put together attempts 
at more culturally appropriate development specifically involving 
or targeting Indian populations. A number of examples illustrate 
the range of experiments that emerged in this context. Among the 
Amazonian Napo group of Quechua Indians, a Canadian-funded local 
NGO attempted to promote indigenous culture via a museum, ethno-
tourism and ceramic crafts. Working from the NGO director's view 
that "viable cultural practices are those that integrate successfully 
with the market," the project clashed with indigenous concerns about 
the ownership and benefits from this commodification (Wilson 2003: 
168). The revaluation and promotion of material cultures was further 
endorsed by the Inter-American Development Bank, which granted 
US$1 million to Ecuador's indigenous ethnicities to promote their 
entrepreneurial capacities. 
Phase One of the Development Project of Indigenous Peoples and 
Afro-Ecuadorians of Ecuador (PRODEPINE I)12 funded the 
recuperation of indigenous culture, which is equated with festivals, 
rituals, and archaeological sites, during the mid- l 990s. Funded by 
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the World Bank, Ecuadorian government and IF AD (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development) to the tune of US$50 million, 
PRODEPINE I funded festivals, video work, and crafts to "rescue 
and strengthen a rich cultural patrimony." Over the project's 
lifetime, PRODEPINE I supported cultural identity and strengthened 
indigenous organizations, as well as benefiting around 1,300,000 
indigenous women and men (IFAD 2004). One of PRODEPINE I's 
central aims was to recuperate and spread knowledge about 
indigenous culture within Indian groups, thereby strengthening 
ethnic identity and cultural forms. In workshops on culture, 
participants discussed and recorded (in written and video formats) 
different groups' languages, clothing, festivals, forms of reciprocity 
and solidarity, beliefs, burial rituals, social sanctions, music, and 
dance. With the agreed strategy of support for the handicraft 
and tourism sectors, the project ran concourses to establish quality 
standards and held intercultural fairs and events, where services and 
products "can be displayed and promoted" (van Nieuwkoop and 
Uquillas 2000: 21-2). The project's cultural component supported 
the production of four documentaries, 28 festivals of music, and 
three workshops on cultural inheritance, yet was evaluated as 
unsatisfactory as the "aim is to insert culture well into income 
generating activities and productive investments" (Uquillas 2002: 
15), and income did not match expectations. One project element 
was the creation of trademarks, labels, and certificates to highlight 
the quality and distinctive cultural origin of goods and services 
but was little used (van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas 2000: 22). 
In the second phase of PRODEPINE, funded to US$40 million and 
approved in June 2004, successful project components are 
programmed to continue alongside new elements founding the 
project more securely upon the notion of cultural difference. 13 
Community investments, land-titling, scholarships, and institutional 
strengthening, perceived as strong parts of the first phase, are 
to be extended while new work in natural resource management 
and cultural development defined in terms of community values and 
cultural assets are to be added (ITDG 2005). The number of 
targeted beneficiaries is set to increase to 1.5 million indigenous 
and Afro-Ecuadorian people (World Bank 2004 press release), while 
more attention will be awarded to ethnic and cultural variations, 
with separate development plans for Indians and Afro-Ecuadorians 
respectively (Japan PHRD 2003). Central to PRODEPINE II is 
the training and technical assistance to communities engaged 
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in handicraft production and marketing, community-based tourism, 
and production and marketing of products based on ethno-biological 
knowledge and resources (Japan PHRD 2003). Privileging culturally 
distinctive products and services, the project's second phase 
establishes indigenous groups more securely within a globalizing 
and differentiated consumer-led type of capitalist development. 
Looking across the various examples of indigenous development -
whether devised within neo-liberal multilateral development agencies 
or emerging from historically embedded patterns of indigenous 
autonomy and livelihood - the factor of indigenous security appears 
to be a crucial element. Otavalo traders in textiles have a marketable 
identity and social capital, yet income depends on secure access to a 
market stall and stable supply marketing chains (Kyle 1999: 436). 
The fields of biotechnology, bio-prospecting, intellectual property 
rights, and exploitation of medicinal plants offer insecure ownership 
(Authors' interviews New York and Quito, 2000). Despite many 
years of mobilization to clarify collective land rights and individual 
title, indigenous development projects can be slow and inefficient 
with regard to this means of security. PRODEPINE I's component 
of land registration was slow to get off the ground and relied heavily 
on a national NGO that had many years experience of working with 
Indian land claims, and project resources available to the NGO for 
this work are limited (Griffiths 2000: 33). Only after a decade of 
transnational social movement and NGO pressure did the World 
Bank revise its indigenous policy to recognize individual and 
collective land rights. 
Indigenous groups are currently being encouraged to undertake 
certain types of activities which often engage them in sustained 
interaction with members of multiple and diverse ethnic, national, 
and racial groups. Given the histories of many indigenous groups, 
especially peasant populations in the Andean highlands, these 
interactions are not unprecedented. Indigenous women traders 
who rely upon tourist sales have long known the importance of 
an indigenous appearance in enhancing their "authenticity" and 
likelihood of success in both service and artisan sectors (Cone 1995; 
Crain 1996). Yet in the context of globalizing economic relations and 
Indians' growing reliance upon the external sales of services and 
products, these relations take on a new urgency. 14 The maintenance 
of a highly controlled and costly form of bodily self-presentation 
has become increasingly important in a wide-range of post-
Fordist employment (e.g. McDowell 1997). Moreover, Indians' 
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self-presentation risks restricting them to a devalued identity, as the 
racism that underpins the boundaries between Indian and other 
racialized identities often remains in place. 
Development needs to build upon Indians' existing multiethnic and 
cross-cultural relations to challenge expectations of colorful ethnics 
and widen knowledge of the realities about Indian livelihoods and 
concerns. Quechua women in the Bolivian organization ASUR trade 
their weavings across the world, communicating with many diverse 
cultures yet rely upon working over four months to raise US$ I 00 per 
item (Healy 2000). ASUR's creative work to "use cross-cultural 
education to adapt the market to the [indigenous] artisans" (Healy 
2000) illustrates how empowering intercultural practices and respect 
can develop from multiethnic encounters (see also Bigenho, this 
volume; Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). 
Indigenous development on the ground: socio-spatial fixes? 
Using Latin American examples, we now explore how indigenous 
societies and spaces are represented in policy and then how 
development practices rework Indian development opportunities. 
Responding to economic and cultural concerns, indigenous 
development projects attempt to bring Indians more successfully into 
niche global markets and to establish the basis for cultural identity 
and strengthening of indigenous institutions and social relations. 
Indigenous development policy thus plays a role in reproducing the 
geographical, economic, social, and cultural relations through which 
indigenous groups are reproduced inside capitalist political cultural 
economies. Our question here is thus, to what extent does indigenous 
development practice in effect provide a "spatial fix" on indigenous 
development and, if so, in which geographies? What are the 
implications of these for indigenous well-being? In the following 
examples, we explore the sub-national regional imaginative 
geographies, the gendered fixes of indigenous development, and 
questions about urban indigenous groups. 
The first risk in indigenous development is attempting to provide 
one solution for a highly diverse population, whose engagements in 
economic and cultural relations are often highly differentiated and 
even mutually incomprehensible. As the example of PRODEPINE I 
illustrates, a blanket policy can be founded upon imaginative 
geographies that mark out one homogeneous group of indigenous 
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people as a norm. PRODEPINE I has garnered respectful 
assessments as much from its multilateral donors as from 
longstanding critics of targeted neo-liberal programs. However, 
commentators consistently point up the ways in which it works on 
the ground, shaping and reshaping the spaces of development and 
the relationships of diverse ethnic groups to the project. The project 
proclaims its commitment to "development with identity" and 
"interculturality" yet paradoxically uses the same procedures for 
diverse ethnic and cultural groups (IFAD 2004). Although founded 
upon the notion of (ethnic) difference, the project in practice does 
not take cultural, geographical, and political-administrative variability 
into account. Specifically, there is a widespread perception among 
project beneficiaries and commentators that the project was primarily 
designed for the Sierra region of Ecuador (that is, the Andean 
highland region). Indeed, the Sierra received 63 percent of total 
funding. Moreover, project elements were implemented more quickly 
in the Sierra than in the lowlands or coast (Griffiths 2000: 28). Thus 
although the project was designed to supercede historical associations 
of Indians with poverty and the Andean mountains, the imaginative 
geography of policy in effect has refixed the Andean Sierra as the 
place where indigenous development occurs (Radcliffe, Laurie, and 
Andolina forthcoming). Reflecting Andean Indian experiences of 
land insecurity and peasant economies, as well as regional forms 
of indigenous organization, this imaginative geography of indigenous 
development policy uses a specific interpretation of socio-spatial 
relations in other, very different contexts. As a consequence of the 
Andean policy template, Amazonian indigenous groups and Afro-
Ecuadorian populations argue that the project does not address their 
core concerns nor provide them with the expected benefits. The 
Shuar group in Ecuador's Amazon found that public participatory 
workshops on development priorities clashed with culturally 
established processes of lengthy kin-based discussions (Larreamendy 
2003: 185-6). Pressure groups and multilateral agencies have 
begun to call for specific multiple Amazon and Afro-Ecuadorian 
PRODEPINEs in order to address these shortcomings (IFAD 2004). 
Another dimension of spatial fixing is the way in which indigenous 
women are treated in indigenous development projects. Indian 
women's development concerns are wide-ranging and challenging to 
any development agency. Compared with indigenous men and non-
indigenous women, the majority of Indian women find it difficult 
to access education, training, secure employment, and adequate 
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healthcare and bodily well-being. 15 Depending on specific local 
gender divisions of labor, rural-based Indian women can find 
themselves undertaking more agricultural work when men out-
migrate, or women are the first to migrate into urban areas ( often as 
domestic servants) as in many Ecuadorian highland areas. In Chile 
too, Mapuche women are more likely to migrate to cities than 
Mapuche men, although they then face "hard poverty" due to 
poor qualifications, racism, and limited job opportunities beyond 
domestic service (Gonzalez 2003). An underlying expectation of 
much development thinking is that women form the basis of a 
culturally and spatially distinctive rural indigenous community, an 
expectation that profoundly shapes policy and practice (Radcliffe, 
Laurie, and Andolina 2004). Many policy-makers and Indian leaders 
represent women as actors who maintain an ethnic group's cultural 
distinctiveness by rearing children, speaking indigenous languages, 
and wearing ethnic clothing. 16 Asked why their organization focuses 
on indigenous peoples, one international NGO staff member replied: 
The most marginalized group, the most dispossessed are the Indians. 
In this large group, the second thing is ... Look - it's a group that can 
be considered as a reserve really, the possessor of ancestral cultures 
and in relation to this, particularly the women. 
(Authors' interview 2000) 
Reporting on the nature of Ecuadorian indigenous social capital, a 
World Bank policy document argued that women are more likely to 
stay in communities with high levels of social capital (World Bank, 
personal communication 1999), thereby associating women's work 
in sociocultural reproduction with localized settings. 
Development projects then devise mechanisms for indigenous women 
that reinforce or build upon these preconceptions, if indeed they 
take gender into account at all (see Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 
2004)! In PRODEPINE I, women were awarded micro-credit 
facilities that built up locally oriented productive activities in women-
only groups based in villages (Tene, Tobar, and Bolanos 2004). 17 
Under the project indigenous women were granted capital of around 
US$500 per village for savings schemes (cajas solidarias), compared 
with the average of US$15,000 for a "general" village project 
(Authors' interview 2000). By granting women such small amounts 
of capital, the project reinforced a localized set of gendered activities 
while working against women's diverse itineraries of migration, and 
travel for trade and exchange (Authors' interview 2000). While no 
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doubt raising women's confidence and expanding domestic small 
animal production, the reinforcement of a women-only "add on" fails 
to address women's lack of power to decide on broader dimensions of 
indigenous development, gain access to land, and further careers. 
Diverse Ecuadorian Indian women highlight these latter development 
issues as central to their demands, yet they are rarely incorporated 
into mainstream indigenous projects. Evaluating PRODEPINE I, 
IF AD "could not verify the existence of a gender strategy that 
promotes women's decision-making and opportunities for training, 
business management, lending for land purchase and legalization, 
scholarships and other project interventions" (IF AD 2004). 
A final aspect of indigenous development's spatial fix concerns 
the silences in policy about urban-dwelling indigenous people and 
national cultural economic relations. Under the existing indigenous 
development paradigms in operation in Latin America, Indians are 
represented as rural, often peasant, producers and the existence 
of large numbers of indigenous people in the region's cities and 
towns is downplayed or ignored completely. As one Bolivian 
indigenous leader commented, the Aymara people "includes urbanite 
professionals, not only campesinos [ rural dwellers]." Although 
policy-makers do picture Indian merchants in urban economies, they 
are seen as exceptionally entrepreneurial and hence not representative 
of the majority of Indian populations. Indigenous organizations 
have criticized policy for this rural bias, for example, by drawing 
attention to the lack of an urban dimension to the World Bank's 
revised policy on indigenous development (Bank Information Center 
2004). Indigenous leaders astutely point out the inconsistencies of 
multilateral development policy for failing to address Latin American 
societies as multicultural and racialized. In a meeting between 
highland indigenous leaders and counterparts from Guatemala, 
Bolivia's bilingual intercultural education program was critiqued for 
being applied "only in the countryside, not in the city," thereby 
reinforcing the association of culturally distinctive Indian subjects 
with rural areas and non-Spanish fluency (Fieldnotes 1999). By 
separating out distinctive Indian rural areas, many indigenous 
projects reinforce an understanding of indigenous livelihoods as 
distant from wider political economic processes and actors. The 
inability of small-scale community projects to intervene in neo-
liberal development policy at the national and international levels is 
highlighted by Indian organizations, independent commentators, and 
project personnel (Authors' interviews 1999-2004). Although donors 
view PRODEPINE II as offering high strategic rewards, the project's 
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annual funding of US$40 million for 2004 and 2005 will be dwarfed 
by neo-liberal competitiveness and structural adjustment loans which 
will total some US$ I 00 million annually in 2004-7. 
Conclusions -
The cultural economies of Andean indigenous peoples exist in the 
interstices of uneven developments and exclusionary racial 
formations within which the combination of security, access to 
resources and markets, and recognition as full citizens is rarely 
achieved. The resultant severe consequences for the development 
opportunities of the majority of the region's Indians have recently 
been taken on board by policy-makers who highlight the potential 
offered by cultural difference as the basis for a distinctive 
development strategy. Yet the imaginative geographies of policy 
concerning Andean indigenous peoples - as local, rural, and 
culturally distinctive - tends to reinforce the exclusionary features of 
existing cultural economies. Although concerned about the potential 
loss of Indians authentic cultures under globalization, indigenous 
development policy tends to offer the global market as the arena 
through which cultural difference is to be reproduced. The spatial fix 
of capitalist political economies continues to tie Indian groups to 
ethnic homogeneity and an arena outside the mainstream, articulated 
around the model of the "Indian citizen." The Indian citizen 
embodies the goals of good governance (under the leadership of 
traditional authorities) and market-led development (ethnic crafts and 
tourism). Imaginative geographies of policy and the spatial fix thus 
combine to create a circularity of argument - a local, ethnically 
homogeneous, and rural Indian cultural economy will give rise to a 
(profitable and governable) local, ethnically homogeneous, and rural 
Indian cultural economy. 
Under indigenous development projects, indigenous people are often 
highly motivated to succeed but continue to experience precarious 
working and living conditions as a result of low wages, variable 
working hours, and little long-term security. However valuable 
Indian services and products become in global markets, indigenous 
development is currently operating under the sign of restructuring 
where indigenous "freedom" to become business people occurs under 
forced adoption of the position of "entrepreneur" albeit without 
secure access to credit, institutions or cultural capital (see also 
Ellmeier 2003; Bigenho, this volume). Particularly in the context of 
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mainstream neo-liberal thinking where culture is reduced to product 
and institution (see Chapter 10, this volume), the challenge is to 
maintain a flexible and dynamic concept of culture in development 
thinking and practice. Whereas early and localized experiments in 
Andean indigenous development built upon the creativity of popular 
culture (Kleymeyer 1995), the challenge has been to balance 
instrumentalist and creative aspects as indigenous development has 
been scaled up and reworked in neo-liberal spaces and institutions. 
While recent policy represents a considerable advance on cultural 
economies that marginalized Indian labor, cultures, and societies, 
this comprises a limited interpretation of Indian culture and a 
misinterpretation of indigenous cultural economy. Separating 
economically beneficial behaviors from the sociocultural contexts 
that validate and underpin them works against the synergy of cultural 
identity and development opportunities. If the balance between self-
exploitation and ( economic and cultural) reward is forced into low 
rewards and exploitation by others then development activities have 
little long-term potential. As noted in relation to successful self-
generated indigenous development, Indians' engagement with the 
social and economic benefits of new activities can work well if the 
latter fit with an existing life. Skills in production and marketing are 
not built up overnight, while the sustainability of production, trade, 
and innovative responses to development opportunities relies upon 
the maintenance - not the destruction - of culturally meaningful 
social networks and events. The challenge in future development 
programs revolve around the need to move away from indigenous 
societies as automatically comprising a culturally distinctive and 
geographically discrete group whose impulse is to produce goods 
and services for global consumers. 
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2 "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
in their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the society 
now prevailing in those territories or part of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, 
as the basis of their continued existence as peoples in accordance with their 
own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems" (Martinez Cobo 
1987, quoted in Assies, van der Haar, and Hoekema 2001: 4). As the region's 
census rarely include questions on ethnic-racial grouping and in the context 
of indigenous identity's stigmatization, total numbers are based on informed 
estimates. Indians make up between 8 and 10 percent of the region's 
population, with 85 percent found in Meso-America (Mexico and Central 
America) and the Central Andes (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia). In 
this chapter, the terms indigenous people and Indians are used interchangeably, 
although many Indians prefer to be known by their language or cultural group, 
such as Quechua or Shuar. On the distinct difficulties of defining African 
indigenous peoples, see Barnard and Kenrick (2001). 
3 To attribute indigenous populations with specific cultures is problematic, 
given their long-term interaction with - and mutual influence of - non-
indigenous cultures. Nevertheless, as the definition of indigenous peoples in 
the previous note indicates, these groups often maintain distinctive relations 
with environments, social relationships, justice systems, and beliefs, more 
or less inflected by national and global patterns of meaning. Latin American 
indigenous cultures are highly diverse, varying with language group, patterns 
of (international) migration, and rapidly changing horizons of cultural reference, 
and structures of feeling (Stavenhagen 1996; Assies, van der Haar, and 
Hoekema 2001). 
4 Edward Said's concept of imaginative geography refers to the ways in which 
Others' places are imagined as separate, distinct and distant. Said provided a 
post-structuralist critique of the imaginative geography of Orientalism (Said 
1978). 
5 In this chapter we do not have space to discuss the diverse experiments in 
recuperating autochthonous crops and indigenous forms of agricultural 
techniques that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in several Andean countries 
(e.g. Healy 1996). 
6 The indigenista movements of Mexico and the Andean countries in the early 
twentieth century revalued and celebrated pre-Colombian Indian achievements 
(associated particularly with the Inca and Aztec Empires) and rewrote the 
narratives of nationalism but generally failed to challenge racist exclusion and 
poor Indian living conditions. 
7 For these reasons, recent development policy has encouraged the re-emergence 
of the term "indigenous" to replace the class-based and state-oriented term 
"campesino!peasant". 
8 In Latin America, culture - as opposed to indigenous culture - has been 
revalued in development for a number of reasons. Culture has been seen as the 
basis for collective action, a route out of the crisis in economistic thinking, a 
tool in fighting poverty and low self-esteem, the source of economically 
favorable attitudes, as a bulwark against globalization and to release the 
energies of the informal sector (De Soto 1989; Kliksberg 1999; Hojman 1999). 
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9 As a consequence, Afro-Latin Americans and other ethnic-racial groups have 
been relatively invisible. 
10 On neo-liberal development in Latin America, Gwynne and Kay (2004) provide 
a good introduction. Evaluations ofrecent shifts in neo-liberal policy and 
projects include Perreault and Martin (2005), Laurie, Andolina, and Radcliffe 
(2005), and Bondi and Laurie (2005). 
11 Coffee is of course a traditional Guatemalan export although the trade in 
organic and free trade products has a more recent history. 
12 In Spanish, the project is titled Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos 
Indigenas y Negros del Ecuador (The Development Project of Indigenous and 
Black Peoples of Ecuador). 
13 At the time of going to press, the second phase of PRODEPINE had been 
cancelled due to political events. 
14 Elsewhere we discuss how project managers' and policy-makers' expectations 
of indigenous appearance shape their decisions about which groups in a locality 
become beneficiaries of an indigenous development project (Laurie, Andolina, 
and Radcliffe 2002). 
15 It is extremely difficult to go beyond broad generalities about indigenous 
women, as - despite their incredible diversity and varied response to the 
conditions in which they find themselves - national governments and NGO 
projects rarely disaggregate national statistics by ethnicity and gender (see 
Vinding 1998; Radcliffe 2002). 
16 By contrast, indigenous men are more likely to be represented as traditional 
and modem, bilingual, and able to move between Indian and non-Indian 
spaces and societies (see Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 2004). 
I 7 In Bolivia, the Banco Solidario also operated group credit schemes targeting 
women. 
~ Laboring in the 
transnational culture 
mines: the work of 
Bolivian music in Japan 
Michelle Bigenho 
Since at least the 1970s Bolivian musicians have been touring Japan 
on short-term contracts, developing in that country one more niche 
market for an Other's music, much like the cases of jazz (Atkins 
2001), blue grass (Mitsui 1993), salsa (Hosokawa 2002), hip hop 
(Condry 2001), or tango (Savigliano 1995). For Bolivian musicians, 
these flexible transnational contracts with Japanese companies offer 
a remuneration that is near impossible for musicians to match within 
their home country. In this chapter, my ethnographic lens focuses 
on the intersection of Japanese and Bolivian interests as I follow a 
Bolivian music tour in Japan and consider both the Japanese 
contracting company and the contracted Bolivian musicians. In a 
double sense, my analysis is about the work of culture: the laboring 
processes that break sweats and raise creative juices, as well as the 
symbolic work that occurs so that Bolivian music can be appreciated 
by Japanese audiences. 
The work of these musicians can be located in the cultural economy 
of late capitalism, a context characterized by "the culturalization of 
economic life," and the privileging of cultural exchanges over 
economic and political ones (Ching 2001: 285). Cultural economy 
builds profits through the commodification of difference (Ching 
2001: 288) and the cultivation of multiple differentiated niche 
markets (Jameson 1991; Garcia Canclini 1992) that may provide 
limited economic benefits for those who supposedly embody and 
perform that difference. The primacy of a cultural economy comes 
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with the late or post-Fordist capitalist shift from a production-
oriented economy to a consumption-oriented one (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2000: 295; Ellmeier 2003: 5) 
While some approaches to cultural economy emphasize a media-
generated circulation of cultural symbols, (Ching 2001; Iwabuchi 
2002a), the examples I present emphasize cultural performances 
that are still at the margins of these media machines ( on cultural 
economy, see Chapter 1, and James, this volume). I follow a 
Bolivian band that is somewhat well known in Bolivia, but that 
has remained outside of any glitzy commercialized national or 
transnational fame. When Musica de Maestros (Music of the 
Masters) performs in Bolivia, they unabashedly follow a 
multicultural nationalist project, staging highland indigenous, 
lowland indigenous, and mestizo (mixed spanish-indigenous) 
musical forms. While staged indigeneity - that is, a presentation of 
indigenous identity which has been a part of the Bolivian music 
economy since at least the 1950s1 - used to focus primarily on the 
use of three instruments associated with an imagined Indian world 
(pan pipes, notched flutes, and small plucked instruments or 
charangos ), current Bolivian cultural politics demand specificity in 
the representation of different ethnic groups and an attention to 
perceived performance practices associated with particular groups 
and instruments. While the 1952 Bolivian Revolution brought 
the general inclusion of indigeneity into the national project, the 
specificity of today's musical representations is consistent with 1990s 
multiculturalism: the heavily debated pluri-multi model (ILDIS 1993; 
Alb6 1994) that speaks to a line of incorporation while maintaining 
many of the established hierarchies between mestizo and indigenous 
peoples. The representation of indigeneity is a crucial selling point 
for Bolivian musicians touring Japan, but in Japan some of the 
specificity demanded at home blends into a more general need to 
represent regionalized cultural difference. Within Japan that world 
of difference is often glossed as "Andean." 
In this case I explore the parameters of cultural encounters put into 
place by the export of culture, entering into that conceptually 
slippery realm between culture as a way of life, and culture as 
commodified representations (Wade 1999: 449). While development 
projects under globalization have emphasized "culture" as "a way 
for poor people to help themselves and the economy" (Elyachar 
2002: 500), in this work, Bolivian musicians have placed Bolivian 
local cultures on national and transnational performance stages. For 
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Japanese audiences, Bolivian musicians have to perform an ethnic, 
indigenous, or Andean Other, but following Jan Nederveen Pieterse's 
critique of the "ethnic economy" (Nederveen Pieterse, this volume), 
the business relations between the Japanese contracting company 
and the Bolivian musicians are not entirely bounded by conceptual 
categories of ethnicity. These cultural flows are transnational in the 
sense that neither the Japanese company nor the touring musicians 
work in any official capacity within their respective nation-states. 
But the projects of the company and of the musicians hardly subvert 
national projects either. The musicians consciously take on a 
nationalist project in their own forms of self-representation, and the 
contracting company sells the Bolivian show to Japanese schools -
realms of the state where Japanese national citizens are shaped. 
The transnational cultural flows, while constructed through cultural 
entrepreneurs, also work within spaces of the state. These details 
make it worth contemplating Aihwa Ong's call to consider how 
globalization processes may strengthen the state rather than weaken 
it (Ong 1996: 6). 
In the following analysis, I draw on ten years of ethnographic 
research on Bolivian music, ten years of performing with Bolivian 
musicians, a three-month music tour of Japan in 2002 with 
representatives of the Bolivian ensemble (Music of the Masters), 
and interviews conducted in both Bolivia and Japan, with Bolivian 
musicians who have toured Japan, and with Japanese who have 
been involved in playing, contracting, or sponsoring Bolivian music. 2 
During the three-month tour, I participated as a performing musician, 
playing 75 concerts in 88 days but, unlike my Bolivian colleagues, I 
received no payment from the company. 3 
Bolivian musicians in Japan fit into a cultural economy where their 
coveted qualities for employment include their development of 
multiple skills, their flexibility in terms of accepting contracts for 
lengthy tours, and their ability to convincingly embody cultural 
difference. Their employment situation mirrors that of the "cultural 
entrepreneur" who, according to Andrea Ellmeier, is replacing "the 
artist" in a post-industrial cultural economy (Ellmeier 2003: 10). The 
kind of flexibility required by the musicians' labor conditions sits 
in juxtaposition to the rigid views of culture that frame their staged 
performances. I argue that the late capitalist laboring in cultural 
difference is fundamentally driven by this juxtaposition between 
the necessarily deterritorialized work conditions and the ultra-
territorialized conceptualization of culture as something spatially 
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bounded and unproblematically authentic. First, I address how 
Bolivian music performances in Japan are shaped by somewhat 
fixed ideas of what is "Andean." Second, I discuss how Bolivian 
musicians' labor conditions in this process are characterized by 
repetitive tasks and flexible contracts, and how some Bolivian 
musicians are disturbed that they are not, under these conditions, 
treated as "artists." Finally, I address the symbolic work of cultural 
difference that operates in this particular global economy of music. 
"Andean" music in Japan 
Not every Bolivian musician gets invited to tour Japan. All those 
who have toured speak of an initial connection or contact. For Music 
of the Masters, that contact was ten years in the making and came 
through a man named Koji Hishimoto. In 1989, Hishimoto arrived in 
Bolivia with the intention of staying for three months and he stayed 
for seven years. His main purpose for being there was to learn to 
perform Bolivian music, specifically the wind instruments of the 
notched flutes and pan pipes. When Hishimoto met Rolando Encinas, 
a well-known notched flute player and director of Music of the 
Masters, in his broken Spanish, Hishimoto pointed at Encinas and 
said "teacher" and then pointed at himself and said "student," 
expressing the desire to set up a master-apprentice relation. Thus 
began an apprenticeship that became a partnership in the composing, 
arranging, and performing of Bolivian music, both within and outside 
of Bolivia. When Hishimoto returned to Japan, he began working as 
a guide and translator for Warao Neko, Laughing Cats - a Japanese 
entertainment company that contracted international groups to 
perform in schools and theaters throughout Japan. After a few years, 
Hishimoto facilitated an invitation to Encinas and the latter opted to 
tour under the name of his group, Music of the Masters. 
Music of the Masters in Bolivia consists of a 24-to-30 person 
orchestra that interprets the "master" composers of Bolivian music, 
drawing on mestizo-Creole genres as well as indigenous music from 
the highlands and lowlands of Bolivia. Much of the orchestra's local 
appeal derives from its novel form that breaks from the five-person 
ensemble that, since the 1960s, was popularized both nationally 
and internationally. Encinas developed the ensemble's repertoire 
by digging through archives for original scores, talking to Bolivian 
composers and their surviving relatives, and conducting fieldwork 
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in the Bolivian countryside. Most of the members of the group are 
mestizos from the lower middle class of Bolivia; only a few 
members more strongly identify with indigenous Aymara 
backgrounds.4 The ensemble has never had any official connection 
to the state, and Encinas has maintained a fiercely independent 
attitude about the group's productions. 
In Japan, Music of the Masters took an entirely different shape, 
beginning with the number of musicians who traveled. Only five 
musicians were invited from Bolivia, a number set by the Japanese 
company. If Encinas directed Music of the Masters in Bolivia, while 
on tour in Japan, he turned over much of the artistic direction to 
Hishimoto. Encinas depended on Hishimoto to musically translate a 
Bolivian nationalist artistic project into a show that would appeal to 
Japanese audiences. In a sense, this task entailed playing "Andean" 
music. "The Andean world," a knowledge construct that once was 
the realm of extensive anthropological inquiry, has since the 1990s 
come under extensive critique (Stam 1991 ). Just as scholars of a 
post-Edward-Said world want to avoid Orientalism (1978), scholars 
of the Andean region tiptoe around any possibility of committing 
Andeanism in their current work. Nevertheless, the power of 
Andeanist discourse remains strong within the shaping of 
transnational pro-indigenous development projects (see Andolina, 
Laurie, and Radcliffe forthcoming), and also within the imaginations 
that define transnational Bolivian music performances. To land 
touring contracts, Bolivian musicians perform Andeanism. While 
my more general fieldwork on this topic has revealed that Japanese 
professional musicians and hobbyists of this music manage extensive 
and detailed knowledge of different Andean music traditions, a 
general listening audience tends to lump Bolivian music under the 
general term "folklore." To this term the Japanese did not attach any 
national or ethnic adjective and understood the term "folklore" to 
mean only music from the Andes, and more specifically, any music 
that included the playing of quena (notched flute), zampoiias (pan 
pipes), and charango. In Japan, "folklore" is synonymous with 
"Andean music" and there is no other kind of folklore. 
The Japanese talk about being drawn to this music through Simon 
and Garfunkel's late 1960s recording of "El condor pasa." What 
audiences knew as the song that began, "I'd rather be a sparrow 
than a snail ... " was a 1933 composition by the Peruvian composer, 
Daniel Alamia Robles. Like tango in Japan, which had to go through 
the European metropoles before becoming popular in Japan 
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(Savigliano 1995), "El condor pasa," as filtered through the global 
song machine of the USA, was key in ushering in a European and 
Japanese boom in Andean music. Just as tourism demands "a 
generalizable culture that can be packaged and purchased" (Medina 
2003: 364), the commoditizing of Andean music for a global 
audience implied a similar process. Simon and Garfunkel's version 
of "El condor pasa" did this work of translation, bridging, and 
generalization. No performance of Andean music in Japan was 
complete without some rendition of this tune, and this became the 
second theme played for every performance we gave. Hishimoto 
would introduce the group, discuss the high Andes mountains that 
marked the group's geographic place of origin, and talk about the 
condor that flies high in those mountains. As a backdrop to our 
musical performance, a mural of the snow-capped Illimani mountain 
provided the visual cues for the context of La Paz, Bolivia. 
Hishimoto would gesture through an imaginary map of South 
America and would end by mentioning the Peruvian origin of the 
piece we were about to play. Hishimoto explained to me that the 
Andes mountains and "El Condor Pasa" were points of reference on 
the way to situating the audience within the frame of Bolivian music 
proper. As with most audiences, some people learned better than 
others. At the close of our concerts, Hishimoto asked the students 
to tell him where this music was from. He often received a range 
of incorrect answers including "Africa," "Mexico," Brazil," and 
"Argentina." At hearing these answers, Encinas would shake his head 
in frustration: "You can play your heart out in 40 degree [Celsius] 
heat and they still don't know you are from Bolivia." These incorrect 
answers never referenced the USA or any Asian country. Even for 
the inattentive listener, these performances were about non-US and 
non-Asian Others. 
After playing "El condor pasa," we moved into Bolivian themes, 
but some genres were seldom, if ever, played in these performances. 
In developing the repertoire for these shows, Hishimoto steered 
away from any genres that did not feature a steady one-two beat 
(2/4 or 4/4 meters). He commented on the desire to evoke audience 
participation in the form of hand clapping and in some cases, even 
dancing. For an audience whose members do not know the music, 
this kind of participation proves more difficult in genres played 
in more complex meters. During the Japan tour, we played no 
bailecitos, no carnavales, and only a few cuecas - all genres that 
form an integral part of Music of the Masters' repertoire when we 
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perform in Bolivia, but also genres that feature combined meters 
of two and three (6/8 and 3/4).5 
In his choice of repertoire, Hishimoto also emphasized a heavy 
drum-beat, another element that could potentially activate audience 
participation. Nearing the end of the tour, at about performance 
number 70, I had reached far beyond saturation point with the set 
repertoire and I begged Hishimoto to substitute just one piece, any 
piece. I was desperate; I suggested a different tune in one of the 
genres already included in the program. Music of the Masters had 
a vast repertoire - about 80 compositions at the time - but our 
Japanese performances varied only slightly from one concert to the 
next. Hishimoto responded by sighing quietly, shaking his head, and 
telling me that the piece I suggested did not include a part for the 
bombo - the large goat-skin-covered drum. My suggestion was 
quietly rejected as Hishimoto followed the aesthetic of keeping the 
sonorous element of the drum. I mustered up a smile and feigned 
enthusiasm for performance number 71. 
Our performances were intentionally educational and included 
several interludes of explanatory discourse. A part of every concert 
included a "demonstration of instruments," a section through which 
Hishimoto would talk as the appointed musician would solo on the 
instruments perceived to be quintessentially "Andean." A great 
number of these spoken interludes remained in our shows, even 
when we played for regular audiences in a theater. When I attended 
concerts of other Japanese musicians who played "folklore," their 
performances were also peppered with all kinds of explanations. Talk 
about the music seemed to be an integral part of musical shows that 
were presented as culturally different. Unlike more experimental 
approaches that might present culturally different performances with 
no explanatory discourse, expecting the audience to approach this 
difference as an audience might approach avant-garde works (see 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 205--41), the cultural difference of 
"Andean music" in Japan was assumed to need ample explanation. 
Cultural difference was not something to simply experience as a 
good time, but something to be contemplated educationally and 
pedagogically. "Bolivian music" in Japan was shaped to meet 
audience expectations about "Andean music" or folklore, and these 
expectations emerged through a global music economy that treated 
culture as difference. Japanese preconceptions about Andean music, 
perhaps set in the 1970s, continued to fix performance parameters 
for touring musicians of the early twenty-first century. 
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Laboring for Laughing Cats 
While interest in an essentialized cultural difference helped generate 
the musicians' contract for a tour of Japan, the musicians' labor 
conditions mirrored the widespread tendencies towards labor 
flexibility and flexible specialization that characterize post-Fordist 
capitalism (Amin 1994: 4). Capitalism has a long-term trajectory of 
"mobilizing and homogenizing the labor force on the one hand and 
formalizing difference on the other," and the contemporary focus 
on autochthony is a continuation of "the paradoxes of capitalist 
labor history" (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh: 2000: 427, 449). As Arjun 
Appadurai has suggested, "globalization of culture is not the same 
as its homogenization" and ultimately these global processes are 
articulated through the twin politics of sameness and difference 
(Appadurai 2002 [1996]: 57-8). Let me tum to more specific details 
of the tour that show how these paradoxes of capitalism work on the 
ground. 
The selection of five Bolivian musicians for the Japanese tour was a 
delicate matter and one that stirred jealousy on the home front. As 
Aihwa Ong points out, transnational flows of culture and capital have 
not brought an accompanying equality in the mobility of subjects 
(Ong 1999: 11). In general, this ensemble's musicians are the 
disempowered non-mobile subjects who have not been emancipated 
by global flows. Their mobility has been limited to very specific, 
short-term tours. Those who can participate in this temporary 
transnational cultural labor usually are underemployed at home and 
already existing within flexible labor contracts. If they are not in this 
tenuous position in Bolivia, a three-month tour and absence from any 
more stable employment is likely to move them into the realm of 
labor flexibility. When Saskia Sassen discusses the classifications for 
foreign workers in Japan, she names the first category as including 
"artists, religious personnel, and journalists," and she states that these 
categories "do not represent the typical migrant worker" (Sassen 
1998: 61). Bolivian musicians in Japan held entertainer or artist 
visas, occupying this atypical migrant worker position, but they often 
categorized their own labor activities as "service." At home and 
abroad, I have heard Bolivian musicians discuss their work in terms 
of "cultural service." While some musicians made this categorization 
with an attitude of "pride in honest work," other musicians 
complained about touring conditions and not being "treated like an 
artist." While Bolivian musicians may have entered as atypical 
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migrant workers (i.e. as "artists") they did not always feel treated as 
such. In selecting those who traveled, Encinas considered the musical 
demands of a five-person ensemble as well as the intense personal 
demands of working and living in shared space over a three-month 
period. Controversy emerged at home because, for the guaranteed 
earnings of this work, just about everyone in the ensemble would 
be willing to drop everything in Bolivia and tour Japan. In Japan, 
Hishimoto always joined the group, although initially, much like 
my own situation, he had to persuade the company to permit his 
embodied Japanese presence in the middle of this Bolivian 
performance spectacle. 
In a sense, Laughing Cats purchased the labor of the musicians for 
a set number of days and during those days the company would 
schedule as many performances as possible. Laughing Cats also 
arranged for the musicians' visas, paid their airfare and hotel, and 
distributed a US$30 per diem to each touring musician for the 
purchase of food. Upon finalizing the tour, sometimes a mere 36 
hours before departure, each member of the group received from the 
company payment for their work. Operating out of a small office and 
rehearsal space in Mitaka, Tokyo, Laughing Cats would often have 
two or three groups simultaneously on tour; a Chinese theater group 
and a Korean dance troupe were all on tour when I was in Japan in 
2002. Laughing Cats also sent Japanese troupes on performance tours 
abroad. For example, Hishimoto was once contracted to accompany 
a Japanese theater troupe in a tour of Mexico and Costa Rica. 
Hishimoto's work, as well as that of the tour manager, and sound 
engineer were - like the musicians' arrangement - short-term labor 
contracts that lasted as long as the tour, usually two or three months 
of work. Flexible labor contracts shaped the work of both Japanese 
and Bolivian members of the tour. 
Among Bolivian musicians, a Laughing Cats tour is viewed as a 
no-frills arrangement: lots of hard work and, according to some 
musicians, not a fair remuneration. Everyone on a Laughing Cats 
tour - musicians, manager, and sound engineer - was involved in the 
grunt work of setting up and taking down a performance, something 
that would happen one to three times a day, depending on how many 
performances were scheduled for the day. A particularly heavy 
workload would include up to three performances at three different 
schools within a single day, and this pattern was often repeated over 
several days within a single week. Tour members stayed in business 
hotels in the cities and in ryokans or traditional hotels in the 
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countryside; these arrangements often involved sharing rooms 
with other members of the tour. We all traveled in a medium-sized 
bus/truck, with just enough seats for those on the tour and ample 
space behind the seating area for sound equipment, instruments, 
costumes, and suitcases. After finishing the performances for the 
day, the group would often have three to eight hours of ground travel 
before arriving at the destination of the next days' performances 
and the night's accommodations. While some Bolivian musicians, 
because of the working conditions, traveled once with Laughing Cats 
and never returned again, other groups continued to return for annual 
tours. In spite of these working conditions, a contract with Laughing 
Cats still represented remunerated employment in music that simply 
could not be matched within Bolivia. 
Hishimoto told me he once entered a school director's office and on 
his desk he saw over 100 brochures advertising different performing 
groups. Many companies were competing for these contracts with 
schools. With this kind of competition, company workers, even those 
on short contracts like Hishimoto, our manager, and our sound 
engineer, felt the pressure to meet high standards of work. Those 
standards included a meticulous attention to punctuality, a serious 
attitude towards work, and the attempts to meet perceived audience 
expectations in a performance of cultural difference. Punctuality 
was key to the success of the company's work. Our Laughing 
Cats manager would drive the bus into the school grounds about 
15 minutes before our scheduled arrival. But to make that first 
appointment of the day, we had usually traveled five or six hours 
the previous day, making sure we were at a hotel within 20-minutes' 
drive of our first performance site. Each day the manager carefully 
studied maps, because this job was not about showing up on time 
to the same place of work every day, but rather about punctually 
arriving every day at two to four different, and previously unknown, 
places of work. Ideally, we would arrive two hours before show 
time. Within this timeframe, we had ample time to unload, set up, 
do a sound check, change our clothes, and perhaps even rehearse 
problem spots of the performance. Timing was crucial in the school 
context because students were scheduled to attend the special 
assembly of our performance, and these performances had to fit 
within the already highly regimented school day. If we gave one 
performance during the day, being punctual seemed quite easy, but 
when we had three performances in a single day, at three different 
schools, being punctual became a real challenge indeed. In one case, 
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we literally ran to set up a second show for which we had exactly 
25 minutes from arrival to show time. 
Each day involved a serious attention to this kind of work until 
the final show of the day. The Bolivians emphasized the importance 
of teamwork to unload, set-up, and strike the set. As the tour 
progressed, internal critiques inevitably surfaced about someone who 
wasn't quite doing their share. We usually had some time between 
setting up and doing the sound check. I used this time to play scales 
and exercises on the violin. As we moved into the fall months, and 
the mornings became cooler, many of the Bolivians began to grab a 
game of basketball during this short interlude. Most of our school 
performances took place in gymnasiums that doubled as theaters 
for staged events, and usually a basketball could be found in some 
comer of the venue. As Jhuliano Encinas, the guitar player told me, 
the physical activity warmed them up and helped them bring renewed 
energy and enthusiasm to what could easily become a monotonous 
performance routine. For the Bolivians, this kind of enthusiasm and 
energy, even if feigned, was a necessary element of good work on the 
tour. In fact, I was constantly under criticism by other group members 
because I apparently did not meet these standards of visible and 
demonstrable enthusiasm. In the middle of the show, another 
musician would annoyingly remind me to smile. I thoroughly enjoy 
performing with these musicians - the fatigue of the tour aside - but 
while my stage presence in Bolivian performance contexts might be 
critiqued for my musical interpretations, in those contexts I was never 
critiqued for lack of smiles or enthusiasm. Exaggerated enthusiasm 
was a particular labor demand in the Japanese transnational context. 
Musicians who had previously toured with this company would 
express their dissatisfaction in terms of whether or not they 
were being treated "like an artist." Being "treated like an artist" 
translated to accommodations in five-star hotels, comfortable travel 
arrangements that included air travel and bullet trains for long 
distances, and the ability simply to arrive at a performance, pick up 
an instrument, and play. Making music on these tours leaves little 
room for an artistic persona. The work is something of a mix between 
service, of teaching young Japanese students about Andean music, 
and assembly line production of aesthetic experiences. 
On occasions, the Bolivians' attention to pumping up energy and 
enthusiasm clashed with some of the Japanese's expectatipns about 
work. For example, one school director became very angry when 
she saw the Bolivian musicians playing basketball. The Bolivians 
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thought it was because they had not asked for permission to do so. 
According to Hishimoto, that was not the issue; rather, the director 
was upset because the school was paying them to work as musicians 
and to put on a show. She could not believe that these paid 
musicians were playing basketball on her yen, so to speak. In the 
context of this incident J. Encinas defended their game of basketball 
as a way to bring energy to their performances. On a daily basis, the 
musicians sought ways to laugh and joke on stage, and as the tour 
progressed I saw this as another strategy for keeping up enthusiasm. 
For example, in the second half of the show, we always introduced 
ourselves in Japanese - one of the few lines of Japanese we all had 
to learn. No one in the audience really knew our names, so we made 
a game out of giving ourselves silly names. Our sound engineer, who 
was studying Spanish and who understood more and more about 
the daily on-stage jokes, would complain about our lack of a serious 
attitude. I would often catch him hiding a smile as he crouched 
behind the sound board and tried to keep a straight face. 
Working in the culture mines entails serious attention to playing a 
role on stage: the role of musicians who enthusiastically want to 
share the music from their country. Tour members commented on 
the fact that this kind of energy and enthusiasm, through one 
performance after another, is probably the most difficult part of this 
work. Bolivian musicians' strategies for fulfilling these roles did not 
always meet with the approval of Japanese hosts who sometimes 
held conflicting ideas about how one should approach working in 
music and cultural difference. Bolivians were expected to be serious 
about work, but on stage they were expected to embody cheerful, 
happy-go-lucky natives who showed not an inkling of being worn 
down by the repetitive tasks of the tour. 
After a three-month tour, musicians returned home with money for 
everyday expenses, but also with limited capital that was invested 
in the construction of a house for one's parents, in sound equipment 
that could be "made to work" as another source of income, in the 
purchase of a car that could be "made to work" as a taxi, and in 
other living arrangements that moved one out of what is a very 
precarious position for a Bolivian musician - the payment of 
monthly rent. 6 Money earned while doing cultural work in Japan 
expanded one's repertoire of economic survival strategies at home. 
A Laughing Cats tour involved hard work, but work that Bolivians, 
coming from a country where remunerated employment is so scarce, 
were more than willing to endure. 
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To participate in these short-term employment "opportunities," 
Bolivian musicians have to be already within flexible labor 
conditions at home. While the work in Japan provides relatively 
significant income on a temporary and unpredictable basis, some 
musicians explicitly remarked on how the treatment on these tours 
leaves them feeling quite far from the heightened pedestal of "artist." 
In the next section, I turn to the symbolic work of performing 
cultural difference in the Japanese national context. 
Transnational politics of cultural difference 
In its labor contracts, the company preferred musicians from what 
might be called "Third World" contexts. I would suggest that the 
reasons for these choices were connected to tight competition for 
shows, economic limitations, and Japanese ideologies about national 
homogeneity. Bolivian "culture" is mobilized as a difference 
and is set up to work with the official ideologies of Japan as a 
homogeneous nation (Kelly 1991: 413; Masden 1997: 56; Sassen 
1998: 59). The myth of Japanese homogeneity, based on the 
metaphorical associations of "Japanese blood," has come under 
increasing strain within the contexts of Japanese returnees and 
foreign workers in Japan (Yoshino 1997). Pluralization of Japanese 
society is in fact challenging the long-standing myth of a 
homogeneous Japan (Murphy-Shigematsu 2000: 215). According 
to Kirk Masden, in the face of this pluralization, many of the 
official policies of the Japanese Ministry of Education continue to 
uphold the myth of homogeneity (1997: 29). Bolivian music, 
transformed into Andean music, works as a marker of cultural 
difference within the Japanese context, but it does so without 
threatening this country's core ideology of homogeneity. 
Partway through the 2002 tour, my Bolivian colleagues had to 
complete immigration paperwork, to extend by three days their stay 
in Japan under the "entertainers" visa. A company representative 
accompanied the group to complete their paperwork and en route 
to these bureaucratic dealings, I had a lengthy discussion with her. 
From Latin America, she said they hired groups from Mexico and 
Bolivia. She told me that Japanese like "happy music" and she 
quickly categorized under this term, the music from these two 
countries. She told me that the company had tried to hire a Native 
American group, but they were unable to do so because the 
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performing group demanded fees at a level beyond the company's 
budget. Although I did not ask her directly about contracting groups 
from the USA, she volunteered her thoughts, responding to me as 
if I might wonder about my own country's representation in this 
company's work. The company had considered bringing a gospel 
group, or even a "country" music band, she said. But they were 
afraid the fees would be too high, particularly since they would be 
coming from the USA. The geopolitical asymmetries of culture and 
power seemed to predetermine who would be hired as a performance 
spectacle for Japanese school children. While some Bolivian 
musicians, on the basis of tour conditions alone, would not tour a 
second time with Laughing Cats, there were still more Bolivian 
musicians who would jump at this employment opportunity. Bolivian 
and Mexican groups would accept the company's fee while Native 
Americans, from the US national context, had set a fee above what 
the company could pay and still run as a business. 
The company representative also mentioned that performances from 
Asian countries were high in demand. Since the co-hosting of the 
World Cup, she suggested, the Japanese had showed a renewed 
interest in Korea. She said, "There is a feeling we are becoming 
friends with Korea." The head of the company is married to a 
Chinese woman who also works in the company. Some of the 
interest in "Asia" may be facilitated by this personal tie to another 
Asian country, but it may also be part of Japan's "return to Asia" -
a renewed interest, since the 1990s, in the rising economic power of 
other Asian states (Iwabuchi 2002b: 547). According to Hishimoto, 
primary and secondary schools are required to sponsor one special 
performance each year, but it does not have to be a foreign group's 
performance. The Laughing Cats' representative told me these 
foreign shows were strongly recommended by the Ministry of 
Education. In qualifying her explanation, she referred to Japan's 
geography, saying that as a country of islands, it is difficult for 
Japanese to get to know other cultures. From her perspective, these 
foreign spectacles helped break an imagined cultural isolation in 
Japan. According to the company representative, these cultural 
performances were perceived as a way for Japanese students to get 
to know the world. Even as the space-time compressions of labor and 
symbolic capital are surely at work here (Harvey 1989), narratives of 
perceived Japanese isolation and homogeneity seem to propel these 
cultural performances in the first instance. Economic conditions 
determine who the Japanese company invites to occupy the position 
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of exotic other. Cultural workers from First World countries, even 
if relatively disadvantaged within their own national contexts, 
can afford to outprice a possible contract for touring Japan. Many 
cultural workers from Third World contexts are not in an economic 
position to be so choosy. 
Laboring in Bolivian culture within the Japanese context brings up 
old but still pertinent issues about culture and power. In his 1989 
essay, "Notes on the Global Ecumene," Ulf Hannerz commented 
on Japan's "low cultural profile" and questioned a simple reading of 
political and economic centers as exporters of culture. Hannerz takes 
apart some of the assumed patterns of cultural flows that supposedly 
occur between centers and peripheries, and argues that not every 
wealthy nation follows the US example by exporting its "culture" 
(Hannerz 2002: 38). Hannerz's "culture" within this argument refers 
to mass-mediated popular culture. In the same year, Renato Rosaldo 
published an argument about an altogether different angle on 
"culture." Rosaldo argued that those who seem to have culture (i.e. 
seem different) have less power and those who seem not to have 
culture have more power (Rosaldo 1989: 196-217). Things have 
shifted since these two arguments were published. For example, 
Japan's economic bubble has burst and scholars are noting Japan's 
current export of its mass-mediated popular culture (lwabuchi 
2002a: 4-5), particularly within other Asian countries ( Ching 2001: 
294). In relation to culture as perceived difference, Rosaldo's ratios 
still seem to operate. Within Japan, Japanese may view Bolivians 
as "having culture" even though the latter may lack the economic 
resources that would alter fundamentally their standard of living. 
But the Japanese see themselves as "having culture" too. Rosaldo's 
ratios are suddenly taken for a spin. When asked to compare their 
lives with those of Bolivians, the Japanese I interviewed reflected 
on their own fast-paced lives and expectations of an ultra-serious 
attitude, while turning to Bolivian cultural performances to lighten 
up. While Bolivians and Japanese recognized how they occupied an 
exotic slot, the socioeconomic inequalities between them still made 
their mutual encounter into a hierarchical one. 
Bolivia has long been a country whose natural resources have been 
mined to the advantage of non-Bolivians and a minority elite within 
Bolivia. Silver was mined for the Spanish empire, while tin benefited 
a few mining Bolivian barons. Gas has become the next item of 
extraction. In October 2003, popular sectors put the brakes on one 
more extraction for foreign benefit; they forced President Gonzalo 
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Sanchez de Lozada to resign and called for a national referendum on 
the sale of gas. Since 1985 and the Supreme Decree 21060, Bolivian 
governments have applied neo-liberal economic packages and 
walked a precarious path between the pressures of external sources 
of aid, like the USA, and the majority of Bolivians who have yet 
to experience any benefits after almost 20 years of structural 
adjustment. Alongside structural adjustment came an eventual rise in 
indigenous politics, both on the ground and within some government 
initiatives of the early 1990s. In the 1990s, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), the government, and indigenous groups 
played roles in the staging of indigeneity for international funding 
agendas. In using the performance metaphor, I do not imply that 
these activities were less significant or that they made indigenous 
peoples "less real": this would be to read the theatrical metaphor 
through Western ethnocentricities that view acting in terms of 
falsehood (Schieffelin 1998). Rather, I want to emphasize that these 
representations of indigeneity, although perhaps inclusive of more 
people who consider themselves indigenous, are like musical 
representations of indigeneity in that they are articulated through a 
multiplicity of groups and interests. 
On the national musical stage, Bolivian political transformations 
were transcribed into the previously mentioned attention to specific 
indigenous performance practices. In the midst of Bolivia's dire 
economic straits, the country attracts tourists to see its stunning 
lakeside views, appreciate its snow-capped peaks, visit its Pre-
Columbian archeological sites, observe Bolivians dancing in 
color:ful fiestas, and hear its diverse range of musical styles. While 
economically strapped, Bolivians present a visual pageant rich in 
cultural difference, and that cultural difference has been exploited 
for tourism and extracted for world export. 
One might write of the relative power of the Japanese next to the 
relative powerlessness of the Bolivians, and the importation of 
"culture" from the less powerful context resonates with Rosaldo's 
relative positionings of culture and power. But this case shows 
that both the Japanese and Bolivian workers who labor in this 
deployment of culture operate under similarly tenuous or "flexible" 
labor conditions; the "cultural entrepreneurs" (Ellmeier 2003) here 
are Japanese as well as Bolivian. While many discussions about 
power and cultural difference often hold implicit a Western/non-
Western dichotomy, a consideration of Bolivian music in Japan calls 
forth alternatives that do not necessarily fit this mode. The meaning 
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of culturally performed difference in Japan may not fit exactly 
that pervasive monolithic dualism, and to understand the work of 
Bolivian music in Japan, one must consider how difference operates 
within - or perhaps more appropriately said, outside of - ideologies 
of Japanese nationalism. 
Conclusion: the fixed and the flexible 
In this chapter I have explored what it means to labor in the 
production of Bolivian music performances in Japanese schools. The 
terms of that labor are shaped by what the Japanese audiences expect 
to get from a performance of Bolivian music. Cultural difference, I 
argue, is the Japanese's principal desired product of this labor, and 
the staged cultural differences of Bolivians symbolically work to 
sustain a Japanese nationalist ideology of homogeneity against a 
heterogeneous non-Japanese world. Touring Japan in this way is not 
generally the labor of love about which Bolivian musicians dream. 
There is the occasional performance in a spectacular Japanese 
theater, where the combined elements of a state-of-the-art sound 
system, lighting display, supporting crew, and crucial changes to the 
performed repertoire make for an incredible performance. But that is 
one performance in twenty. Encinas often reiterated that we were 
involved in a cultural labor (un labor cultural). For many touring 
members this labor made other economic strategies at home 
financially possible. Making money in the Japanese culture mines 
also permitted many of these musicians to engage in creative musical 
composition and performance in other contexts. Laboring in culture 
in Japan made it possible to engage, at other moments, in music as 
a labor of love. Bolivian musicians in Japan articulate complex 
positions in relation to their work. At the level of the daily repetition 
of tasks, they admitted the straightforward economic incentive in 
touring and talked about small capital investments that they hoped 
might tilt their economic position at home away from precariousness. 
On the other hand, these musicians are extremely proud of their 
country's music; they want it to be valued beyond the local subway 
station, and they discuss the tours of Japanese schools in terms of 
building future audiences. Celebration of their own music in Japan 
works like other celebratory narratives of world music that "tend to 
normalize and naturalize globalization" (Feld 2001: 197). Moreover, 
celebration continues despite the problematic side of globalization, 
which leaves culture workers with deep nationalist sentiments even 
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as their decontextualized labor builds "distantiation from place and 
its sociomoral pressures" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 303). In the 
face of the shrinking Bolivian nation-state (see Gill 2000), sentiments 
about national culture continue to fuel these transnational artistic 
activities. 
While the performance expectations for Bolivian musicians in 
Japan can be quite rigid, their labor contracts are fluid and unfixed. 
A three-month tour may be repeated over several years, but no 
guarantee is ever made for future contracts. After four or five years 
of touring, some Bolivian musicians have felt the results of being 
temporarily or perhaps permanently left outside of these contracts. 
These conditions divide musicians in the Bolivian context and push 
workers into individually negotiated entrepreneurial ties. While these 
conditions are perhaps not unique for people working in music, they 
are exacerbated by the effects of failed neo-liberal reforms that may 
have been dressed in the clothes of multicultural politics, but that 
have not brought acceptable living conditions for the majority of the 
Bolivian population. 
When Bolivian musicians tour Japan with Laughing Cats, both 
Bolivians and Japanese are involved in the work that produces and 
repeats cultural difference in a staged form, and those closest to 
the tour activities, Japanese and Bolivians alike are limited by the 
same short-term "flexible" terms of labor. Globalization of labor 
has harnessed culture workers at home with culture workers from 
abroad to produce, repeat, and fix cultural difference. In this process, 
ideologies of Japanese nationalism are fortified and Bolivians 
experience a sense of national pride in what they are doing, in spite 
of the fact that they are often first seen as Third World citizens, 
Andeans and Others before they are considered Bolivians. 
In another project, I have found that in Bolivia, indigenous music begins to 
emerge as staged "folklore" as early as the 1930s (Bigenho in press). 
2 My earlier research was supported by Fulbright IIE 1993--4, Fulbright Hays 
1994-5, and Hampshire College Summer Faculty Development funds 
1999-2004. Hampshire College sabbatical leave in 2002 made possible my 
presence on the music tour in 2002. A Whiting Foundation grant made possible 
my research in Japan and Bolivia during the summer of 2003. 
3 With my sabbatical salary from Hampshire College, I paid my own expenses in 
Japan, a financial position that somewhat puzzled the Bolivians. I had played 
The work of Bolivian music in Japan • 125 
with these musicians over the last ten years, and they were happy to have me 
on the tour, but they wondered how I could receive my salary when I wasn't 
working at my institution. I explained that I was conducting research. They 
nodded and got on with what for them was the real work of the tour, and in 
that real work, I participated as one more team member. 
4 Over the last ten years of performing with Music of the Masters, I have noted 
a major generational shift in the membership of the orchestra. Whereas the 
original membership consisted of many people who were already working 
and/or heads of households, the current membership is weighted more heavily 
with young people who do not necessarily maintain or contribute to households. 
The ensemble has never been pushed in a commercial sense, and some of the 
older members had to give priority to other groups through which they earned 
more money in their music performances. 
5 In other work, I have written about the performance practices and disputes 
about playing these meters in Bolivian music (Bigenho 2002: 47-54). 
6 Within Bolivia, a peculiar relation to property exists called "anticretico." 
The owner of a house or apartment leases the space to a person who is willing 
to put down a sizeable sum of money. The person may occupy the space for 
a year or more without paying a monthly fee in rent. Upon leaving the owner 
must return the lump sum to the "tenant." When musicians do not have the 
means to purchase a home or apartment, they use anticretico as a step out of 
monthly rent. 
C. Social capital and 
migration - beyond ethnic 
• economies 
Jan N ederveen Pieterse 
How does social capital relate to cultural difference? Considering 
the importance of cross-cultural trade and economic relations, 
historically and now (cf. Griffin, 1996, 2000), one would expect 
this to be a salient issue, but it hardly figures in the literature. The 
conventional assumption is that social capital is culturally bounded. 
In most literature this is precisely taken as the strength (particularist 
loyalties, lower transaction costs, and so on) and the weakness of 
social capital (group exclusiveness). There are two major strands in 
the literature. In one, cultural difference fades into the background 
and informal social relations and group bonds are at the foreground; 
this is the course taken in the work of Coleman and Putnam. In the 
other strand, culture (usually reified as "ethnicity") is both a resource 
and boundary of social capital; the latter terrain is the focus here. 
In a sense, this line of enquiry appears as an extended commentary 
on "ethnicity" as the pattern of a particular type of social relations, 
much of which is modelled in turn on the role of the Jews in 
commerce. This was the subject of classic studies in the field: 
Simmel's essay on The Stranger and Sombart's sequel study of The 
Jews in Modern Capitalism. An implication of these studies is that 
ethnic social capital is a pre-modem hangover in modem times. 
Immigrant enterprise is now widely considered to be a factor in the 
economic dynamism of many countries. A matter of keen debate 
in the USA and Canada is whether immigrant enterprises are more 
significant employment creators than domestic enterprises. Headlines 
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such as "Millions of Immigrants Needed to Sustain Economies" 
(Wordsworth 2000) are increasingly common in Canada, Germany, 
Italy, and several other countries. 1 Part of the wider backdrop is 
graying labor markets in several OECD countries. In addition, 
specific immigrant groups are viewed as making special 
contributions, such as Indian software programmers and Chinese 
engineers and programmers in Silicon Valley, and are actively 
sought after. While countries are relaxing rules to facilitate the faster 
deportation of illegal immigrants, they are relaxing immigration laws 
to facilitate bringing in desired migrant entrepreneurs, particularly 
with a view to attracting dot.corn enterprises and programmers.2 
In this context, several stereotypes of immigrant enterprise are 
gradually being left behind. For example, a study of Tunisian 
immigrants in France shows that, unlike in the 1970s, immigrants 
are now more often self-employed, community ethics give way to 
economic rationality, and commercial organization and transnational 
networks are developing. Research suggests that this also applies to 
Asian and Turkish immigrants in France (Boubakri 1999), and there 
are similar findings in Germany (()zcan and Seifert 2000). 
Meanwhile, in most research, attention remains focused on the ethnic 
character of enterprise. This chapter argues that "ethnic economy" 
is more often a misnomer than accurate. Cultural capital matters 
alongside social capital, but viewing it as "ethnic" in character is not 
helpful and is likely to be misleading. The second general point is 
that immigrant economies are often embedded within cross-cultural 
economies. The chapter considers whether "immigrant economy" 
would be a more insightful terminology, but finds similar problems. 
In relation to social capital, a key distinction runs between causes of 
social capital (norms and values, or "habits of the heart," and social 
networks) and outcomes, such as lower transaction costs (Newton 
1999). Among causes, a distinction runs between strong and weak 
social ties. Further distinctions run between bonding social capital 
(strong ties among close relations), bridging social capital (weak 
ties among people from diverse backgrounds but of similar 
socioeconomic status), and linking social capital ( or "friends in high 
places"). Considerations of cultural difference or "ethnicity" apply 
across these different dimensions of social capital and take on 
cultural hues, that is, each apply within and across cultural settings. 
The question of cultural difference and social capital arises in 
three different contexts: immigration and migration, transnational 
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enterprise, and ethnically diverse societies. In this treatment, the 
emphasis is on migration and immigrant enterprise. 
A related question is how is cultural difference conceptualized? 
Is "ethnicity" adequate or burdened by time? (for details, see 
Nederveen Pieterse 1997a, 2002). Much literature and reporting on 
ethnicity is fraught with friction, tension, antagonism. The media 
report on ethnicity mainly when it generates problems, oppression 
or conflict, in line with the media principle "when it bleeds it leads." 
But what of the situations when ethnicity does not entail conflict or 
when conflict is minor? This chapter opens by probing the notion of 
social capital, while the next section deals with the problematization 
of "ethnic economies" and "ethnicity." This leads to shifting the 
focus onto cross-cultural enterprise. Because a historical dimension 
is often missing in this line of research and focusing on the present 
confines analysis, immigrant economies are considered here in 
a historical setting. This yields several types of cross-cultural 
economies, which can be linked to varieties of social capital. The 
closing section considers the policy ramifications of the shift in 
orientation from ethnic to cross-cultural enterprise. 
Social capital 
The theme of social capital emerges on the heels of human capital. 
Just when the importance of capabilities, capacitation, and 
enablement is recognized, the attention shifts - "It's not what 
you know, it's who you know!" (Barr and Toye 2000). Also on the 
horizon is cultural capital, and another newcomer is natural capital. 
A background consideration ( discussed below) is that none of these 
would add up to much without economic resources. And so the 
debate runs the course of several forms of capital - economic, 
physical, financial, human, cultural, social, political, natural - and 
eventually comes back, full circle, to economic capital. 
Social capital is usually defined as the capacity of individuals to gain 
access to scarce resources by virtue of their membership of social 
networks or institutions. Putnam gives a wider definition of social 
capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms 
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993: 67). Social capital is a notion of the 
times, "the latest conceptual fad across the social sciences" (Fine 
2001a). A hybrid notion, social capital mixes angles and approaches 
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that used to be wide apart. It brings the "social" into economics and, 
by the same token, looks at the social from an economic point of 
view. Its social angle on the market comes at the price of a market 
angle on the social. One is not sure whether just to scratch one's 
head or pull out one's hair. The appeal of social capital can be read 
both as an agenda in its own right and as a sign of the times. 3 The 
significance and appeal of social capital are that it serves as a bridge 
between sociology, economics, and politics, as a linking concept that 
bridges diverse fields and invites interdisciplinary research. In the 
process, it presents ample problems. 
World Bank language refers to social capital as "the glue that 
holds society together." Social, all right - but capital? This is a 
very particular way of looking at social relations. The "social" 
of course figures in many approaches such as network analysis 
in anthropology, social distance in sociology, widening chains of 
interdependence in configuration sociology; and reciprocity and trust, 
solidarity and belonging are other ways of looking at social relations. 
The terminology itself is heavy baggage. The backdrop of capitalism 
becomes the foreground in that social capital refers to social relations 
and institutions that are viewed as instrumental within a capitalist 
framework; thus social relations and networks become "capital," 
assets that can be employed for income generation. For Bourdieu 
(1976), this was part of a problematic and social technology of 
domination, another glance at how the elite run things and a French 
equivalent of the "old boys' network. "4 With Coleman ( 1988), 
it is part of a rational choice approach to collective action and a 
functionalist perspective in which social relations are redefined 
as exchange relations. Robert Putnam (1993) establishes a link 
between social capital, civic democracy, and public and economic 
performance. In the wake of Putnam' s work, linking social capital 
and democracy has become a well-established theme (for example, 
van Deth, Maraffi, Newton, and Whiteley 1999). It suggests a 
causal link between social connectedness -,. social trust -,. civic 
engagement - civic democracy (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1997: 
87) and a further link to economic prosperity. 
"Capital" in human, cultural, social, and natural capital holds a 
promise of measurability, which is a highly strategic attribute in 
market-driven times. Rational choice and functionalism contribute 
to an analytical approach that can be readily transformed into a 
policy package. No wonder that for some time social capital has 
been a la mode and in the spotlight of funding agencies. Yet social 
130 • Jan Nederveen Pleterse 
capital is a slippery concept that ranges from cultural attitudes and 
social practices to public policy, politics and economic development. 
Attending a World Bank conference on social capital, Desmond 
McNeill (2003) jotted down the following stray remarks: "Social 
capital is a battering ram to get social issues into development"; but 
according to an economist, "This is pure smoke"; alternatively, it 
is "Anthropological wine in economic bottles." These sprawling 
observations illustrate the perplexity surrounding the concept. 
What is at stake is that social capital would make it possible to 
link concerns such as civil society (along with social cohesion and 
participation), democracy, and good governance with economic 
growth and development. A booming literature, particularly in 
economics and political science, scans the contours of social capital 
to examine whether it meets the requirements of clear definition, 
measurability, and applicability and can serve as an instrument 
of analysis and policy. Much current literature is concerned with 
conceptual clarification and is of a modelling nature, like rival 
exercises in reductionism. The objective is to uncover and next to 
instrumentalize social capital as the newest variable of productivity 
and development policy: "If you can't count it, it doesn't count." 
Whatever can be turned into an "indicator" is welcome in an age of 
managerialism. For now, we bracket this problematic and tum to the 
question of how cultural difference is conceptualized in this setting. 
Ethnic economies? 
UlliFF mww w P!1iffli! 
The common point of departure and widely used is the notion of 
ethnic economies (for example, Light and Bonacich 1988; Waldinger, 
Aldrich, and Ward 1990; Waldinger 1995; Haberfellner and Bose 
1999; Light and Gold 1999; Haberfellner 2000; Schmidt 2000). "An 
ethnic economy consists of the ethnic self-employed and employers, 
and their co-ethnic employees ... An ethnic economy exists 
whenever any immigrant or ethnic minority maintains a private 
economic sector in which it has a controlling ownership stake" 
(Light and Karageorgis, 1994: 647, 648). The assumption is that 
particularistic loyalties involve as well as engender trust and thus 
lower transaction costs. Jewish diamond traders in New York and 
Antwerp, passing one another diamonds for inspection on trust 
and without written contracts, are classic examples. The general 
argument is that social control is greater and the enforcement cost 
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of non-compliance with business expectations is lower within 
ethnic settings. 
At this point, let us pause and consider the term "ethnicity." 
"Ethnicity" in "ethnic economy" performs a double duty; it is 
defined as a social science concept ( as above), while at the same time 
borrowing the aura of "ethnicity" from general usage. One problem 
is that these two uses (the definition and the image of ethnicity) 
cannot be kept neatly apart. What precisely is ethnic in ethnic 
neighborhood, ethnic food, ethnic economy? The term ethnicity 
expresses a relationship; it denotes foreignness, but a particular 
kind of foreignness. It seems that some national origins are foreign 
while others are also ethnic. Ethnicity denotes difference and cultural 
distance from the mainstream. So some nationalities are more ethnic 
than others. 
In the USA, the language is ambiguous. The idea of "white ethnics" 
has gained currency (in the slipstream of "ethnic chic"), yet 
Canadians, British, Australians, or Germans are not often referred to 
as "ethnic." In the USA, German, British, Irish, or Scandinavian food 
may be foreign, but not necessarily ethnic, presumably because these 
cultural influences were integrated into the mainstream in an earlier 
phase. Yet this also applies to native and African Americans, 
although these are still regarded as "ethnic." Ethnicity is a marker 
of cultural distance, but not every cultural distance qualifies. A 
country's or a people's location in the hierarchy of power also 
matters. In the USA, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Cubans, Koreans, 
Ethiopians, and so on are considered as "ethnicities," but if we look 
more closely, this refers not to ethnicity but to national origin. 
This means that "ethnicity" serves as a descriptor of a relationship 
between cultures, a parameter of cultural distance and difference, 
which does not necessarily tell us much about the group itself. 
Within the host country, the nationality may be viewed as an ethnic 
group or minority, but this does not necessarily match relations 
within the country of origin. Within each of the nationalities 
mentioned there are multiple cultural groups or subcultures, identified 
by region, religion, sect, language, which in some contexts are called 
ethnic groups. In Manchester, England, Pakistanis are viewed as an 
ethnic group although they hail from different regions in Pakistan 
(Werbner 2001). Cubans from Cuba are quite different from the 
"Miami Cubans" (Portes 1987); among the latter, Cuban Jews are 
different again. 
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Let us consider the example of Ghanaians. Ethnic groups among 
Ghanaians include Asante, Fante, Brong, Kwahu, Adansi (which 
belong to the broader Akan ethnic group), Ga, Adangbe, Ewe, and 
Dagban. These groups are reproduced in the migrant communities 
overseas where usually ethnic associations have been formed. Ethnic 
associations "provide social and moral support, especially in time 
of bereavement and fatal sickness, much more than any tangible 
economic and social value for the establishment of business, 
hence their limited membership base and level of participation" 
(Amponsem 1996: 161-2). Ethnic associations exist alongside 
other networks such as national associations, old boys' networks, 
professional associations, class-based networks, women's clubs, and 
church networks. While there are some ethnic patterns and clusters 
in migration (1996: 161), migrant communities are ethnically mixed 
(compare Owusu 2000). Accordingly, ethnic association is only a 
narrow basis for social capital. As Amponsem comments: 
Due to intense competition, playing one's membership of a particular 
ethnic group too high leads to the risk of business being branded as an 
"ethnic shop" by the immigrant community at large and, therefore, 
risks exclusion and patronage from other members in the community. 
Rather, membership or affiliation with Ghanaian (national) associations 
such as [the] Ghanaian National Association of Hamburg, Sikaman 
Association in Amsterdam, and Association of Ghanaians in Toronto, 
even though difficult to organize in bigger cities like London and New 
York, are more neutral and preferable to ethnic ones. 
(1996: 162-3) 
Thus, what from a Canadian, American, German, or Dutch point 
of view is an "ethnic shop," is precisely not an ethnic shop from a 
Ghanaian point of view. It would not make sense as, and could not 
afford to be, an ethnic shop. By labeling it thus and assuming social 
capital to be based on "ethnicity," we have precisely missed the 
point. 
This is probably generally valid. Lebanese businessmen in West 
Africa, North America, or Australia hail from different regions 
and denominations within Lebanon. Although they belong to a 
different nationality than the host country, their social and economic 
cooperation need not be among Lebanese and is still less likely to 
have an "ethnic" basis (compare Hourani and Shehadi 1993). While 
Jews are generally considered an "ethnic group," Israel now ranks 
as a multicultural society. Korean grocery stores in California rank as 
ethnic shops in the media and literature, but their social cooperation 
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need not be on an ethnic basis since they probably come from 
different regions in Korea. Only occasionally are we told of a 
regional or specific identification besides the national one, for 
example when we are informed that Palestinians owning stores in 
the San Francisco bay area are mostly Christians from the Ramallah 
area (Kotkin 1992: 236). Similarly, Iranians in Los Angeles break 
down into at least four different groups: Jews, Bahais, Muslims, 
and Armenians. This has been interpreted as "internal ethnicity in 
the ethnic economy"; thus, what seems to be an ethnic economy 
upon closer inspection turns out to be four ethnic economies 
(Light, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, and Der-Martirosian 1993, 1994). 
The foundations of ethnicity may include region, alleged common 
descent, religion, or language, and these can also intersect one 
another (same language, different religion, and so on). Take the 
case of religion. Instances where religion and ethnicity (i.e. region, 
language, alleged common descent) coincide, such as Sikhs, Parsis, 
Ismailis, and Jews, are rare by comparison to cross-cultural religions. 
Besides, these groups are not homogeneous either: not all Sikhs, 
Parsis, Ismailis, or Jews follow their religion. The "world religions" 
are typically cross-cultural and so are their adherents, in their 
countries of origin as well as in countries of immigration. A Shiva 
temple in India or Nepal may well be a meeting place for Saivaite 
Hindus from different parts of India or Nepal. The 400 Hindu 
temples that exist in the USA have typically been built by Hindus 
from different regions of India, such as Gujaratis, Bengalis, and 
Tamils (Tambiah 2000: 181 ). The metropolitan area of Phoenix, 
Arizona counts six mosques that are places of worship for Saudis, 
Sudanese, Pakistanis, Lebanese, Maghribians, and so on. The largest 
mosque is located in Tempe. Next to the mosque complex are a 
Lebanese restaurant (named Carthage), a barber, and a bazaar with a 
halal butcher and other services, a combination that reflects the 
communal character oflslam (compare Satha-Anand 1998). Clearly 
the center also serves as a cross-cultural meeting place. The social 
capital that is invested in and arises from this complex is typically 
cross-cultural, a reflection of Islam being a cross-cultural religion. 
Thus it refers not to ethnic social capital, but to rainbow social and 
cultural capital. Smaller mosques in the Islamic diaspora can cater to 
Sunni Muslims of specific national origins (for example, mosques in 
Amsterdam neighborhoods for Moroccans, Turks, or Surinamese, but 
rarely for all). Even then they are not "ethnic" because Moroccans 
from different parts of Morocco may frequent the mosque 
(Nederveen Pieterse 1997b). 
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The Detroit suburb of Dearborn, Michigan, known as the Ford Motor 
Company headquarters, now ranks as a center of "Arab America" 
where 275,000 Middle Easterners have settled, the largest 
concentration of Arab Americans in the country. Middle Eastern 
immigration started with the Lebanese early in the twentieth century 
and has since brought immigrants from every country across the 
Middle East. While no more than half of these are Muslims, a new 
mosque complex is being built, spread over ten acres and billed as 
the largest mosque in the country. Services at the existing mosque 
"draw a diverse crowd of devotees from throughout the area, 
including many Americans whose ancestors emigrated from Europe 
or Africa long ago and who have since converted to Islam" (Lee 
2000). In such cross-cultural and cross-national conglomerations as 
East Dearborn, ethnic economy becomes useless as an analytical 
category and is clearly much too narrow. A different 
conceptualization is needed. 
It follows that we need to question and open up the notion of ethnic 
economy itself. 5 It is true, of course, that ethnic groups have been 
formidable social, cultural, and economic forces, past and present 
(Kotkin 1992), but ethnos, ethnie, or ethnicity simply mean "people," 
and there are people and people, or many different peoples within a 
people (di Leonardo 1984). A shortcoming of the ethnic economy 
approach is that, like most approaches that deal with ethnicity, it 
ignores the hybrids, the in-betweens. In reality, there are no neat 
boundaries between ethnic groups; the boundaries are typically fuzzy 
and permeable (Lowe 1991; MNghi Ha 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 
1995, 2001b). Thus, many immigrant entrepreneurs who are labelled 
ethnic are in reality hyphenated and mixed, and on this ground alone 
ethnic economies tend to be hyphenated economies. Furthermore, 
an "ethnic economy" is not necessarily an economy with a degree 
of interconnectedness or integration, but rather a random set of 
businesses. 
It may be a different case if we consider ethnically diverse societies 
(i.e. diverse not as a result of recent immigration). Here, ethnicity 
and ethnic social capital may be relevant terms with the proviso that 
there are many different varieties of ethnicity here too (Nederveen 
Pieterse 1997a). Besides, of course, cross-cultural relations count 
here as well. In his fine study of the transnational informal enterprise 
of Ghanaians worldwide, Amponsem rejects the term ethnic economy 
and opts for embeddedness instead. 6 He distinguishes 
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"ethnic" from "non-ethnic" enterprise by the degree of embeddedness 
of organizational strategies in informal personal networks, trust and 
social relations ... Ghanaian immigrant business strategies and 
practices are highly organized along crosscutting and cross-community 
ties, social trust and informal relations. 
(Amponsem 1996: 213) 
What sets them apart from mainstream firms is that the latter are 
organized along formal and contractual relations. "Given that the 
differences are contextualised and analysed in the dualist model 
rather than the interface process, the difference is conceptualised as 
'ethnic' and 'non-ethnic' enterprises. The ethnic economy discourse 
is therefore another dualist dichotomy of 'otherness' in strategy and 
practice" (Amponsem 1996: 213). 
If we consider that what matters is a difference of degree between 
the prevalence of formal and informal, contractual and non-
contractual relations in business, the discussion is set on a different 
footing. Formal and contractual enterprise also involves informal 
relations and implicit understandings (i.e. it is embedded in cultural 
and social practices, but embedded in different ways; compare 
Schmidt 2000). In the background looms the paradigm of modernity 
and Parsons' pattern variables. The point of social capital, trust, 
institutional density, and related notions is to open up this framework 
to examine the underlying social relations that make business tick 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Yet embeddedness is too vague a 
notion and not distinctive if we consider, following Polanyi, that all 
market relations are socially (and culturally) embedded. Would it 
be more insightful if instead of ethnic economy we say immigrant 
enterprise? This leads to several other problems: does it concern first 
or second generation immigrants? There is cultural segmentation 
among immigrants too; they relate to widely different economic 
specializations, and immigrant enterprise comes in many varieties, 
as the discussion below suggests. Instead of referring to ethnicity, we 
distinguish between (mono) culturally embedded and cross-cultural 
social capital. 
Cross-cultural enterprise 
A general consideration is that immigrant economies, in order to 
function, need to build ties with other communities and cultural 
groups. By labeling immigrant enterprise "ethnic" and by focusing 
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on its informal and grassroots character, we set it apart. The major 
drawback of "ethnic economy" discourse is the suggestion and 
assumption of ethnic boundaries. Ghanaian informal enterprise 
reaching across the world - Diisseldorf, London, Amsterdam, 
Vancouver, Bangkok, and so on - involves many non-Ghanaians, 
formally and informally. Informal business relations are not confined 
within ethnic boundaries. Amponsem describes the social relations 
of Ghanaian traders in Bangkok as follows: 
Successfully living in an isolated Bangkok hotel for four weeks, 
without family and with limited contact with the foreign social 
environment, is only made possible for the trader through the social 
interaction and the family atmosphere created together with other 
traders and migrants - a "little local community." It is usually a 
scene of sharing and interaction reminiscent of a social gathering of 
"communities" as Ghanaian traders from different parts of the world 
meet their counterparts from Nigeria, South Africa, Zaire, Mali and 
Guinea, for example, at the lobby of the Top High Hotel in the 
Pratunam area in Bangkok. 
(1996: 95)7 
If Dearborn, Detroit for "Arab America" and Jackson Heights in 
Queens, New York for South Asians are spectacular examples of 
cross-cultural agglomerations, the principle of cross-cultural relations 
across immigrant groups holds much wider. It applies to groups such 
as the overseas Chinese, among whom immigrants from different 
regions often mingle (see Lin 1998; Liu 1998; Minghuan 2000). It 
applies to settings such as Amsterdam Southeast where Surinamese, 
Antilleans, Moroccans, Ghanaians, Ethiopians, and other Africans 
each tend to have their own circles, but also mingle (Hannerz 1992); 
or to Mount Pleasant in Washington, DC, Spanish Harlem in New 
York and East LA, and their mixed Latino presence. Labor, training, 
customers, supplies, credit, and possibly accountants, solicitors, and 
real estate necessarily bring immigrant enterprises into contact with 
many other networks. Neighborhood and social life are other factors. 
All this tends to be concealed from view if the heading is "ethnic 
economy," and thus these links are under-researched. Meanwhile it 
is also true that, when it comes to issues that represent deeper forms 
of integration, such as unionization and health insurance, immigrant 
groups often appear to be insular ( e.g. on California see Milkman 
2000). 
Labor is a keynote in the definition of ethnic economy. "The ethnic 
economy is ethnic because its personnel are co-ethnics" (Light and 
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Karageorgis 1994: 649). This is a narrow criterion,8 but even by this 
criterion ethnic economies may be a shrinking phenomenon. With 
growing migration in conjunction with a hierarchy among emigration 
countries, cross-cultural employment has long been on the increase. 
Thus, Japanese restaurants with Korean waiters are common, and 
examples along these lines are abundant. Job seekers in the culturally 
segmented labor market of Toronto use both ethnic and interethnic 
circuits which fulfill different roles. Using interethnic ties helps 
people gain access to diverse resources beyond their homogeneous 
networks. Access to social capital beyond the ethnic group's 
boundary principally benefits members of the ethnic group who are 
concentrated in lower paying jobs, while for members of mainstream, 
higher status ethnic groups, using intra-ethnic ties is associated with 
higher income. The advantage of using interethnic ties is conditional 
on the socioeconomic status of job seekers and job contacts: if the 
contact is with higher status ethnic groups, the use of interethnic ties 
is more rewarding than are ties with members of lower status groups 
(Ooka and Wellman 2006). 
Los Angeles ranks as "the sweatshop capital of the United States" 
(Bonacich and Applebaum 2000). Here, according to a Los Angeles 
Times poll, "minority-owned firms tend to hire within their own 
ethnic group," but actually the patterns diverge. Businesses owned 
by Latinos in Los Angeles county describe their workforce as three-
quarters Latino; 41 percent of black businesses report a mostly black 
workforce; and, of Asian firms, one-third employed mostly Asian 
workers and almost as many had a mostly Latino workforce 
(Romney 1999). The latter pattern of cross-cultural (or interethnic) 
employment, such as Asian garment manufacturers in California 
employing Mexicans, is confirmed by further research (Light, 
Bernard, and Kim 1999). The distinction between exploitative and 
non-exploitative trust is not likely to coincide with the line separating 
cross-cultural and same culture employment. Is trust less exploitative 
when employer and employee share the same national origin? That 
would overestimate the homogeneity of national origins: among 
South Asians, caste differences crosscut national and regional 
identities; among other migrants, class, region, and religion enter 
the equation. 
In East San Jose, the Latino shopping center Tropicana has in recent 
years seen an increase of immigrant Vietnamese business owners 
who now own nearly one-third of the shops. In a new shopping 
center across the road, El Mercado, a deliberate attempt is now being 
made to blend Mexican and Asian cultures. Art is being used as a 
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tool to blend the communities (for example, with an exhibition on 
marketplaces from Mexico, Vietnam, Nigeria, and Portugal). A 
Vietnamese architect comments, "We need to create a myth, the kind 
of myth that highlights our relationships and the good things between 
the communities" (Melendez 2000). Thus, cross-cultural commerce 
is a growing trend and an emerging theme. Part of this is due to the 
rise of "ethno marketing" as a function of growing multiculturalism 
in many countries ( e.g. Halter 2000; also Radcliffe and Laurie, this 
volume). For commerce in cross-cultural settings, the importance of 
cross-cultural skills such as language is also being recognized. 
Meanwhile, research on ethnicity and ethnic economies has generally 
concentrated on the inward character of ethnicity to the neglect of 
relations with the outside world. But how do immigrants relate to the 
wider economy and society? They function commercially and as 
entrepreneurs by acting as go-betweens or by integrating. Armenian 
businessmen in Europe and North America, Lebanese contractors and 
shopkeepers in West Africa, Chinese tokos (shops) in the Caribbean, 
Chinese businesses in Hungary and Spain, Surinamese stores in the 
Netherlands, Korean grocery stores in the USA, Palestinian stores 
in California, Indian comer dairies in New Zealand. All deal with 
suppliers, customers, and employees of different ethnicities, 
whether local or of other immigrant communities. Operating in an 
intercultural space affects the consciousness and identity, habitus 
and business practices of immigrants, as research among Colombian 
businessmen in the Netherlands shows (van Cotthem 1999). In 
Germany, Turkish businesses employing more than ten people have 
increased to almost 5,000 in 1998; Turkish businesses include 
not only retail and restaurants (61 percent), but also service, 
manufacturing, and construction sectors (27 percent). A Turkish 
· enterprise that began as a travel agent for guest workers is now 
Germany's eighth largest travel agent, with an annual revenue of 
DM914 million (Richter 1999). In these cases, family or co-ethnic 
labor and credit may often play apart, but by no means across the 
board. The trend in several immigrant economies is towards greater 
use of bank credit.9 A specific factor in the case of Muslims is the 
need for interest-free loans, for business and mortgages, which puts 
many in touch with a cross-cultural circuit of hawal bankers. 10 
Immigrant enterprise is therefore a wheel within a larger set of 
wheels. Cultural social capital functions, and over time can only 
function, as part of cross-cultural social capital. Immigrant business 
includes several varieties: 
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• Immigrant business catering to same nationality immigrants. 
Not the same ethnicity because that would be too small a market. 
• Immigrant business catering to other immigrants. For example, 
a Dominican grocery in California selling Mexican products to 
Salvadoran customers. 
• Immigrant business serving a niche market. For example, 
French hairdresser, Italian pizzeria, Chinese restaurant, Korean 
contractor in New York. In this case, ownership, management, 
labor, supply, and credit may or may not follow immigrant or 
national origin connections. Within this pattern, there are many 
variations. One variation is an immigrant business acting as 
intermediary between immigrants and locals, for instance in labor 
recruitment, contracting, ethno marketing or crime. 
• Immigrant businesses from diverse origins clustered together, 
either by tradition or by design, as in the recent trend of "ethnic 
shopping malls" from Toronto to Amsterdam (Choenni 2000). 
(Note that "ethnic" here has the popular meaning of non-Western 
and refers to the combination of various cultural groups.) 
• Immigrant business catering to local customers. In other words, 
a business that has entered the mainstream: while different in 
national origin, it is not necessarily different in business 
practices. 
• A second- or third-generation immigrant business. Now the 
business may either continue to occupy a niche market using 
national origin for sign value (the Jewish deli in New York) 
or national origin may fade into the background. In terms of 
business practices and ownership (for example, a joint venture 
with nationals or being traded on the stock exchange), it may 
become indistinguishable from local enterprise. A Chinese-
owned garage in Jakarta may differ from other garages only 
in ownership or management. 
This is what a short-term typology yields. The picture changes 
further if we consider the longue duree. 
In the longue duree 
For obvious reasons, the cross-cultural dimension acquires greater 
depth the longer the period of time we consider. That change across 
generations makes a huge difference in immigrant careers is well 
known, yet most current research does not involve intergenerational 
140 • Jan Nederveen Pleterse 
data and leads to narrower conclusions than if we widen the 
perspective over longer time spans by taking into account historical 
research (compare Nederveen Pieterse 2000). Immigrant economies 
are widespread and as old as the trading diasporas and the 
combination of commerce and migration. The major varieties 
of immigrant economies distinguished in the literature are: first, 
minority or immigrant enterprise; second, trading or middleman 
minorities; and, third, enclave economies. Minority enterprise 
and commerce comprise the general category and a common 
phenomenon, as the study of the economic history of virtually any 
region shows. Enclave economies or immigrant businesses catering 
only or mainly to customers of the same ethnicity are probably 
relatively rare and limited; trading or middleman minorities are 
much more common. The Jews in Europe are the classic example. 
The collaboration between the Chinese and the Spanish in the 
Philippines, between the Chinese and the Dutch in Indonesia, 
between the Chettiars from Madras and the British in Burma, and 
between the Ismailis from Gujarat and the British in East Africa are 
other examples. Closer examination shows that, before the minority 
group was recruited for a particular function and assumed middleman 
status in the interstices of colonialism or empire, it was usually 
already present and active in the region. Regarding the Chinese in 
Manila, "the Spanish expedition which arrived at Manila in 1570 
found four Chinese junks in the harbor. Manila, the Spaniards 
reported, was large and carried on an extensive trade. In the town 
lived forty married Chinese and twenty Japanese" (Dobbin 1996: 21). 
The Spanish built on the Chinese junk trade between Manila and 
the Fujian province and wove this regional commercial network into 
their own growing intercontinental galleon trade. The same pattern 
applies to the Parsis, who were such important brokers for the 
British in their commercial activities and empire building in India. 
Before being enlisted into collaboration by the British, they were 
already active as a commercial minority in the region. The presence 
of Parsis on India's west coast goes back to the ninth and tenth 
centuries when, due to Arab competition in the Persian Gulf, they 
moved the center of their activities eastwards: 
Thus the Parsis should not be seen as a refugee community settling 
down in India as agriculturalists and weavers, woken to commercial 
life by the European East India Companies, but rather as having much 
earlier developed a new trading diaspora between the Arab-dominated 
Middle East and Hindu India. 
(Dobbin 1996: 79) 
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Immigrant economies are embedded within intercultural economies. 
For immigrant enterprise to be successful, entrepreneurs must be 
at least bicultural. The Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific has been able to prosper thanks to its capacity to integrate 
and build relations with the wider environment in language, cultural 
skills, and the weaving of relations of reciprocity and trust. This is 
confirmed by the emergence over time of mestizo groups such as 
the Chinese Mestizos of the Philippines (later the Catholic Chinese 
Mestizos) and the Peranakan Chinese in Java and Malaysia and 
their conversion to Islam (peranakan literally means "child of the 
country") (Wertheim 1964, 1978). This does not match Furnivall's 
classic description of colonial plural society in Java and Burma 
(1939), according to which different ethnic groups met only in the 
marketplace where conversion and intermarriage did not take place. 
The Chinese Mestizos in the Philippines are nowadays deeply 
integrated and typically interact with other businessmen not on an 
ethnic footing, but as members of a wider business community that 
meets in settings such as the Lions and Rotary clubs. 11 Peranakan 
Chinese have at times been integrated in multiple cultures at the 
same time, for instance in the multicultural East Indies: Christian, 
Muslim and Javanese (Taylor 1986). 
The literature distinguishes between political incorporation of 
immigrants - such as strangers in the Buganda kingdom in East 
Africa who attach themselves as clients to district chiefs or to their 
subjects, delivering tribute in kind or labor (Obbo 1979) - and 
cultural incorporation - the adoption of language, customs, dress, 
mode of livelihood, fictive kinship and religious practices, such as 
strangers in Central Africa (Wilson 1979). 12 The relationship between 
colonialism and trading minorities can be considered a specific type 
of political and economic incorporation of immigrants. An asset 
of the Chinese has been their readiness to integrate with the native 
society and adopt the local language and religion (see Dobbin 1996: 
64; Kwok Bun 2000). This also applies to their migration within 
China. 13 Their capacity and willingness for intercultural adaptation 
itself stemmed from previous experience with other trading 
diasporas. 14 
A large number of Chinese settlers were converted to Islam. Having 
come largely from Fujian, they not only found it advantageous to 
adopt the predominant religion of the Javanese port towns, but in fact 
were familiar with the role of Islam in Fujian's trade. In Quanzhou, 
Fujian's most important seaport by the late thirteenth century, both 
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trade and administration were dominated by foreign Muslims and an 
Islamic diaspora promoted trade with the rest of Asia. 
(Dobbin 1996: 47-8) 
This suggests that intercultural enterprise is itself part of a chain 
of diasporas, each imparting skills, examples, and networks of 
cross-cultural intercourse. As indicated above, the classic middleman 
role in colonialism is often a specification of an earlier commercial 
presence and activity. Phoenicians in Carthage and Spain; Jews and 
Greeks from ancient times onward; Arabs, Persians, and Parsis partly 
in their footsteps; and the Chinese diasporas in their turn, along with 
Indian and Malay diasporas thus form an interlinked series or chain 
that stretches far back in time and widely across space. Thus, for 
centuries Christian Armenians were the trait d'union in the silk trade 
between the Safavids in Persia and the Levant (Matthee 2000). This 
brief gloss leaves out many other trading diasporas and networks -
witness the history of cross-cultural long distance trade (Curtin 1984; 
Stearns 2001 ). How deep in time some of these networks run is 
suggested by the traces of trade found between ancient Egypt and 
the Harappa culture of Mohenjodaro, and of trade with the Romans 
found in Cochin on India's west coast. 
Chain and network migration are familiar themes. In addition, a 
multicultural history serves as a skill and cultural capital among 
immigrant groups. In explaining the powerful influence of Middle 
Eastern entrepreneurs in various industries in California, built up 
over a short period of time, Kotkin (1999) notes that "particularly 
Jews, Arab Christians and Armenians, have a long history of being 
minorities in great polyglot cities of the Old World: Beirut, Tehran, 
Jerusalem, Cairo or Damascus." Coming back to Fujian, the region, 
then and now, is not among China's poorest, but has developed 
an emigration culture that goes way back in time. Fujian is now 
estimated to send around 100,000 emigrants abroad every year 
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2000). The case of human smuggling 
that had tragic consequences in Dover, England in the summer of 
2000 (with the accidental death by asphyxiation of a group of illegal 
migrants secreted in a truck) also concerned migrants from Fujian 
province, as do several other episodes of illegal Chinese migration 
into Europe and North America. 
Ulrich Beck (2000) speaks of "place polygamy" and Pico Iyer (2000) 
charts the lives of "global souls." Cross-border and transnational 
social relations are growing in density and importance, and these 
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increasingly complex relations cannot be understood without 
recognizing multiple identities. For instance, the identities of 
settler and sojourner are not mutually exclusive (a point made by 
Chen [2000) in describing the trans-Pacific character of the Chinese 
presence in San Francisco). Akio Morita, the late Sony chairman, 
argued that "insiderism" is a necessity for multinational corporations: 
multinationals can only be successful if they become insiders in the 
host economies and societies, so they must "look in both directions" 
(Ohmae 1992). Migration history suggests that "insiderism" is 
common and has deep roots in time. What is now called 
"glocalization" (after another Japanese expression) has been common 
practice in the historical chains of trading diasporas. 
Implications __ ., ___ _ 
Just as the ethnic enclave economy approach emphasizes clustering 
and boundaries in space, the ethnic economy approach emphasizes 
difference and bonding along lines of culture. 15 When research in 
this field takes into account cultural difference, it is concerned 
with "ethnicity." The hurdle of "ethnicity" entails an overriding 
preoccupation with the difference between mainstream and "other" 
identities to the relative neglect of crosscutting relations. In effect 
this involves a twofold reification: cultural difference is reified as 
"ethnicity" and ethnicity is reified as "ethnic economy." If we look 
closer, there are ample instances of intercultural economic activity 
and ample literature as well. Yet, by and large, this remains under-
theorized and under-represented, and thus these instances do not 
reach the threshold of awareness in research or policy. 
This review of various settings and types of immigrant economic 
activity, past and present, has drawn attention to their cross-cultural 
or multiethnic character. Reviewing the arguments presented and 
focusing on the key hurdle of "ethnicity," the concept "ethnic 
economy" involves the following problems: 
1 "Ethnic" as an ethnocentric term (merely denoting distance 
from European or Western culture) must be distinguished from 
"ethnic" as an account of cultural embeddedness. However, since 
"ethnic" is often used loosely in many different senses (i.e. emic 
and etic or by outsider and insider standards), it may not be 
feasible to maintain such a distinction. 
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2 Using "co-ethnic labor" as the criterion to define ethnic economy 
is vague and too narrow. Customers, credit, suppliers, ownership 
and location are other relevant criteria. 
3 If it is possible to verify whether what seems "ethnic" really is 
ethnic or is culturally embedded, its significance should not be 
taken for granted at the risk of stereotyping. Therefore, a more 
effective and neutral distinction is that between monocultural and 
cross-cultural social capital. 16 Considering that cultural and group 
boundaries are typically fuzzy and fluid, this distinction should 
not be given exaggerated weight. 
4 Culturally embedded norms and social networks may indeed be 
significant, but immigrant economies also require cross-cultural 
social capital to function. Twinning social capital and cultural 
difference yields the following distinctions: 
• bonding social capital or close ties, which may be culturally 
embedded; 
• bridging social capital or loose ties at the same 
socioeconomic level, which may be culturally embedded 
and/or cross-cultural; 
• linking social capital or ties with others at a higher 
socioeconomic level may be culturally embedded and/or 
cross-cultural. Thus "ethnicity," as suggested by the 
ethnic economy terminology, may be relevant with regard 
to bonding social capital, but not necessarily with regard to 
bridging or linking social capital (a precis is given in 
Table 6.1). 
Beyond "ethnic economies" are rainbow economies. This can be 
summed up in two points. Cultural difference does inform social 
capital, but ethnicity is not helpful as a terminology and analytical 
category. The "ethnic economy" concept must be rejected because 
what matters generally is not ethnicity but nationality or varieties 






Strong ties among close relations 
Weak ties among people from 
diverse backgrounds, but similar 
socioeconomic status 
'Friends in high places' 
Cultural variations 
Possibly culturally embedded ('ethnic') 
Culturally embedded or cross-cultural 
("ethnic" or interethnic) 
Culturally embedded or cross-cultural 
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of national origin. Moreover, in immigrant enterprise, social capital 
is not merely internal to the immigrant community, but spills over 
cultural boundaries. Immigrant economies are often blended or 
rainbow economies that rely on cross-cultural resources and 
social networks. Thus, for bonding social capital to deliver requires 
bridging social capital. A third variable (linking social capital) relates 
particularly to home country resources. What matters is neither 
the situation of full separation behind cultural boundaries ("ethnic 
economy" and multiculturalism as a mosaic of ghettos) nor the 
situation of full assimilation ( cultural boundaries don't matter), but 
rather the in-between zone that Portes (1996) refers to as "segmented 
assimilation." Most research on social capital tacitly assumes or 
overtly focuses on cultural boundaries. It would be appropriate for 
research to pay as much attention to bridging social capital, in the 
sense of loose relations across cultural boundaries, as to bonding 
social capital within cultural boundaries. An implication for policy 
is not to rely merely on ethnic or immigrant social capital, but to 
take into account and enable cross-cultural relations (i.e. not simply 
within but between immigrant groups and between immigrants and 
others). 
Policy implications 
If the intellectual importance of social capital is to bridge diverse 
disciplines (sociology, political science, economics), its policy 
significance is to link civic cooperation (sociology), democratic 
governance (political science), and economic growth (economics). 
Thus, Putnam's study of administrative reform in Italy (1993) points 
to the importance of civic traditions and local democracy for 
administrative and economic performance. Similar implications 
follow from studies of "institutional densities" in geography (Amin 
and Thrift, 1993, 2004 ), of industrial clustering and districts as 
exercises in collective learning (dei Ottati 1994), government 
enablement (Helmsing 2000) and intersectoral partnerships of local 
government, firms, and NGOs (Brown and Ashman 1999). These 
lines of research involve interesting takes on social capital. The 
recognition of good governance as a social capital asset holds 
significant policy implications beyond the stipulations of the World 
Bank and the refrains of Washington rhetoric. It suggests that local 
democracy is not merely desirable on political or moral grounds, but 
can also be economically productive; social capital can serve as a 
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bridge between social cooperation, progressive politics, and forward-
looking economics. However, this uplifting story falters when it 
comes to ethnic diversity. A World Bank report notes: "Recent 
research has found that ethnically fragmented countries tend to 
have slower growth, lower levels of schooling, more assassinations, 
less financial depth, and higher deficits" (World Bank 1998a: 18).17 
Current research is concerned with examining "how political 
institutions can be reformed to secure the benefits of ethnic social 
capital while diffusing the costs" (World Bank 1998a: 18). It would 
be interesting to examine cross-cultural social capital in these 
settings. 18 
A point often made and a fundamental consideration for policy is 
that social capital without resources is a cul de sac. At the time when 
social capital was becoming a fad in addressing urban poverty in the 
USA, its downside was also becoming apparent: 
There is considerable social capital in ghetto areas, but the assets 
obtainable through it seldom enable participants to rise above their 
poverty ... the call for higher social capital as the solution to irmer 
city problems misdiagnoses the problem and can lead to both a waste 
of resources and new frustrations. It is not the lack of social capital but 
the lack of economic resources - beginning with decent jobs - that 
underlies the plight of impoverished urban groups. 
(Portes and Landolt 1996: 20, 21) 
This raises the question of whether indeed social capital is capital 
(Robinson, Schmid and Siles 2002). At any rate, the importance of 
resources varies according to the circumstances. Research bears out 
that "the relative importance of investments in physical capital and 
schooling appears to vary with the extent of social development. In 
particular, schooling is important at low levels of social development, 
but physical capital becomes more important at higher levels" 
(Temple and Johnson 1996: 41). 
This must be factored into an understanding of different immigrant 
economies. East Asian immigrants in North America are backed by 
the financial hinterland of the Tiger economies: immigrants from the 
Middle East can tap into oil revenues or remittances of relatives 
working in the oil economies. Backed by financial capital from 
overseas, relayed by regional banks, they can buy into prosperous 
markets. In free enterprise capitalism, without government support 
for job creation, these groups can create their own jobs by buying 
stores or businesses. The link between capital and migration is 
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clearly on the map in relation to Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants 
(Tseng 1994, 2000). In Los Angeles alone, the home of the largest 
Korean population in the USA, there are seven Korean American 
banks (Andrejczak 1999). Start-up capital is a component that 
African immigrants lack. The relative poverty of much of sub-
Saharan Africa does not provide them with a financial hinterland to 
fall back on. The same applies to many Latin Americans and South 
and Southeast Asians. 19 For African Americans too, there is no 
financial depth backing them. 
A further consideration is that neither social capital nor economic 
resources may deliver in the absence of capable agency ( or human 
capital) (Krishna 2001). Therefore, another pertinent resource is 
education, which is more advanced in some regions than in others. 
Due to their educational background, Indian immigrants in Britain 
and North America have been able to enter the professions early 
on, particularly in the fields of medicine, education, and software.20 
In other words, immigrants' differential economic and social 
performances are also functions of differential country resources 
and, of course, the immigrants' class location in the country of 
origin. Affirmative action and multiculturalist policies usually 
focus on supporting immigrant communities or on relations between 
immigrants and the host community.21 The present argument suggests 
a further angle, namely reckoning with cross-cultural relations not 
only between immigrants and locals, but also among and across 
different immigrant groups. In urban policy, taking into account and, 
under some circumstances, fostering such cross-cultural relations 
may be considerations. 
What is underway implicitly in areas such as planning "ethnic 
shopping malls" may become an explicit policy consideration. 
There are ample situations where such an approach is in fact being 
implemented (see d' Andrea, d' Arca, and Mezzana 1998). One 
example is the recent development of a local exchange trading 
system (LETS) of local inhabitants and asylum seekers in 
Woudrichem, a small Dutch town. The system involves asylum 
seekers providing services (haircuts, food preparation, household 
and garden work, party catering, drawing lessons) and Dutch locals 
offering goods (used bicycles, computers, videos) and services (cab 
rides, language and orientation lessons). Since asylum seekers may 
stay for long periods but do not have work permits, this system 
integrates them into the local economy and community without 
payment of money. An economist from Rwanda administers the 
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Notes 
system. A cafe night every two weeks serves to facilitate contacts. 
This initiative involves the generation and deployment of cross-
cultural social capital, both among asylum seekers (from many 
different parts of the world) and between asylum seekers and locals. 
Policy can therefore make up for specific social capital shortfalls. 
Thus, under some circumstances, specially targeted start-up credit 
facilities could be provided to immigrant entrepreneurs who do not 
come from rich hinterlands (i.e. who are short of linking capital). 
To use a grand term, we could call this a policy of cross-cultural 
democratization and a step from multiculturalism to interculturalism. 
The forms this might take would differ on a case-by-case basis. 
"Europe's Immigrant Entrepreneurs Are Creating Thriving Businesses - and 
Thousands of Jobs" (Business Week, February 28, 2000); "Today's Refugees 
Are Europe's Future Assets" (Guardian Weekly, April 18, 1999). "Immigrants 
Create Wealth; They Add Critical Ingredients to the Mix that Generates 
Progress. They Tend to Take Risks" (Sunday Telegraph, February 6, 2000); 
"Keeping the Hive Humming: Immigrants May Prevent the Economy from 
Overheating" (Business Week, April 24, 2000). 
2 In the UK, Germany, Australia (Saunders 1999), and Israel (Hoffman 2000). 
On Germany, see Finn (2000); on Switzerland, see Piguet (1999). 
3 For critical reflections on the genealogy and use of social capital, see Woolcock 
(1998), Fedderke, de Kadt, and Luiz (1999), and McNeill (1996, 2003). 
4 Smart (1993) criticizes Bourdieu for applying inconsistent definitions of 
different kinds of capital. 
5 Criticisms of the ethnic economy approach are growing as the notion suffers 
from culturalism and ethnicism. Noting several problems in the sociology of the 
ethnic economy, Cobas (1989) mentions a contradiction between the stranger 
hypothesis and the protected market hypothesis, while MNghi Ha (2000) draws 
attention to the underestimation ofhybridity (compare Werbner, 2000). 
6 Following Granovetter (1985), many others also refer to embeddedness in this 
context, such as Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993), Portes (1994,1995), Rath 
(2000), and Schmidt (2000). See also Chapter 1, (this volume); James (this 
volume). 
7 Transnational informal enterprise is not necessarily cross-cultural as, for 
example, Portes (2000) describes. 
8 Light, Bernard, and Kim (1999) adopt the term immigrant economy instead of 
ethnic economy if there is "non-ethnic labor," in other words labor is the key 
criterion. 
9 A survey of Latina business in Orange County, California shows that "Few 
borrowed money from banks to start businesses, but the percentage of those 
Soclal capital and migration • 149 
with bank credit has grown" (Norman 2000). Boubakri (1999) shows the same 
for immigrant enterprise in France. Meanwhile, other reports point out the lack 
of access to bank credit for rapidly growing immigrant enterprises (Aguilera 
2000; compare Fisman 2000). 
10 Hawal banking is a financial infrastructure using informal networks among 
Muslims worldwide. Reports on hawal banking circuits in the Washington, DC 
area are by Noguchi (1999). 
11 Oral information from Peter Chua (Santa Barbara, California). 
12 Shack ( 1979) discusses varieties of incorporation of strangers in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
13 "They [the south Fujianese] were prepared to merge with the social and 
economic networks of the host city and in Shanghai, for example, many 
Fujianese were regarded as having 'become local people,' enabling them to 
penetrate local networks in most business circles" (Dobbin 1996: 64--5). 
14 Compare with Tambiah's (2000) fascinating account of the intergenerational 
Man lineage of the Chinese. 
15 The ethnic enclave economy is a predecessor of the ethnic economy approach; 
compare Light, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, and Der-Martirosian (1993) and Werbner 
(2001). 
16 I deliberately refrain from defining "culture" in this discussion (See Chapter 1, 
this volume; Watts, this volume). At a subtler level of analysis, the distinction 
between mono- and cross-cultural enterprise (and social capital) is up for 
discussion. Cultural differences run, of course, also among nationals, for 
example by region. Ethno marketing and import and export trade are also 
cross-cultural - witness the literature on "international manners" in business 
and on varieties of capitalism. 
1 7 Note the charged choice of words of ethnically fragmented rather than 
ethnically diverse societies. 
18 In my own work, I ask "Under what conditions do we get widening circles of 
social capital?" (Nederveen Pieterse 2001a: Chapter 8). I argue that government 
can play a facilitating role in the form of managed pluralism ( compare Midgley 
1995; Gold and Light 2000). 
19 This may be an explanation for recent reports that new immigrants in Canada 
and the USA are not doing as well economically as previous waves; they may 
have less access to financial resources in the country of origin. It might also 
explain why Indonesian immigrants in the USA lag behind others. 
20 In Britain, South Asians "[a]lthough they represent just under 3 per cent of the 
population, ... provide about 16 per cent of the total number of GPs, nearly 
20 per cent of hospital doctors, and about 12 per cent of pharmacists. They own 
just over 50 per cent of the 'cash and carry' shops and just over 55 per cent of 
the independent retail trade" (Parekh 1997: 65). 
21 The informal economy is generally not a high priority policy area (see Rath 
1999). 
.. Social capital as culture? 
Promoting cooperative 
action in Ghana 
Gina Porter and Fergus Lyon 
In this chapter we focus on culture and its complex interconnections 
with the concept of social capital. Our study is set in the context of 
recent preoccupations of the World Bank ( followed by other donors) 
with the concept of social capital itself and the related construct 
that it can be built in order to promote economic growth and 
development. The adoption of the social capital concept is perhaps 
the closest that the World Bank has come in recent years in its 
recognition of the potential linkages between local cultures (notably 
cultures of enterprise), economic growth, and development. That is 
not to say that we agree that culture is social capital - or vice versa. 
Far from it, indeed! Our thesis is rather that the World Bank has 
taken up social capital in a highly essentialized form - as group 
cooperation per se - in its development initiatives, while at the same 
time congratulating itself on its adoption of a more culturally ( as 
opposed to economistically) oriented development paradigm. 
The Bank's conflation of social capital construction with group 
activities, and its consequent efforts to promote development through 
supporting group-based initiatives, far from illustrating a cultural turn 
in its development thinking, arguably reflect a continuing lack of 
sensitivity to cultural diversity and the specific geographical contexts 
within which diverse cultural registers ( elite, popular, and youth 
cultures, among others) evolve and interact (see also Nederveen 
Pieterse, this volume). 
Following a brief introduction to the links between concepts of 
social capital and culture, we review recent development problems 
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and donor activities in Ghana. We then present two rural case 
studies of group-based development interventions in Ghana's coastal 
savanna to illustrate our argument that while culture is complex, 
multifaceted, and inextricably linked with place and time dynamics, 
recent development interventions seemingly emanating out of 
donors' desire to build social capital have been based on very poor 
conceptualizations of culture. 
Social capital, culture, and development 
Social capital is, as Harriss (2002) observes, a slippery concept. 
Widely publicized through the work of Putnam (1993, 1995), it 
focuses on the potential benefits of associational life and collective 
action. The positive value of social relations built on trust, norms, 
and networks is a central theme, though precisely how these 
relations are initiated and sustained, and by whom, lacks explication. 
Nonetheless, social capital is assumed by much of the donor 
community to bring voluntary cooperation that leads to improved 
welfare and economic performance (Barr and Toye 2000). This focus 
on social interaction as a positive win-win situation of empowerment 
and inclusion (Defilippis 2002) has been extremely seductive to 
development specialists mired in their persistent failure to find 
solutions to seemingly intractable poverty problems. There has been 
a growing view that interventions are possible which can harness 
underlying social forces and energy in society and thus expand social 
capital and correct for state and market failures (Mayer and Rankin 
2002). Consequently, social capital "has become one of the central 
organizing themes in global development work" (Defilippis 2002), 
in no small part due to its adoption by economists at the World 
Bank, where it was identified in a 1997 publication as a 
developmental "missing link" (Harriss 2002: 9, 82). 
The linkages between social capital and culture are complex. Much 
depends, of course, on how we define culture, another notoriously 
slippery concept (Mitchell, D. 2000). Here, drawing on Rankin's 
(2003) efforts to combine standard recent anthropological 
interpretations of culture ( as opposed to cultural studies perspectives) 
with geographical concerns for the significance of place and scale, 
we conceptualize culture as a grounded dynamic and symbolic entity. 
It encompasses people's actions, shared beliefs, values, behavior, 
and the meanings they assign to their world and those actions. 
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This includes recognition of the potential of both history and 
multiple, intersecting spatial scales, to shape ( and be shaped) by 
those actions and meanings (for further discussion of these themes 
see Chapter 1, this volume). 
The concept of social capital has opened an opportunity for 
economists and non-social scientists to consider the concept of 
culture. However, the ways in which the terms social capital and 
culture are interpreted requires examination. Putnam defines social 
capital as trust, networks, and norms each of which is underpinned 
and shaped by cultural contexts (Putnam 1993). Putnam examines 
the spatial differences of social capital by focusing on accumulation 
of social capital within locally based national-ethnic populations 
(compare Watts, this volume; Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). 
From this perspective, the concept appears an attractive route to 
benefit poor people: thus, logically attractive to many development 
organizations and their staff. 
However, recent analyses of the social capital model have raised 
numerous questions. These center around debates as to whether 
social capital is a way of opening economistic approaches to 
development to issues of cultural specificity, or whether it is a way 
for economics to colonize other social sciences. Fine's argument that 
the model has a tendency to ignore the existence of power relations 
and conflict, that "social capital is ahistorical and asocial, so it 
is complicit with mainstream economics" (Fine 2002: 796--9), has 
gained particularly widespread support from academic researchers. 
Meanwhile, a number of empirical studies have illustrated the 
"down-side" to social capital in poor countries: the exclusions, 
clientalism, and backlash that have accompanied many supposedly 
pro-poor grassroots development projects (for example Mayoux 
2001; Momsen 2001). These studies graphically remind us how 
effectively power relations can distort the "harmonious sociability" 
romantically ascribed to communities, severely reducing the potential 
to build extensive networks of trust ( on expectations around 
community, see Watts, this volume). In response, proponents of 
social capital make the distinction between bonding social capital 
(within a community), bridging social capital (outside a community), 
and linking social capital (ties between people of different wealth 
and status) (Woolcock 2000; also Nederveen Pieterse, this volume). 
However, in practice, development interventions tend to be 
preoccupied with bonding social capital. 
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This chapter extends and refines these broad criticisms that 
local power relations may severely impede externally generated 
interventions aimed at building local social capital, by emphasizing 
the specific role that space and place play in shaping local cultures 
of cooperation or non-cooperation. We show how in Ghana, as in so 
many other countries' recent development programs, there has been 
a widespread tendency to reduce the concept of social capital to 
mean merely "membership in local, voluntary associations" (Harriss 
2002), and then to apply this blueprint of group cooperation in an 
asocial and aspatial manner that ignores local specificities of place, 
space, and cultural context. The remarkable lack of geographical 
imagination evident in recent developmental applications of social 
capital adds yet another nail to its coffin. 
Africa's "beacon of hope": donor perceptions of late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century Ghana 
In recent years Ghana, a small West African country of around 
18 million people, has arguably become nothing less than a donor's 
darling. A recent UK DfID document refers to it as "a beacon 
of hope and stability amidst a turbulent region" (DfID 2002: 7). 
Although continued dependence on primary products (gold, cocoa, 
timber) has limited Ghana's potential for rapid economic growth, it is 
seen to be "favored by a healthy democracy and a strong independent 
media" (DfID 2002: 7). Ethnic and religious tensions occasionally 
emerge, but strife tends to be spatially circumscribed. The successful 
transition from government by Rawlings' NDC to Kufuor's NPP 
government in December 2000 was marked as a particularly notable 
success. 
Ghana has recorded some significant firsts in its recent history: 
notably, first African country to achieve independence (1957), and 
first African country to implement a (painful) World Bank/IMF 
structural adjustment program (1983). The latter program marked the 
start of a long relationship with the World Bank, which continues 
through to the present. Unlike its more truculent near-neighbor 
Nigeria, the Ghanaian government has mostly tried to work with 
donor agendas to reduce the poverty that persists across the country, 
but is particularly widespread in its three northern regions. 
So far as expatriate staff are concerned, Ghana (by comparison with 
other African countries) is a very good place to be located: above all, 
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violence is low, Ghanaians are extremely welcoming to strangers, 
and many donors perceive a national ethos around avoiding tension 
and strife ( to the extent that one donor interviewed suggested 
that Ghanaian culture may be "dangerously confluent") (Authors' 
interviews with donor staff, 2003-4). The relative ease of working 
in Ghana with Ghanaians cannot be ignored as a factor which 
encourages continued donor support to the country. This perception 
of cultural harmony may have an important bearing on recent donor 
interventions to support the country's "latent entrepreneurship" 
(DfID 2002: 7), since the tendency to see Ghanaians as essentially 
collaborative also makes them supremely suited subjects for 
experiments in social capital building. The fact that Ghana is widely 
recognized and represented as a country with a rich traditional 
associational life (Atingdui, Anheier, Sokolowski, and Laryea 1998), 
gives an additional impetus to donor expectations. 
Donors and development in Ghana: the role 
of the Local Development Groups 
Local Development Groups, or LDGs, are at the heart of many recent 
donor initiatives aimed at building social capital worldwide, since 
membership of groups is commonly argued to be crucial to building 
trust and social cohesion (Weinberger and Jutting 2001: 1395). A 
review of World Bank literature suggests that group membership is 
directly equated with social capital (also Narayan and Pritchett 1997; 
Grootaert and Narayan 2001). For instance: 
To measure the density and importance of social connections in rural 
Tanzania in 1995, researchers asked households to list the groups they 
belonged to ... They then constructed an index of social capital 
incorporating various aspects of membership ... Villages rich in social 
capital had higher incomes than those with little. They were also much 
more likely to use fertilizer, agrochemical inputs, and improved seeds. 
(World Bank 1998b: 121) 
On the ground, the potential for groups to allow rapid disbursement 
of funds appears to be a particular factor in their favor among donors 
and local NGOs alike: quotas for group formation and a "scramble 
for groups" have been observed in many countries (e.g. Joshi 1998 
on Nepal; Quirk 2003: 156-61 on India and Mishra, Vasavada, and 
Bates in press). Mayer and Rankin (2002: 805) state that micro-
finance models advocated by mainstream donors like the World Bank 
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"respond more to lenders' concerns with financial sustainability than 
to traditions of fostering radical collective action ... solidarity 
groups function foremost to cut costs and introduce financial 
discipline through peer pressure." Much the same comment can be 
made regarding donor support of LDGs. 
In Ghana, the LDG has been promoted with remarkable persistence 
by donors, led by the World Bank. The broad donor perceptions 
concerning cultural harmony in Ghana that we described above 
may well have been an important contributory factor supporting this 
promotion. Community groups had been at the center of development 
initiatives among donors and NGOs in Ghana well before social 
capital was taken up as a key theme by the World Bank, but the 
focus on LDGs has gathered pace over the last decade, so that most 
NGOs in Ghana now focus the majority of their activities on groups. 
Donor and NGO rhetoric emphasizes LDGs as central to liberal 
democracy and democratic development in Ghana, but the sad reality 
is that numbers of groups and group members and associated loan 
recovery rates have become more prominent NGO targets than real 
improvement in living conditions or participation. Experience in the 
micro-credit sector in Asia seems to have a particularly strong impact 
on donor ideology about groups in Ghana, as elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa. The Grameen bank in Bangladesh, in particular, 
is still commonly held up as a successful model, although the 
application of such Asian models in Ghana has been attributed by 
local academics to a lack of confidence in local ideas and identified 
as a factor which actually undermines local potential for change 
(Porter 2003). Senior figures in major local NGOs talk about being 
"rolled over" by donors because they lack the formal evidence 
(i.e. support from academic writings in international publications) 
to support their local perspectives. 
Ghana might well have been expected to present a fertile seedbed 
for donor group-based initiatives because of its rich tradition of 
associational life and nationally promoted values of cooperation. 
However, important spatial distinctions can be drawn, for instance 
between northern and central Ghana and the coastal zone. These 
distinctions, which we suggest have been inadequately recognized 
by donors (and consequently their client NGOs), help shape the 
potential for success of group-based interventions on the ground in 
each region. A brief description of each zone and its history of group 
action helps set the national scene in which the more detailed 
discussion of the case study LDGs can then be placed. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s northern Ghana became the site of the 
majority of international and local NGO activity, because of its 
chronic poverty and limited infrastructural development. (In the 
colonial era, this region was viewed principally as a labor reserve 
for southern gold mines and cocoa farms.) Initially assistance was 
focused on basic service delivery, though following the mid-1990s' 
ethnic disturbances many NGOs expanded their focus to citizenship 
and ethnicity (Mohan 2002). Most NGOs working in northern Ghana 
now focus a majority of their activities on groups. There are many 
such associations: groups for agro-processing, revolving credit 
schemes with goats, groups for money literacy and income 
generation, and so on. Many of these programs are focused on 
women and some involve membership groups as large as 150 people. 
Central Ghana exhibits rather different local cultural, political, 
and economic contexts from both northern Ghana and the coastal 
savannas. Much of the central area - notably the Ashanti and Brong 
Ahafo Regions which form the Akan heartland - is richer than the 
north: it includes major maize and export cocoa producing zones, 
gold mining and timber production, and has more developed 
communications and infrastructure. This is a region capable of 
substantial community mobilization without external support, related 
to its history of opposition to central government and the tradition 
of demonstrating group support through funeral attendance (Dennis 
and Peprah 1995). NGO activity has been very limited in the region 
(Kyei 1999) because donor support for interventions is focused on 
Ghana's poorer districts. 
Further contrast is offered by the coastal savanna region where there 
has also been little NGO involvement, despite the fact that there 
are considerable pockets of poverty. There is much dependence here 
on semi-substance farming and artisanal fishing and some areas are 
arguably as poor as northern Ghana. In recent years a number of 
donor-led initiatives have extended into this zone (which is facing 
serious environmental problems) and a few international NGOs -
which had previously concentrated on northern Ghana - have begun 
to operate more extensively here. Additionally, quite a few local 
NGOs have come into existence, though by comparison with 
northern Ghana their numbers remain comparatively low. Again, 
group-based activities have commonly been central to the 
development initiatives set in motion. 
Our discussion so far has shown how donors ( and consequently both 
local and international NGOs - who mostly depend on donors for 
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their survival) have adopted a relatively uniform concept of 
cooperation in groups. We now aim to demonstrate how and why 
attempts to implement this aspatial blueprint have been rejected or 
adapted, by reviewing the diverse experiences of group formation 
in one region, the coastal savanna zone. 
LDGs in coastal Ghana: patterns of adoption, 
adaptation, and rejection 
Case 1: Struggling to form groups: Ghana's Village 
Infrastructure Project and Intermediate Means of Transport 
This case study explores support for and resistance to group 
formation in a rural transport context. The broad donor development 
context is provided by the nationwide Village Infrastructure Project 
(hereafter VIP), which was established in the second half of the 
1990s. Associated with the VIP was an Intermediate Means of 
Transport (hereafter IMT) project involving the Ghana Ministry of 
Agriculture's Village Infrastructure Project Coordinating Unit. The 
experiences of five villages in the Central Region not previously 
targeted under the broader VIP program were followed closely 
during the process of adoption of the Intermediate Transport project 
(IMT) to assess their impact within the villages. The latter evaluation 
was carried out as part of an action research project involving one of 
this chapter's authors (Porter 2002a, 2002b). 
The Village Infrastructure Project (VIP) is a World Bank funded 
program focused explicitly on rural community groups and 
associations in pilot locations across the country. Project components 
include rural water infrastructure, rural transport (including village 
tracks and trails and intermediate means of transport such as bicycles 
and trailers, power tillers, and carts), post-harvest infrastructure (e.g. 
drying facilities and so on), and institutional strengthening focused 
on the district assemblies. While previous programs relied more on 
existing groups, new groups can be eligible for assistance in this 
program, providing they register formally and have "satisfactorily 
completed appropriate training in group dynamics and management 
through a partnership NGO." A further requirement is evidence 
of group savings at a "commercial bank." 
We examine here those cases of local groups buying intermediate 
means of transport such as bicycles and trailers, power tillers, and 
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carts through the VIP and a similar set of equipment purchased 
through the IMT action research project. From the outset, problems 
have been identified around "group formation, dynamism and 
cohesion" in the VIP (Anchirinah and Yoder 2000), particularly 
in cases where groups have been established for the purpose of 
receiving funds, and in those groups that share equipment and 
maintenance. Successful groups were identified in the VIP where 
farmers had established the groups themselves, such as nnoboa (joint 
farm labor) work groups. However, shifting the emphasis of some of 
these groups and, in particular, building new groups has presented 
challenges. 
Interviews with inhabitants of the five villages in the action research 
project found negative attitudes to groups, raising questions about the 
reasons for such attitudes. Reluctance to form groups was found 
particularly in relation to perceptions about potential quarrels: 
I would not consider group ownership because ... it always includes 
quarrelling. 
(Young woman, Assin-Aworabo) 
You would not get it [the IMT] whenever you need it. 
(Woman, Gomoa-Sampa) 
Husbands tended to support this view, not wishing to see themselves 
drawn into village disputes: "if there is trouble arising she would 
come to me" (Young husband, Aworabo ). Indeed, in the subsequent 
implementation component of the action research when transport 
equipment was offered to villagers on credit, we found that only 
five pieces of IMT out of 70 were purchased by groups. One of these 
cases was in a small village (Gomoa-Abora) where most residents 
are interrelated and two groups purchased and managed equipment 
together. 
Moreover, the five groups have proved no faster than individuals 
in paying for their equipment. When we held review meetings with 
villagers in the five villages after a 16-month monitoring period, 
four out of the five village reviews still came out strongly in favor of 
individual as opposed to group activities. There was a common view 
among both women and men that group ownership of equipment 
would only be feasible if members were drawn from the same 
household, as otherwise there would be too many disputes about 
the use of equipment. 
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Despite this apparent resistance to groups in the Central Region, 
district assemblies and administrative officers in these districts have 
favored group loans, specifically because they argue that the group 
will apply pressure on defaulting individuals. Moreover, local 
officials argue that loans to individuals are difficult because of the 
need for collateral and guarantors. They are particularly positive 
about the reliability of women's groups in meeting repayments 
because of the application of sanctions. VIP staff, meanwhile, 
argue that on a large project like VIP, groups are necessary not just 
because of the size of the project but in particular because VIP 
are focusing on the "poorest of the poor" and individuals could not 
afford IMTs (Porter's meeting with VIP staff, Accra, 2000). At the 
same meeting, however, a Ministry of Agriculture representative 
from another department suggested that in the agro-processing field, 
individuals operated and managed the equipment better than groups, 
"although project staff find groups easier to manage." By August 
2000, one of the two District Chief Executives from the study 
districts was expressing some disillusionment with group work in the 
VIP. He found the VIP regulations around the use of long-standing 
groups operating their own account "too difficult" and suggested that 
the project would work better through individuals. 
Government and NGO attachment to groups was still strongly in 
evidence, despite the clearly expressed negative attitude of villagers 
to group formation for development projects, as illustrated in the 
following comments: 
Formation of strong groups is needed. 
(Staff member, Feeder Roads Department) 
Women's groups can guarantee credit ... already existing women's 
groups can easily be contacted for the use of IMTs ... women's 
groups can guarantee for credit facilities. 
(NGO regional project officer) 
Women's groups can influence others to use IMTs. 
(Government officer) 
Women's groups are a force to be reckoned with. They can easily 
move to NGOs for funding. Repayment is guaranteed. 
(NGO staff member) 
One small workshop discussion continued to list the following 
advantages of groups (presented by a government staff member): 
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As a group, can influence one another to adopt the IMT; can easily 
organize their members for training and education; can guarantee for 
credit and ensure repayment; as a unified front can easily approach 
local and international NGOs for support. 
At local government level, however, some bemusement was 
expressed that groups were patently not working in Gomoa district. 
One district officer spoke out at the workshop in evident frustration, 
"Why can't it work here with groups?" He received no response. 
Case 2: Struggling to sustain groups: the case of inventory 
credit and processing groups 
Farmer groups also lay at the heart of two agricultural projects 
managed by an international NGO in the Central Region of Ghana. 
The inventory credit program allowed groups of farmers and crop 
processors to receive micro-credit from local banks using their 
produce as collateral. Under this system, groups stored their produce 
at an inventory site and then received 70 percent of the market price 
at that time. When the market price rose after the harvesting period, 
the produce could be sold and farmers were paid the value of their 
crop minus the initial credit and the cost of storage. The organization 
of groups was carefully supervised and coordinated by NGO staff 
who played a key role in their functioning. Of crucial importance 
was the fact that there were two locks for the store. The key to one 
lock was held by the group, and the other key was held by NGO 
staff. The banks did not appear to be willing to lend inventory credit 
unless a trusted NGO was actively involved. This raised questions 
regarding the sustainability of the group after the departure of the 
highly trained, motivated, and mobile staff currently involved. 
Interestingly, the pilot scheme to introduce this inventory credit 
program and associated group marketing to (new and established) 
farmer groups in selected areas of Ghana (Volta, Eastern, and Central 
Regions) seems to have had least success in the coastal zones of 
Central Region, though it was subsequently adopted with apparent 
success further north in Brong Ahafo and northern Ghana. The 
groups' success in Brong Ahafo was attributed to the "better 
operation of farmer groups there than in Central Region" by the 
NGO which organized this program (Interview, Accra, 1999). 1 
Some groups were able to repay the start-up loans sooner than 
others, with success attributed by the NGO workers to the 
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behavior and commitment of the equipment operators and managers 
who collect fees for using the equipment and prepare the accounts. 
This research demonstrates the importance of understanding how 
social capital is culturally specific and how the issues of trust and 
sanctions need to be understood as part of the cultural context. In the 
context of this project, the ability to sustain trust was found to be 
based on norms of reciprocity and the ability to exert sanctions. 
Norms also shaped what sanctions are deemed acceptable, and 
the implicit acceptance of particular types of authority such as the 
chieftaincy system. One of the groups had particular success, 
reportedly due to the specific commitment of a woman leader and 
to the fact that the machine operator belonged to the same church 
as some of the leading members (which may give additional moral 
pressure in his case). Groups with effective, committed leaders, and 
some previous experience of working together are more likely to 
be successful in this context. However, of the four sites established, 
only one was operating fully in 2004 due to the inability to invest 
in maintenance. In contrast, there are other types of groups in the 
locality that do sustain themselves over decades such as trader 
associations. 
The failure of groups in the farmers' groups is attributable to a lack 
of conceptualization of what makes groups work and how they are 
underpinned by culture. In particular, the expected form of leadership 
and organization were transplanted from W estem cooperative models 
(with a chair, secretary, and treasurer), while ignoring the local 
forms of leadership modeled on the chieftaincy system, which have 
been adapted by women trader associations that have a "queen" and 
elders. Cooperation within groups is also dependent on issues of 
trust. Trust is essential for cooperation because it provides the 
foundation on which other individuals' actions within a group 
initiative are accepted as being either for the overall benefit of the 
group or without disadvantage for the group. Trust comes about 
through an expectation that those being trusted will cooperate (Lyon 
2000). Trust seems to grow on the back of accepted cultural norms 
that specific people will cooperate, keep verbal agreements and act 
reciprocally. In the Akan group oflanguages in Ghana the nearest 
equivalent term to trust is gyedi which also means confidence, 
knowledge of a person's ability, belief and faith, all of which in 
Ghana are firmly intertwined with concepts of reputation. 
Trust cannot be fully understood without reference to processes of 
power and control ( compare Watson, this volume). Power over others 
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is utilized by individuals within the group, or by the group as a 
whole, to maintain control over group trajectories, and punish deviant 
behavior. This latter type of power (a) enables specific values of the 
dominant interests to become recognized as group norms (implying 
moral obligation and routine/habitual compliance), (b) allows 
surveillance of members' activities and behavior (which may 
ultimately either support or destroy trust), and (c) realizes threats 
or actual action when deviant behavior occurs. The sanctions 
which are ultimately imposed may take various forms, from group 
displeasure with the individual ( expressed verbally or by actions, 
including apparent loss of trust and application of corrective 
pressure), through expulsion from the group to possible initiation 
of broader actions. Such actions may involve the wider community 
in implementing social and/or financial punishments, bringing loss of 
prestige and shame, a "bad name," financial loss, and even physical 
attack. When major sins are committed it may be necessary for the 
"sinner" to leave the community altogether. 
Cultural insensitivity and the (mis)understanding 
of trust and norms 
The projects described above illustrate a number of factors that shape 
cooperation including the key roles of risk, trust, and sanctions. We 
argue that these issues are not considered in the donors' use of the 
term social capital due to their lack of understanding of cultural 
heterogeneity in relation to local norms, attitudes, and history. In 
order to further understand these complex patterns of resistance and 
compliance to donor pressures to form groups in Ghana we need to 
consider a range of possible influencing factors, including specific 
agro-ecological conditions and their impact on prevailing livelihood 
opportunities and practices, related migration histories, the likely 
impact of remoteness, transport accessibility and proximity to urban 
areas, and varying histories of NGO intervention. All these issues 
shape the cultural factors which may predispose people to favor 
or disfavor group action. 
Cooperation is sustained if there is trust or an expectation that other 
members being trusted will cooperate when it might be in their own 
interest not to. It operates when there is confidence in other agents, 
despite uncertainty, risk, and the possibility that those agents may 
act opportunistically (Misztal 1996: 18, Gambetta 1988: 218-19). 
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The more people work and associate together, the more trust may 
grow (Granovetter 1994: 463; compare James, this volume) and the 
more it can be used to support new types of interaction. Trust grows 
on the back of accepted cultural norms that people will cooperate, 
keep the verbal agreements, and act reciprocally. 
Decisions to cooperate in LDGs are shaped by both conscious 
calculation and habitual action, sometimes by unquestioning 
compliance or obedience. Cleaver points out in a slightly different 
but related context, "non-participation and non-compliance may be 
both a 'rational' strategy and an unconscious practice embedded in 
routine, social norms and the acceptance of the status quo" (2001: 
51 ). Sanctions are also an important part of trust relations and based 
on power relations, accepted values of hierarchy, conceptions of 
authority and economic power as discussed above. Norms shape 
what behavior is considered acceptable and what sanctions can be 
taken. These vary depending on whether the relationship is with kin, 
community members, or non-community members. 
The issue of social capital and sanctions in kin groups raises 
specific questions about the ability to work with family groups. 
An environmental NGO working in southern Ghana has begun 
to move from a focus on community lands to family lands in 
project development, recognizing the diversity of interest within 
"communities." This has led to a change from supplying community 
nurseries to supplying family holdings with trees. However, family 
group activities may fail to operate precisely because it is so difficult 
to impose harsh sanctions on deviant members or because they fail to 
address gender inequalities within the family (Molyneux 2002). 
Kin-based groups also, by definition, bar non-family members. 
However, donors fail to see how their interventions are being 
reinterpreted and how groups actually function in practice. Local 
gender relations, for instance may have a critical influence on group 
potential. Most development groups tend to have a (mostly) unpaid 
executive - leader, secretary, treasurer - which plays an important 
supervisory role. In Ghana, as elsewhere in low-income countries, 
most of the executive tends to comprise literate males. Women 
may be excluded explicitly on the basis that they lack writing and 
accounting skills, a factor which then often prevents women gaining 
equal benefits from group activities and may ultimately disadvantage 
group progress (Lyon 2003) unless individual strong and committed 
women emerge as leaders. 
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The local development group is commonly expected by donors 
to exist for a substantial period as a stable entity, through the 
(frequently slow) period of project planning and eventual 
inauguration to actual activities on the ground, to maintain its 
membership and its external alliances. Although groups are best 
when longlasting, benefits may simply take too long to emerge, 
when measured against other livelihood options, and may have been 
misrepresented by NGOs and District staff or misconstrued by 
groups. Moreover, in Ghana's traditional non-formal groups there is 
often a tendency for non-kin based associations to shift membership, 
focus, rules, and external alliances fairly rapidly in response to 
changing social, economic, and political conditions in a way which 
is not anticipated by donors in LDGs. Similar dynamism and fluidity 
among non-formal groups has been observed in Tanzania (de Weerdt 
2001). 
As local participants - district authorities, implementing NGOs 
and group members themselves - may recognize, the crucial factor 
ultimately is likely to be the power of surveillance and censure, but 
this component may be the one most difficult to graft artificially. 
Indeed, particular problems in a development context seem to stem 
from donor's inadequate conceptualization of sanctions in theorizing 
around social capital and the potential of group action. As we have 
illustrated in our case study, grassroots development workers are 
often far more aware than donors that group enterprises involve 
relationships which may incur social costs both for members and 
for non-members: peer pressure, loss of trust, and exclusion of 
the poorest and most vulnerable. It is not necessarily a win-win 
scenario and while direct and indirect costs (time, money, materials, 
argument, etc.) are likely to be incurred at an early stage, direct and 
indirect benefits (income, information, facilities, etc.) may take some 
years to become visible (Weinberger and Jutting 2001 ). The ability 
to impose sanctions is likely to vary spatially, with urban proximity 
causing particular potential difficulties ( an observation supported by 
Freidberg [2001] with reference to problems of collaboration around 
Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso), a point we discuss further below. 
Geography, culture, and development cooperation in Ghana 
Our findings in Ghana suggest that the ability to build trust and 
impose sanctions varies substantially across regions, within regions, 
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and between different cultural registers, especially where externally 
initiated LDGs are concerned. 
The widespread existence of active donor-supported LDGs in 
northern Ghana appears logical in the context of that region's relative 
remoteness, its associated lack of livelihood opportunities, and 
its relatively long history (by Ghanaian standards) of NGO 
intervention. In this context, when an NGO arrives with the 
promise of largesse, and this is predicated on group formation, the 
pressure to cooperate will commonly be intense. If some livelihoods 
improve even marginally as a result - particularly those of more 
powerful community members - the group is likely to be sustained, 
or at least a semblance of group action maintained whenever the 
potential for external assistance appears on the horizon. Given the 
shortage of other local options, benefits from the group become 
part of an overall livelihood strategy and there can be strong peer 
pressure on individuals to cooperate. Additionally, in northern Ghana 
there may be social ( as opposed to economic) benefits for women 
from group formation since cultural constraints can limit their 
activities and travel to distant places. Our research findings are 
supported by studies elsewhere showing that group operations may 
allow women a good excuse to meet and even occasional 
opportunities for travel to NGO offices at district and regional 
headquarters (Townsend, Arrevillaga, Bain, and Cancino 1995). 
In the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions, livelihood opportunities 
are far greater than in the northern regions and thus the imperative 
to form groups from this perspective seems lower. However, there 
is much evidence in this region that groups have been a traditional 
component of the rural livelihoods repertoire. Relationships are often 
built up carefully over time, especially in remoter rural areas, so that 
community mobilization, including associated group formation, is 
feasible. Nnoboa groups, for instance, are formed by groups of 
farmers to undertake working parties at labor bottleneck periods, and 
many other groups may emerge from time to time. Thus, although 
there has been much less NGO intervention in this region, because 
of its perceived comparative wealth, traditional group formation is 
common (Lyon and Porter 2005). Consequently, when NGOs do 
intervene, we might hypothesize that grassroots interest in LDGs 
is likely to be sustained, especially in remoter rural areas. In the 
case of inventory credit (see case 2 p.160), this hypothesis was 
confirmed. 
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The coastal savanna zone, where much of our research was 
conducted, provides other lessons. In more accessible areas, and 
particularly those areas close to major cities and in settlements along 
major highways, populations are fluid, people come and go with the 
farming and fishing seasons and according to other non-seasonal 
opportunities which become available. "Straddling" the urban-rural 
divide has intensified as a feature of life in this part of Ghana since 
early colonial settlement, and has accelerated since the introduction 
of Structural Adjustment Policies by the World Bank in 1983. Group 
formation is likely to be more difficult in these locations within the 
coastal belt because individuals can far more easily disappear into a 
distant suburb or to another town where fellow group members and 
creditors cannot find them without considerable effort. In addition 
to this broad pattern of rural-urban mobility, there are substantial 
migrations of fishermen, their wives, and families as the fishing fleets 
move up and down the West African coast - from Abidjan to Lagos 
and beyond. Not only may these migrations further destabilize the 
potential for developing trust and sanctions. Such national and 
international migrations also make it particularly difficult for the kind 
of spatially based groups favored by donors to become established 
and develop the necessary link to local NGOs in order to obtain 
funding for specific activities. Particular examples of group failure 
were given by villagers concerning susu (non-formal rotational group 
saving and lending schemes). In coastal fishing villages like Dogo 
in Gomoa district and Ada Foah in Dangbe East district, the poor 
experience of development groups has turned many residents against 
group schemes in general (Village interviews 1997). It has possibly 
been a major cause of lack of trust in new ( especially externally 
initiated) group enterprises among inhabitants of many other 
settlements in coastal Ghana. 
Despite these problems, even in the coastal zone, groups may 
work in particular circumstances. In case study 1, family bonds 
were sufficiently strong in one village to overcome the potentially 
disruptive influences of urban proximity and allow some group 
purchase of intermediate means of transport. The four other IMT 
study settlements were located inland, off the paved road (between 
8 and 25 km distant), on bad roads with relatively poor access to 
transport. They thus might have been expected to provide contexts 
relatively favorable to cooperation. However, the widespread 
reluctance to undertake NGO-promoted group activities among the 
Fanti even in less accessible areas, may lie in regional historical 
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experience of defaulting from groups described above. In some cases 
communities may not have suffered actual bad experiences, but the 
mere publicity that cases of absconding receive often seems sufficient 
to deter moves towards group activity, despite pressures for group 
formation from NGO staff. This reluctance may be encouraged by 
the greater self-reliance and choice that people have due to the 
history of cash cropping in this region, as well as the lack of 
sanctions available to stop them. 
Conclusion 
Donor interventions to support social capital in many cases appear to 
be misguided. These interventions, founded upon the World Bank's 
limited conceptualization of social capital, emphasize a "win-win" 
scenario of trust and empowerment in groups, and have been 
essentialized as support for Local Development Groups. Many such 
projects end up focusing on specific groups that are easy to 
work with, essentially turning a blind eye to class, ethnic, gender, 
and other such social and political divisions in communities 
and reinforcing local structures of inequality and discrimination 
(Brohman 1996; Atak 1999; also Watts, this volume). There is 
growing evidence to suggest that this has been the case in northern 
Ghana (Mohan 2002). 
Our chapter has charted how, while donors and others have been 
pursuing the LDG as a development tool in Ghana, the geography 
of cultural development has inserted a powerful, yet unanticipated by 
policy-makers, complication into this process. We have shown how 
group activities in Ghana are firmly embedded in local-regional 
cultural conceptions and attitudes: these may bring intra-group 
solidarity or they may encourage contestation and disharmony. There 
may thus be fundamental disjunctions between what donors expect 
of groups and what groups might be realistically expected to achieve 
(in specific cultural and economic contexts) and between donor and 
grassroots perspectives on how groups will operate on the ground. 
Given the limited geographical imagination of donor discourses 
concerning LDGs,2 their failure in certain locational contexts in 
Ghana hardly surprises. It can be argued that this is directly 
attributable to limitations of the social capital literature which has 
not only failed to give adequate consideration to the importance 
of history ( a now widely accepted criticism) but also neglects the 
crucial significance of geography (see Chapter 1, this volume). 
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Moreover, our chapter illustrates how the potential to build social 
capital is highly dependent on locational context: namely on regional 
cultural history, prevailing livelihoods and opportunities, remoteness, 
migration patterns, and a range of other (sometimes highly localized) 
economic or sociocultural factors (such as female seclusion and 
gender relations), what we might term the variations in cultural 
economy. These factors interact to produce specific local conditions 
that have the potential to either support or destabilize social relations 
in simple or complex ways, predisposing people to accept or reject 
group projects. 
Building trust (and so-called social capital) commonly hinges on 
developing an intimate knowledge of people's character, personal 
and family circumstances, being able to monitor their actions and test 
them gradually over time, and, most critically, knowing where to find 
them if trust is misplaced and sanctions have to be imposed. It is not 
surprising then that we find cooperation between non-family groups 
and group action in response to external development interventions 
tends to be stronger in those parts of Ghana where local options are 
limited by local agro-ecological conditions and conditions favor close 
and regular interactions. All of the factors listed above have an 
inherently spatial component which may either favor or disfavor 
group action. 
Returning to our coastal case study region, the net development 
result of failures at group formation and associated problems with 
disbursement of funds in coastal Ghana is probably to further 
encourage concentration of development funds in northern Ghana, 
where there is greater willingness to work in groups according 
to donor requirements, despite the fact that poverty in some coastal 
districts of Central Region is on a similar scale to that in the north. 
Meanwhile, in parts of coastal Ghana (and probably elsewhere) the 
requirement for pre-formed groups and working through groups may 
actually be diverting development efforts by local NGOs away from 
assistance to those individuals and traditional non-formal groups 
most needful of support, and creating further disillusionment among 
those communities which have been subjected to development. Such 
long-term outcomes illustrate the power of development concepts 
such as social capital, as well as highlighting the ongoing processes 
that underpin the reproduction of uneven landscapes of development. 
Far from illustrating a genuine cultural turn in development thinking, 
donor adoption of social capital concepts arguably reflects a 
Notes 
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continuing lack of sensitivity to cultural diversity and the specific 
geographical contexts within which diverse cultural registers ( elite, 
popular, and youth cultures, among others) evolve and interact. 
Economists continue to set and rule the agenda, despite the growing 
numbers of anthropologists and other social scientists employed 
by the World Bank and other donors. The consequences are well 
illustrated by recent donor development initiatives in Ghana. 
Although donors less commonly voice concerns about project 
replicability and generic approaches than they did in the late 1990s, 
there nevertheless appears to be a persistent reluctance to take on 
board cultural diversity and its developmental implications. 
The same international NGO had also been supporting mechanized oil palm 
processing projects in the Central Region as part of a contract with the World 
Bank. 
2 Compare Radcliffe and Laurie (this volume) on imaginative geographies of 
policy. 
c» On the spatial limits of 
culture in high-tech 
regional economic 
development: lessons 
from Salt Lake City, Utah 
Al James 
Introduction: Silicon envy and the copycat cluster league 
Over the last decade the connections between innovation and 
regional growth have become a central avenue of research for 
academics and policy-makers alike. With the shift to a new phase 
of capitalism (variously labeled the information economy, 
postindustrialism, the Fifth Kondratiev, post-Fordism, or the New 
Economy) the most important type of competitiveness is argued 
to be sustained only through learning and innovation, to anticipate 
and outrun attempts at imitation by competitors. Geographers have 
argued that these key processes are territorially embedded, and 
examined how regional industrial "clusters" foster and support 
conditions conducive to knowledge creation, inventiveness, and 
learning. No region has been more intensely scrutinized than Silicon 
Valley, California. Widely regarded as the paradigmatic icon of 
economic and technological success in the global knowledge 
economy, this region is consistently held up as a visible example 
of what other regions can do to distinguish themselves in a world of 
heightened spatial competition and of eroding regional policy 
(Markusen 1999). Consequently, governments across the world have 
become fixated with trying to recreate the conditions that engendered 
the region's vitality and innovation, in order to grow their own 
high-tech "clusters." 
The copycat cluster league now includes a Silicon Plateau, Silicon 
Desert, Silicon Hollow, Silicon Alps, two Silicon Vineyards, five 
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Silicon Islands, and the improbable Silicon Glacier and Silicon 
Sandbar.1 However, beyond clever names and promotional websites 
these policy attempts to emulate Silicon Valley's success have 
typically failed to ignite any meaningful long-run processes of 
regional economic growth (Florida and Kenney 1990; Castells 
and Hall 1994; Asheim and Cooke 1999; Markusen 1999). 
Problematically, while policy-makers have sought to recreate the 
Valley's success through installing the "right" mix of sleek low-rise 
glassy office buildings, broadband internet connections, a few 
multinational companies, government-run research institutes, venture 
capital, reduced taxes, and an appropriately skilled workforce, merely 
providing an abundance of these "hard" institutions does not 
"automatically" generate the crucial interactions between firms that 
underpin the technological spillovers and regional dynamism (Massey, 
Quintas, and Wield 1992; Johannisson, Alexanderson, Nowicki, and 
Senneseth 1994; Hudson 1999; Malecki and Oinas 1999). Rather, this 
is increasingly recognized as dependent on a set of intangible cultural 
conventions, norms, values, and traditions that facilitate and regulate 
the economic behavior of firms and that hold these regions together 
beyond mere economic specialization and interlinkage. 
Nevertheless, despite this growing consensus, the nature of this 
regional cultural "glue" has yet to be fully elucidated, with references 
to culture still seen by many as appealing to a set of "mystical 
forces" or a "dustbin category" into which we lump anything 
sociological that we cannot fully explain (Sayer and Walker 1992; 
Gertler 2004). In this chapter I seek, therefore, to extend 
our understanding of the cultural economy of high-tech regional 
industrial systems, examining: (i) how regional culture shapes and 
conditions firms' innovative behavior and economic performance; 
and (ii) how far we might empirically verify those links. My analysis 
focuses on the high-tech industrial agglomeration in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, embedded in a highly visible regional culture, Mormonism. 
First, I sketch the evolution of the main schools of thought through 
which geographers have sought to theorize high-growth regional 
economies over the last two decades. Second, I show how the 
cultural economy of firms in the region can be understood in terms 
of a series of tensions between self-identified regional cultural traits 
also identifiable within local firms, versus key elements of corporate 
cultures consistently shown in the regional learning literature as 
positively underpinning firms' abilities to innovate. Third, I measure 
the impact of those tensions on firms' economic performance across 
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a series of metrics. Fourth, I outline the main mechanisms and causal 
agents through which culture shapes and conditions the behavior of 
firms in the region. Finally, I return to the wider policy relevance 
of my analysis, arguing for an explicit recognition of the spatial 
limits of cultural economy on high-tech cluster policy. 
Theorizing dynamic regional economies: from transaction 
cost reductions to cultural economy 
Received wisdom has long held culture and economy as discrete 
entities, each with its own set of self-determining institutions, 
rationalities, and conditions of existence. However, since the early 
1990s economic geography has witnessed a "cultural turn" in which 
culture and economy are reconceptualized as existing in a two-way 
recursive relation, based on their perpetual and simultaneous 
(re)construction by human agents whose economic motives and 
logics are inseparable from their own sociocultural identities (Crang 
1997; Sayer 1997; Barnett 1998). On the one hand, this rethinking 
represents a response to a series of new economic empirical realities, 
in which the social bases of economic success ( and failure) have 
become increasingly apparent. On the other hand, it also represents 
an ontological backlash against the economism of previous Marxist 
and neoclassical accounts of geographical change. Thus, under the 
new banner of "cultural economy," scholars have brought to the fore 
so-called "background" factors: the "soft" sociocultural aspects of 
economic behavior previously ignored in conventional economic 
analyses (Wolfe and Gertler 2001). That is, they have sought to put 
back that which should never have been taken out (see Amin and 
Thrift 2004: xiv). 
This profound shift has been especially apparent within the industrial 
district literature, as geographers have sought to understand the 
workings of the post-Fordist spearheads of regional economic 
growth. 2 Three main schools of thought are discernible. Beginning in 
the 1980s the "Californian school" sought to explain the growth 
of highly competitive regional networks of firms across Western 
Europe and North America through an appeal to the transaction cost 
reductions gained by firms as a function of spatial agglomeration. 
First, instability of markets and an accelerated pace of technological 
change are argued to be met by a disintegration of the production 
process, and a deepened social division of labor, allowing more 
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flexibility (Scott 1986, 1988). Second, as inter-firm transactions 
become more important, so the costs of "transport, communication, 
information exchange, searching and scanning" create a "spatial pull" 
to minimize these transaction costs through external economies of 
scale (Scott 1988: 176). Third, spatial agglomeration is also argued 
to create specialized institutions, which further lower transaction 
costs as labor and other factors of production are pooled among 
large numbers of specialist producers. 
From the late 1980s, however, the transactions cost approach 
received significant critique. Problematically, external economies and 
cost-price benefits to producers cannot fully explain the ongoing 
innovative capacity of particular high-tech regional economies, nor 
why some remain competitive while others do not (Storper 1997). 
Saxenian's (1994) work on the divergent regional economic 
trajectories of Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128 through the 
1980s demonstrated this most explicitly. Controlling for industrial 
sector, products, historical period, position in the business cycle, 
political events, and nation-state (Gertler 1995), Saxenian instead 
highlighted the importance of local cultural determinants of 
industrial adaptation. In Silicon Valley, a distinctive regional culture 
characterized by a willingness to embrace risk, and loyalties to 
transcendent technologies over individual firms, underpinned a 
regional network-based industrial system based on blurred inter-firm 
boundaries and flexible adjustment among producers of complex 
related products. 3 In contrast, a traditional conservative East Coast 
business culture in Route 128 sustained relatively integrated 
corporations, lesser interaction, and lower rates of economic growth. 
Subsequent scholars have built upon Saxenian's work as part of 
a broad "sociological institutionalist" school. While not denying 
the reality of transaction cost reductions, this second approach 
emphasizes that regional economies are integrated by a set of less 
tangible but crucially important "untraded interdependencies" 
(Storper 1995) which go beyond simple input-output links. The 
most common framework employed here has been a geographical 
application of the Polanyian notion of "embeddedness,"4 which 
argues that all economic relationships are embedded in both 
economic and non-economic institutions which create distinctive 
patterns of constraints and incentives (Polanyi 1944). Accordingly, 
scholars have examined how culture - in the form of collective 
beliefs, values, norms, conventions, ideologies, taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and lifestyles - shapes firms' economic strategies and 
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goals, and in particular, how it helps create a sense of community 
and trust upon which inter-firm cooperation is predicated in an 
uncertain post-Fordist climate of demand (e.g. Lorenz 1992; 
Gertler 1995). 
In the third variant of regional theory developed largely over the last 
decade, scholars have extended the sociological institutionalist school 
to focus explicitly on the significance of knowledge production in 
understanding regional economic development. This literature is now 
vast ( see Mackinnon, Cumbers, and Chapman 2002 for a useful 
recent review). However, at the broadest level the advantages of 
agglomeration are argued to emerge from localized information 
flows, technological spillovers, collective learning, and the creation 
of specialized pools of knowledge and skill. These are premised in 
tum on formal and informal networks of interaction between firms 
and their employees which aid the circulation of tacit knowledge 
within the region (Malmberg and Maskell 1997; Capello 1999). 
Significantly, scholars have also focused on the qualitative rules, 
conventions, and norms on which actors draw to combine varied 
skills, competencies, and ideas to create new knowledge and so 
underpin innovation. Innovation is therefore increasingly regarded 
as a fundamentally interactive, and hence unavoidably sociocultural, 
process (Malecki and Oinas 1999; Asheim 2001). 
Unpacking and repacking the fuzzy cultural dustbin 
However, while there is a growing consensus that distinctive regional 
cultures play a vital role in facilitating learning and innovation 
processes, the cultural economy of innovative industrial systems 
remains only partially specified within the geographical literature. 
Problematically, accounts return again and again to descriptions of 
the cultural properties of these regions, yet rarely specify the exact 
nature of the causal mechanisms by which regional culture structures 
promote innovative activity more successfully in some regions than 
in others (Asheim 1996; Storper 1997). There is often circularity of 
argument; that innovation occurs because of the presence of certain 
cultural institutions, and that those cultural institutions are what exist 
in regions where there is innovation. Indeed, while it is Saxenian 
who takes us furthest away from this unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
even she does not thoroughly establish the causal link between the 
competitive culture she describes and the success of Silicon Valley 
as a regional economy (Markusen 1999: 879). 
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To begin to demystify these links, I draw on the multi-tiered 
conception of culture as has been operationalized in the 
organizational studies literature. Here (corporate) cultures are 
conceptualized as the sets of social conventions, embracing 
behavioral norms, standards, customs, and the "rules of the game" 
that underlie social interactions within the firm. These conventions 
are in turn linked to a deeper set of underlying core values that 
provide more general guidance in shaping behavior patterns within 
the firm. Corporate cultures are thus seen as coherent and unifying 
systems that ensure stability and the smooth running of organizations 
through defining appropriate ways of behaving, attitudes, and ways 
of thinking, or put more simply, "the way we do things around here" 
(Deal and Kennedy 2000: 4). Importantly, I argue that we might 
also apply this model at the regional scale, while simultaneously 
recognizing that corporate cultures and regional cultures do not exist 
in isolation from each other; rather, they are interwoven across 
scales. Thus, rather than the all-encompassing notions of "regional 
culture" often employed in the regional learning and innovation 
literature, I instead argue for recognition of a regional culture scalar 
hierarchy, made up of: (i) individual corporate cultures; (ii) a 
regional industrial culture; and (iii) the broader regional culture 
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Once we unpack culture in this way (see Figure 8.1), the cultural 
economy of firms in the region can be understood in terms of the 
overlaps between the different levels of this hierarchy. That is, in 
terms of regional cultural systems of collective beliefs, ideologies, 
understandings, and conventions being manifest in firms' corporate 
cultures, and hence shaping.firms' systems of organizational control, 
rule systems, and decision-making processes. As such, patterns of 
corporate behavior become regionally culturally-inflected, and it is 
the various manifestations of these overlaps, their material impacts 
on firms' economic performances, and their driving mechanisms and 
responsible agents which form the focus of this chapter. My analyses 
draw on the case study of the high-tech industrial agglomeration 
centered on Salt Lake City, Utah, which is inseparable from a 
distinctive and highly visible regional culture, Mormonism. 
Salt Lake City: high tech meets Mormonism 
Salt Lake City is the main concentration of population on Utah's 
W asatch Front, an urban corridor made up of four counties running 
north and south for 85 miles along the base of the Wasatch Range 
of the Rocky Mountains to the east of Salt Lake City. This region 
is home to more than three-quarters of Utah's population of 2.13 
million, along with over 2,100 high-tech firms (90 percent of Utah's 
total high-tech industry), which currently employ over 70,000 people 
across a range of subsectors (Table 8.1 ). Computer Software (SIC 
737) is Utah's lead high-tech subsector in terms of both employment 
and number of establishments, and as such forms my case study 
industry (following Markusen 1994). Utah's computer software 
industry contributes over 45 percent of the state's total high-tech 
payroll of US$1.4 billion (Utah Department of Workforce Services 
2001). 
Importantly, the Wasatch Front is also the heartland of Mormonism, 
the regional culture from which the historical development of Utah's 
high-tech industry is inseparable. Mormonism is the distinctive 
culture associated with the "Mormon Church," or more properly 
"The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" (the LDS Church). 
Mormonism is especially strong within Utah reflecting the state's 
position as the geographical, political, administrative, and historical 
heart of the LDS Church, with Mormons comprising over 75 percent 
of Utah's total population (Church of LDS/Deseret News 2000), the 
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Table 8.1 Utah's high-tech subsector in 2000 (adapted from James 2005) 
SIC Description Establishments Employed % UT high- LQ 
tech emp. 
283 Drugs 53 3,998 5.7 0.18 
357 Computer and office equipment 28 4,057 5.8 1.51 
366 Communications equipment 25 2,953 4.2 1.50 
367 Electronic components and 58 3,993 5.7 0.83 
accessories 
371 Motor vehicles and equipment 40 7,904 11.3 1.08 
372 Aircraft and parts 40 2,744 3.9 0.83 
376 Guided missiles, space 10 5,342 7.6 0.84 
vehicles and parts 
381 Search and navigation equipment 3 645 0.9 0.56 
382 Measuring and controlling devices 39 1,028 1.5 0.49 
384 Medical instruments and supplies 71 8,383 11.9 4.07 
737 Computer software and data 1,438 23,042 32.8 5.76 
processing services 
873 Research and testing services 335 6,168 8.8 0.25 
TOTAL 2,140 70,257 100 
Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services, 2000. 
Note: A location quotient is a measure of spatial concentration: a ratio of ratios. The numerator is the total employ-
ment for a particular industry in Utah divided by total state employment. The denominator is the US employment 
for that industry divided by total US employment. Any location quotient over 1 signifies a concentration above 
the expected state average, e.g. if is 3, means that there are three times more jobs in a particular industry 
than there would have been if Utah had had a proportional share of national employment in that sector. 
same population from which Utah's high-tech workforce is drawn. 
Mormon culture is conservative by popular standards with strong 
family and community impulses (May 2001 ). It includes prohibitions 
against alcohol and drug use, a commitment to fasting and prayer, 
modesty in dress, an emphasis on family and obedience to parents, 
and concerns for the elderly and the poor. The church also 
emphasizes the Protestant ethics of diligence, education, and the 
attainment of skills (Cornwall 2001 ). Three elements of Mormon 
culture make it especially suited to my study. First, Mormonism is 
more than simply a creedal faith; it is a whole way of life requiring 
an almost total commitment in customs, values, and lifestyle (see 
Kotkin 1993). Second, the demographic dominance of Mormons in 
Utah creates the possibility of a denomination-specific domination 
of Utah's general culture. Third, Mormonism provides a regional 
culture whose central tenets are easily articulated and well known, 
and whose ideologies are written down and easily accessible. 





As such, Utah's Mormon regional culture is especially visible and 
therefore allowed me to observe and measure the ways in which 
culture shapes and conditions the behavior of firms in a high-tech 
regional industrial system. 
The data on which this chapter is based was collected by means of 
a multi-method approach. First, I sought to identify broad regional 
patterns through a survey of the lead 10 percent of computer 
software firms (by 2000 revenue from local Utah operations only) 
across the four counties of the Wasatch Front.5 I also categorized 
these data across "Mormon" versus "non-Mormon" versus 
"intermediate Mormon" firms, defined in terms of the proportion 
of a firm's founding and management team who were active 
Mormons (Table 8.2).6 I achieved an overall response rate of just 
over 50 percent, and as such the survey dataset covers the top 
20 percent of software firms on the Wasatch Front by 2000 revenue. 
The firms in my survey dataset employ 7,585 people in Utah, and 
in 2000 generated a combined revenue of US$1,031 million from 
their Utah operations. 
Basic distribution of the survey and case study samples 
(adapted from James 2005) 
Survey Case Study 
Micro Medium Med-Large Total ALL 20-99 emp 
(1-19 emp) (20-99 emp) (100-499 emp) 
18 28 12 58 (55.2%) 6 (30%) 
founded and 
managed 
INTERMEDIATE 6 6 9 21 (20.0%) 8 (40%) 
Mormon/ 
non-Mormon mix 
of founding and 
management 
NON-MORMON 10 12 4 26 (24.8) 6 (30%) 
majority founded 
and managed 
Total Firms 34 (32.4%) 46 (43.8%) 25 (23.8%) 105 (100%) 20 (100%) 
Note: Of the 105 firms in the survey sample, 89% were founded in the State of Utah, and the remaining 11% 
typically branch offices of computer software firms headquartered in other US states, especially California. 
Due to the relatively small number of non-Mormon firms in the medium-large size category (N = 4), I did not 
include statistical comparisons between Mormon and non-Mormon firms in this size category in my subsequent 
analysis. 
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Second, I sought to explain patterns manifest in the survey data 
through a series of in-depth case studies based on semi-structured 
interviews. 7 In total, 20 broadly similar computer software firms 
were chosen in order that they cover the spectrum of Mormon and 
non-Mormon founding and management, as outlined in Table 8.2. 
In this case study sample,8 I was also able to expand my initial 
definition of Mormon firms also to include the proportion of total 
Utah employees in the firm that are active Mormons. In 2000 the 
firms in my case study sample employed 1,009 people in Utah and 
their Utah operations generated a combined revenue of over 
US$111.3 million. All of these firms also fall in the 20-99 employees 
category, the dominant size category in the survey sample. Finally, to 
elucidate the processes through which the innovative behavior and 
economic performance of firms are regionally culturally inflected I 
undertook a systematic analysis of the interview transcripts through a 
process of progressive qualitative hypothesis testing.9 
Unpacking the Mormon cultural conditioning 
of firms' innovative capacities 
At the broadest level, the impact of Mormonism on Utah's computer 
software industry is manifested through large numbers of Mormons 
founding and managing Utah's lead software firms. Almost three-
quarters (69 percent) of the software firms in my survey sample are 
Mormon founded; 68 percent have a Mormon majority management 
team; and 58 percent are both Mormon founded and managed (James 
2003). Mormons also populate firms' workforces at lower levels, 
comprising approximately 69 percent of firms' total employees in 
the in-depth case study sample. However, how much difference do 
Mormon founders, management teams, and majority workforces 
actually make to the ways these firms operate? The data in Table 8.3 
show how this impact can be understood in terms of a series of 
sustained tensions, between self-identified Mormon cultural traits 
also manifest within local firms (LHS), versus key elements of 
corporate and industrial cultures that have been consistently shown 
in the regional learning literature as positively underpinning firms' 
abilities to innovate (RHS). 
In the following four sections I show how, in some cases, these 
tensions reinforce firms' innovative capacities; in other cases they 
potentially constrain them. However, I want to stress from the outset 
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Table 8.3 Unpacking the cultural economy of computer software firms on Utah's Wasatch 
Front with regard to firms' Innovative capacities 
Regional Mormon Culture 
(Self-identified and self-evident) 
Unity and mutual trust 
Self-sufficiency and autonomy 
Family (then Church) above all 
Respect for established ideas, hierarchy 
and authority 
Regional Industrial/Corporate Culture 
(Identified in the regional learning and 
innovation literature as promoting success) 
lnterfirm co-operation and trust 
Use of external competencies 
Sleeping bags under the desk 
Creative dissent, multiple advocacy, constant 
questioning 
that this is not an anti-Mormon work. Above all, my aim is to foster 
a better understanding of the processes through which culture and 
economy are intertwined within firms in the region, not to deprecate 
the LDS Church, its beliefs, or doctrines. 
Mormon unity and cultural trust versus inter-firm 
networking and studied trust 
Over the last two decades, the geographical literature has consistently 
shown that firms' abilities to innovate are strongly conditioned by 
their access to external sources of knowledge (see e.g. Camagni 
1991; Maillat 1995; Oinas and Malecki 2002). When individuals 
with partially overlapping knowledges come together and seek to 
articulate their ideas collectively, they are forced to derive more 
adequate ideas about the technology they are trying to develop 
(Lawson and Lorenz 1999: 312). Additionally, interaction also 
provides a basis for comparison of evolving ideas with other 
practices that are not internally generated. Overall, there results an 
increased potential for new interpretations and synergies to develop 
(Capello, 1999). Significantly, the Mormon regional culture on 
Utah's Wasatch Front is itself characterized by strong ethics of unity, 
reciprocity, and mutual commitment that shape and condition 
the nature of interaction among its members (Poll 2001 ). Indeed, 
extensive ties of extended Mormon kinship are explicitly cultivated 
by the LDS Church leadership, induced not only by the belief that 
unity is a Christian virtue, but also by the trying times experienced 
by the Mormon pioneers (Arrington and Bitton 1992).10 Thus, "at the 
largest level the [Mormon] church as a whole is a family, and ... 
Mormons give to others without expectations of recompense, even 
to those that they do not know" (Dunn 1996: 36). 
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One way to examine the extent to which local.firms exhibit these 
Mormon cultural traits is to track the extent to which Mormon 
ownership and management affect firms' choice of strategic partners. 
Significantly, the Mormon founded and managed firms in my case 
study sample do have a higher proportion of strategic partners in 
Utah who are similarly Mormon founded and managed (67.5 percent) 
than do their non-Mormon (50 percent) and intermediate Mormon 
counterparts (54 percent). The rationales driving these patterns have 
a cultural-historical basis: 
Mormons in the business world in Utah are very protective of each 
other. When we first settled Utah it was an ''us-versus-them" mentality 
for the first hundred years or more and that mentality of us versus the 
rest of the Gentile world still translates into business - there's a lot of 
cooperation between Mormon high tech businesses. 
(Creative Director, active Mormon male) 
Mormons go to Mormons. I can't tell you how many times in meetings 
I've heard "Oh he's in my Ward." And as soon as they discover I'm 
not a Mormon there's a barrier goes up and I have to establish a level 
of trust that would automatically be assumed if I was Mormon. 
(Software Consultant, non-Mormon male) 
These distinctive Mormon-Mormon network structures therefore 
highlight the importance of active social connections ( or "social 
capital") in shaping the quality and quantity of interactions among 
Mormons, premised on mutual understanding, norms of reciprocity, 
and trust (also Cohen and Prusak 2001; Putnam 1993; Porter 
and Lyon, this volume). Trust11 is critical in enabling inter-firm 
interactions, due to frequent and unanticipated contingencies 
associated with technical change or demand shifts, both of which 
provide opportunities for firms to interpret contracts in ways that 
shift the distribution of returns to the favor of one side (Lorenz 1992: 
199). However, in contrast to dominant characterizations of 
("studied") trust as something which emerges over time based on 
firms' judgment of others' behavior in repeated encounters (see 
e.g. Sabel 1992; Lazaric and Lorenz 1997), the Mormon firms in my 
study have a propensity to trust each other in the absence of repeated 
interaction. I label this "cultural trust," premised on a common 
history and heritage, and belief in the same God. As part of this, 
general teaching, preaching, and organizational roles within the LDS 
Church ("callings") that connote good standing within the general 
Mormon community (Shepherd and Shepherd 1994) are also invoked 
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in Utah's computer software industry, often forming the basis for 
explicit corporate decisions: 
There's certainly that thing where you'll run across another company 
and the founder is Mormon as well, and you kinda think "let's pay this 
guy a little more attention." You'll give them a little more, because 
there's that greater sense of he is what he says he is. 
(CEO and Founder, active Mormon male) 
I try to make sure that anyone we work with is active and not just 
"nominally," but that they're really living the principles of the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ. Why? - Because the chances are they'll be honest and 
have integrity in our business dealings. 
(CEO and Founder, active Mormon) 
Mormon customs, conventions, and social norms therefore generate 
a "cultural closeness" between firms, a social architecture that aids 
working alliances. However, "the obvious corollary of the blurring 
of boundaries between self and other in the context of the [LDS] 
church is that the boundary between the domain of the church and 
the 'outside world' is drawn at the same time" (Dunn 1996: 38). 
Thus, while cultural trust in the Utah high-tech business setting helps 
sustain interaction between like firms, it simultaneously excludes 
firms that do not share the same cultural markers, hence constraining 
firms' abilities to learn from non-like firms. More broadly, this also 
highlights the weakness of social capital, in which particularist 
loyalties translate into group exclusivity (see Pieterse, this volume; 
Portes and Landolt 2000). 
Self-sufficiency and autonomy versus outsourcing and use 
of other firms' competencies 
Successful learning and innovation therefore require that firms 
maintain close networks of external association. Additionally, inter-
firm collaboration is an important means of broadening firms' 
capacities more widely (Fountain 1997; Hotz-Hart 2000). Firms enter 
alliances to combine their own competencies with those of a partner 
to create a competitive position that neither could have achieved 
alone. Thus in the context of increased complexity and intersectoral 
nature of new technologies, and shortening product life-cycles, 
partnerships allow firms to speed the pace of product introduction, 
improve product quality, and move more quickly into new markets 
(Hutt, Stafford, Walker, and Reingen 2000). In contrast, Mormon 
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culture is instead characterized by strong emphases on individual 
self-sufficiency, independence, and self-reliance (Ludlow 1992), 
ethics also manifest in local software firms. These social ideals are 
explicitly taught by the LDS Church, and have their historical roots 
in the Mormon pioneer experience when Utah's hostile physical 
environment forced Mormon families to hone the virtue of self-
sufficiency in order to survive (Young 1996). 
My results suggest that software firms on Utah's Wasatch Front 
exhibit Mormon cultural emphases on self-sufficiency through their 
overall levels of strategic partnering. Specifically, the Mormon 
founded and managed firms in my survey and case study samples 
have on average around half as many strategic partner firms as their 
non-Mormon counterparts in each firm size category. 12 Thus, while 
Mormon firms have a higher propensity to interact with other 
Mormon firms, their overall levels of inter-firm networking are 
reduced relative to non-Mormon firms: 
We run into this all the time, I call it the "Pioneer Spirit." There tends 
to be this feeling of well we've got it covered, we can do it ourselves, 
and so there's a lesser willingness to bring in outsiders, to farm it out. 
It's an approach to business that is very reflective of the Mormon 
historic reality. 
(Vice President and Co-Founder, Mormon female) 
That insularity is very much reflected in Mormon business approaches, 
there's a real tendency to keep everything in-house. So we've never 
looked out of the window, we've never even looked at our 
competitors' products, at anybody else's ideas. 
(Director of Corporate Research, active 
Mormon [convert] male) 
While I found typical pride among respondents in their firms' self-
sufficiency and having grown something from nothing, many firms 
were also aware of the limits of such an introverted approach: 
I've seen a lot of Utah companies really hurt themselves because 
they've said "Oh I don't need an attorney," or "I don't need an 
accountant, I can structure this loan or investment myself." And that 
makes it difficult for the business to grow and to be successful. 
(Chief Financial Officer, active Mormon male) 
In the first incarnation of [the company] it was that way to a fault. 
Whenever we needed to mass-produce, rather than outsourcing it we 
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went out and bought our own duplicator. And then when it came 
to shrink wrapping, do we farm that out? - No, we go buy a shrink 
wrapper and do that ourselves! So we outsourced nothing and got so 
bogged down that we kinda delayed getting to our overall goals. 
(President and Founder, active Mormon male) 
Further, a whole range of studies have demonstrated that where firms 
are introverted and rely mainly on internal resources their individual 
performance is weakened, along with that of the entire regional 
system (MacPherson 1992; Wiig and Wood 1997). Rarely does a 
single firm have superior capabilities in all phases of the production 
process, and so it is imperative that they take advantage of 
the synergies that flow from shared enterprise. As such, the 
introvertedness of particular Mormon founded and managed firms 
can be viewed as potentially constraining their innovative capacities 
by limiting their access to external sources of information and 
expertise. 
Family ( and church) above all versus sleeping bags 
under the desk 
In her analysis of Silicon Valley and Route 128's divergent 
performances through the 1980s AnnaLee Saxenian highlights how 
Silicon Valley's engineers, often young men without wives or 
families, instead developed shared identities around the project of 
advancing new technologies (Saxenian 1994). Crucially, this then 
facilitated an increased commitment to the firm, a regularity of long 
unsocial work hours, and the completion of large workloads in short 
periods of calendar time. These are competitive advantages to the 
firm particularly when bringing a new product to market. In contrast, 
Mormon culture is characterized by a rigid separation of work 
and social life through strong commitments to family and church. 
Mormonism emphasizes the primacy of procreation and traditional 
family values, and as a result its members are characterized by 
higher rates of marriage, lower rates of divorce, higher fertility rates, 
and larger families than the US national average (Heaton 2001). 
Children are also considered of far greater value than any material 
wealth, with the favorite dictum of former church President David 0. 
McKay often quoted in support; that "no success can ever 
compensate for failure in the home." 
Various sociological studies have demonstrated how these cultural 
commitments detract from devoting large amounts of time to careers 
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(Heaton 2001). Moreover, these cultural priorities are also manifest 
within computer software firms in Utah, impacting upon levels of 
work intensity across four areas. First, the Mormon (founded and 
managed) firms in the case study sample have average work weeks 
that are 5. 8 hours ( approximately 10 percent) less than those of their 
non-Mormon counterparts (44.7 hours per week vs. 50.5 hours 
per week). 13 Second, while extra-long work hours (working beyond 
7 p.m.; working through the night; working weekends; and/or 
working overtime) are a regular occurrence in 67 percent of the 
non-Mormon founded and managed firms and in 62 percent of the 
Mormon Intermediate firms in any particular month, this compares 
with only 42 percent for their Mormon counterparts. Indeed, in the 
majority of Mormon managed firms this is a deliberate strategy: 
Family and church are very high priorities for us, so we try not to 
have our employees working a lot of extra hours, and we try to reduce 
that as much as we can in order for them to participate in religious 
activities and family activities which we see as a very important part 
of our culture. 
(Director of Business Development, 
active Mormon male) 
Third, the most frequently cited area of extra-long work hours 
involved Sunday working, a major tension for Mormons for whom 
the Sabbath has been historically set apart as a holy day of worship, 
for rest and spiritual renewal. Thus, while two-thirds of the Mormon 
firms in my case study sample have company policies that restrict 
Sunday working, none of their non-Mormon or Intermediate Mormon 
counterparts maintain such policies. This is significant given the 
15-month development schedules common among the other firms 
in my case study sample. Typically, in the final stages of a software 
project, weekend working and late evenings are the norm in the 
non-Mormon firms: 
The last two or three months of a project, you're working 80 hours 
weeks, and those last few weeks get insane! On my last project, in 
the last month I slept in my own bed twice! We got sofa beds in the 
basement and so you'd just go down there and grab a few hours and 
carry on - insane! But good employees, Mormon or not, they know 
that's what this industry's about, and they know they get paid better 
because of it. 
(Chief Financial Officer, non-Mormon male) 
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These attitudes to Sunday working contrast with those that 
characterize the corporate cultures of the majority of the Mormon 
firms in my case study sample: 
Even when we've had 24 hour a day 6 days a week operations, we 
always close Sunday! I've just always tried to maintain that. We 
don't want work replacing family or religious structure. Work is 
supplementary and there to support family and church. True happiness 
is not achieved through a bigger bonus. 
(Director of Marketing, active Mormon male) 
Fourth, average lengths of paid vacation are on average six days 
(approximately 55 percent) longer in the Mormon firms than in the 
non-Mormon firms (17.5, cf. 11.25 days). 14 Removing the start-ups 
from the analysis has a negligible effect on the data (18.5, cf. 
11.5 days). Further, while holiday lengths are typically closer to 
the European average of four weeks in the Mormon firms, in the 
non-Mormon firms they are closer to the US average. 15 
Overall, my results suggest that Mormons in Utah's computer 
software industry have created a corporate environment in which 
work is valued differently than in typical US software firms. Mormon 
cultural emphases on the importance of family, a balanced lifestyle, 
that no success can ever compensate for failure in the home, and of 
money as merely a means to a higher spiritual end all impact upon 
the structure of firms' work weeks and mean that extra-long working 
hours are discouraged. Many respondents outlined the various 
constraints that they perceived these culturally informed work 
patterns to have on their respective firms: 
There very definitely is a strong sense in the Mormon Church that your 
job and your success are not the most important thing in your life. So 
a lot of times I wonder if we're as effective at competing, precisely 
because we can't, and we won't, throw everything we've got into the 
company. So you've got firms elsewhere working 80, 90, 100 hour 
work weeks, often putting in twice as many hours as we did in the 
same week! 
(Director of Technology and Co-Founder, 
active Mormon male) 
We continually battle the problem of our managers from other US 
locations feeling like the workforce in Utah aren't as committed. 
And that is reflected in lower levels of new product introduction in 
the Utah office. If we have a big product release scheduled, your Utah 
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employees are more likely to say "well we'll just have to push it back 
and reschedule." Whereas in some of our other office locations, there's 
more of a willingness to spend 24 hours a day at work until it's done. 
(Director of Human Resources, 
active Mormon female) 
Indeed, these self-perceived constraints are supported by secondary 
analyses at the US national level. Notably, a 1995 report by the 
US National Center for the Educational Quality of the Workforce 
(EQW)16 investigated the relationship between firms' work hours 
and their overall productivity, estimating that for a 10 percent 
increase in work hours in non-manufacturing firms, there results a 
6.3 percent increase in establishment productivity17 - significantly, 
my results suggest that the non-Mormon firms work 16 percent 
longer per week than their Mormon counterparts (50.0 hrs/week vs. 
43.0 hrs/week). However, respondents also highlighted a number 
of perceived advantages that accrue to the Mormon-founded and 
managed firms from these culturally imposed limits on work hours, 
the most commonly cited advantages centering on a more healthy, 
less stressed, and consistently productive workforce: 
It's true that you can work 18 hour days for me and probably produce 
a lot, but not over the long-term. So the church's emphasis on balance 
and family and taking care of yourself results in a more consistently 
productive workforce. It's not just about producing more, but about 
producing better. That's the strategic advantage. 
(Director of Technology Development, 
active Mormon) 
In examining the impact of Mormon cultural economy on the 
competitiveness of software firms on Utah's Wasatch Front, it is 
therefore imperative that we not view the activities of production 
in isolation from those of reproduction, and hence the social 
sustainability of culturally informed work practices. I return to this 
point later in the chapter as part of a broader discussion regarding 
alternative metrics of firm competitiveness. 
Respect for authority, established ideas, and group unity 
versus creative dissent and questioning of leaders 
Continuous technological learning and innovation are therefore 
highly dependent on firms' abilities to access external sources of 
information and knowledge. Fundamentally, however, they are also 
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dependent on firms' abilities to assimilate, reconfigure, transform, 
and apply new information to commercial ends; that is, on firms' 
"absorptive capacities" (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Different 
absorption rates are not random but depend on the social and cultural 
structures within firms, because the ability to absorb new knowledge 
will always depend on sociocultural constructions of what is 
acceptable and desirable (Schoenberger 1997; Westwood and Low 
2003). 18 The organizational learning and innovation literature has 
consistently highlighted a set of cultural norms that, if widely shared 
by the members of a firm, actively promote the generation of new 
ideas and help in the implementation of new approaches. These 
include a climate of openness in which debate and conflict are 
encouraged; a willingness to break with convention; widespread 
support for trying new things; the right of employees to challenge 
the status quo; and multiple advocacy, that learning requires more 
than one "champion" if it is to succeed (DiBella, Nevis, and Gould 
1996; Deal and Kennedy 2000). Firms' abilities to innovate therefore 
presume a necessary relationship between learning and active 
employee involvement at all levels; that all employees can 
act as independent agents, take responsibility, experiment, and make 
mistakes as they learn (Spender 1996). 
However, these traits contrast with Mormonism, from which the 
development of Utah's software industry has been inseparable. First, 
Mormon culture is characterized by cultural emphases on unity and 
individual sacrifice for the common good, which sustain strong 
tendencies towards conformity within the group (Shupe 1992). 
Second, these are reinforced by a pervasive respect for established 
ideas and church operating procedures (Ostling and Ostling 1999). 
Third, the LDS Church organizational system is also based on 
predominantly top-down flows of information, in which leadership 
decision are never challenged, only supported by the wider Mormon 
populace. Indeed, an oft-cited dictum used to justify this system is 
that "when the Prophet speaks the thinking has been done" (Ludlow 
1992). Fourth, these cultural emphases ofreverence for established 
ideas and leadership authority are in turn reinforced by wider 
Mormon emphases on being passive, non-confrontational and never 
demeaning another person. 
Significantly, this distinctive set of Mormon cultural traits is also 
manifest in the corporate cultures of firms in my case study sample. 
Approximately 40 percent of these firms are internally perceived by 
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the industry respondents as having corporate cultures that place a 
premium on unity within the firm, and a "follow thy leader" 
mentality. Interestingly, this includes two-thirds of the Mormon 
firms and half of the Mormon intermediate firms, but only one of the 
non-Mormon firms: 
Unity is a very much higher value to us as Latter-day Saints. We don't 
have quite the intrinsic treasuring of diversity that I see among my 
colleagues who aren't Mormon. All the time, no-one ever comes out 
with an opinion, only collective opinions. 
(Director of Research, active Mormon male) 
In the church, when we have a new leader appointed, everybody raises 
their hand to show that they support that person in their calling. And 
I've noticed that kind of mentality within this company: we understand 
there is one leader in charge, and that we support his opinions and 
decisions in the same way we would in a church setting. 
(Production Manager, active Mormon male) 
Indeed, over half of the non-Mormon industry respondents (spread 
across the whole spectrum of Mormon through non-Mormon firms) 
identified their Mormon colleagues and employees as generally 
less willing to question ideas and leadership authority. Additionally, 
almost one-third of the ( 4 7) active Mormon industry respondents 
also identified this trend among their fellow Mormon employees and 
colleagues generally, arguing that Mormon managers and employees 
raised in the Church simply "borrow" from the models that are 
familiar to them. 
Respondents outlined a number of ways in which these Mormon-
inflected corporate cultures offer advantages to the firm. First, 
respondents suggested that unity through a common value base 
makes it easier for the firm to mesh as a team, consistent with 
norms highlighted in the innovation literature as promoting the 
implementation of new ideas in the firm. These include teamwork, a 
shared vision, and a common direction upon which firms can build 
consensus, mutual respect, and trust (O'Reilly 1989). Second, I found 
a widespread appreciation among both Mormon and non-Mormon 
respondents alike of the more friendly and less stressful work 
environments that these Mormon-informed corporate cultures sustain: 
Mormon culture teaches us to be more passive and less 
confrontational, and I've always found a much more mild atmosphere 
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in Utah offices than in other places of the US I've worked before. You 
don't have the passionate, loud, angry discussions that I've seen in 
other organizations where people sometimes even end up leaving 
because of that. People are just a lot more supportive of each other 
here in Utah. 
(Director of Human Resources, 
active Mormon male) 
However, respondents also identified a number of disadvantages of 
these distinctive Mormon-inflected corporate cultures, in terms of 
Mormon cultural traits of respect for established ideas, unity, and 
top-down leadership authority undermining the processes of creative 
dissent, constant questioning, and multi-directional knowledge 
flows that underpin innovation in firms. 19 Indeed, the majority of 
the Mormon industry respondents were themselves aware of these 
limits: 
It's a strange paradox to be working in high tech in this Mormon 
environment where obedience is expected and questioning authority is 
frowned upon in a very direct way. So you often get R&D situations 
where people are just doing that they're told rather than thinking 
outside the box and helping the company come up with the creative 
solutions that they need to beat their competitors. But if you don't 
question you will never survive in this business. 
(Director of Research, active Mormon female) 
Sometimes there's too much of a lack of confrontation among Utah 
employees, where they don't speak up when they should, they don't 
raise issues because they're afraid of creating contention and hurting 
other's feelings, and I think that makes us less effective. 
(Director of Human Resources, 
active Mormon male) 
As such, the prevalence of Mormon cultural emphases on unity and 
strong conformity within the group, respect for established ideas and 
leadership authority, and passive non-confrontation can be interpreted 
as further manifestations of the cultural economy of Utah's high-tech 
cluster, which shape and condition the absorptive (and hence 
innovative) capacities of local firms. How far we might measure the 
material impact of this set of cultural traits upon local software firms, 
along with the others outlined in this section, forms the focus of the 
next section. 
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Measuring the impact of (Mormon) culture on firms' 
economic performance 
While the regional learning and innovation literature has reached a 
consensus that culture is critical for understanding the dynamics 
of regions, the precise nature of how regional culture shapes and 
conditions the innovative behavior and economic performance of 
firms has yet to be fully elucidated. I argue that the cultural economy 
of software firms on Utah's Wasatch Front is best understood in 
terms of various Mormon cultural conventions, norms, values, and 
beliefs being manifest in local Mormon founded and managed firms, 
conditioning in turn their decision-making processes and hence 
observed patterns of behavior. Moreover, there exists patterning 
at three levels. First, patterning is apparent within firms across the 
different cultural traits outlined in the previous sections. Second, this 
patterning is in tum consistent with regional cultural values. Third, 
there exists patterning across different firms' corporate cultures, 
sustaining a regional industrial culture (see Figure 8.1). In some 
cases, the prevalence of regional Mormon cultural traits within firms' 
individual corporate cultures potentially enhances and reinforces their 
innovative capacities; in other cases it potentially constrains them. 
To measure the overall impact of these tensions on firms' economic 
performance, I have employed five metrics of competitiveness: 
(i) linear revenue growth since start-up; (ii) assumed exponential 
revenue growth since start-up; (iii) R&D intensity I (R&D 
expenditure to annual revenue); (iv) R&D intensity II (R&D 
employment to total employment); and (v) productivity in terms of 
revenue per employee. The results are shown in Table 8.4. 
Overall, the data in Table 8.4 show that for four of the five metrics 
of firms' economic performance, the non-Mormon firms outperform 
their Mormon counterparts, as highlighted in bold. Significantly, the 
age distributions of the Mormon and non-Mormon firms are almost 
identical for each of the employee-size categories employed. While 
limits of space preclude a step-by-step analytical discussion here (see 
James 2005), the most striking differences in economic performance 
at the survey level include: exponential growth rates, where the non-
Mormon firms outperform their Mormon counterparts three times 
over (micro category); Type I R&D intensities (non-Mormon firms, 
medium size category, two times greater): and productivity (non-
Mormon firms, micro size category, over two times greater). At the 
case study level, the most striking differences include: linear growth 
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Table 8.4 Measuring the economic performance of Mormon versus non-Mormon computer 
software firms on Utah's Wasatch Front (from James 2003) 
Metric of Firm Survey Sample (105 firms) Case Study Sample 
Competitiveness (20 firms) 
Micro Medium 
(1-19 emp.) (20-99 emp.) (20-99 emp.) 
Mormon Non Mormon Non Mormon Non 
............................. 
{i) Linear revenue growth 
since start-up 0.16 0.32 0.78 1.05 0.18 0.73 
(2000 UT revenue/age) 
{ii) Exponential revenue 
growth since start-up 0.28 1.05 1.70 1.68 0.56 1.57 
(2000 UT revenue/age) 
{iii) R&D intensity type I 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.53 0.29 0.59 
(R&D expend: sales 
revenue) 
{iv) R&D intensity type II 0.55 0.57 0.40 0.58 0.57 0.34 
(R&D emp: total emp) 




Definition of Mormon vs Founding and management ONLY Founding, management 
Non-Mormon Firms AND majority workforce 
rates, where the non-Mormon firms outperform their Mormon 
counterparts four times over; and exponential growth rates (non-
Mormon firms three times greater). Thus while the results are not 
monolithic, they suggest that the Mormon cultural inflection of the 
corporate cultures of the Mormon founded and managed computer 
software firms in my survey and case study samples has a 
constraining effect on their innovative capacities and economic 
performance. 
However, there clearly remains much to be done in refining and 
supplementing the metrics used here. As part of that, the data 
in Table 8.4 employ only a narrow economic definition of 
competitiveness. However, with the shift to the new economy, 
workers and families are increasingly being challenged in new ways 
to combine the activities of production and reproduction, work and 
home, in an attempt to achieve "work/life balance" (McDowell 
2004). As such, it imperative that we also include metrics on the 
social sustainability of culturally informed work practices in our 
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analyses of competitiveness. Indeed, it is this key premise that 
motivates my current research on the role of socially equitable 
work-life balance policies in underpinning regional economic 
competitiveness. 
From material impacts to causal mechanisms 
and responsible agents ... 
In the preceding sections, I outlined how the Mormon regional 
culture on Utah's Wasatch Front shapes and conditions local 
corporate forms, observed behavior, innovative capacities, and 
economic performance. In this section, I outline the main 
mechanisms and human agents whose daily activities serve to 
reproduce culture and economy as a seamless ensemble within the 
region, and through which the activities of local firms become 
unavoidably regionally culturally-inflected. 
The first mechanism centers on key individuals who occupy positions 
of power within the firm. Fundamentally, because what the firm 
understands itself to be is produced through the actions of its 
employees, the identities and commitments of these key individuals 
are closely entwined with ( although not identical to) corporate 
identities and commitments (Schoenberger 1997). Further, when 
somebody is employed in a firm, their cultural upbringing comes 
with them. As such, it is not just a case of employees' personal 
values but of regional cultural values being brought into the firm, 
informing decision-making processes, corporate strategy, and hence 
observed patterns of behavior, through definitions of what has value 
and what does not. Indeed, for the majority of the respondents, the 
application of their religious values within the workplace was not 
only regarded as acceptable, but also a "natural" thing for them to 
do. Given that 68 percent of Utah's lead 10 percent of software firms 
are Mormon managed, and 58 percent are both Mormon founded and 
managed, this "key individuals" mechanism is very powerful in the 
regional cultural inflection of local firms' economic activities. 
This second mechanism through which regional culture unavoidably 
shapes the activities of local firms can be labeled the "strength in 
numbers" mechanism, based on the group ratification of regionally 
culturally-informed corporate decisions. Fundamentally, culture is a 
group property (Stark 1996) and, as such, what counts in terms of 
cultural values limiting firm behavior is not only whether the firm's 
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decision-makers embody those values, but whether those values are 
ratified by the wider work group and accepted by the majority as a 
valid basis for action (Stark 1996: 164). If most of the firm's 
employees do not share those values, even if individuals do bring 
regional cultural considerations into corporate decision-making 
processes, these will rarely strike a responsive chord in most of the 
others and instead be smothered by group indifference. The strength 
of this mechanism lies in Mormons comprising on average 69 
percent of firms' total workforces on the Wasatch Front. 
The third mechanism through which the activities of Utah's software 
firms are regionally culturally informed centers on the labor market 
and, at one level, on firms actively seeking employees that match 
their corporate values. While Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 
(1964) makes it illegal to discriminate in labor recruitment based on 
assumptions about the abilities of members of certain religious or 
cultural groups,20 firms in Utah do discriminate on this basis: over 
one-quarter of the firms in my case study sample admitted making 
explicit requests on the Mormon background of candidates sought 
to fill a position. On a second level, this is reinforced by workers 
deliberately seeking firms regarded as holding similar values to their 
own. The main corporate value preferences vocalized by Mormon 
candidates at job interview revolved around issues of not working 
Sundays or on violent, sexual, or gambling software content; earning 
a wage that is large enough for their wife to remain at home and so 
maintain a traditional Mormon nuclear family; and of working on a 
product that has obvious social benefit. While these are not 
exclusively Mormon value preferences, respondents suggested that 
only Mormon applicants ever vocalize these issues with explicit 
recourse to religious justifications. 
The fourth mechanism centers on various civic institutions that 
exercise a high degree of social control over their members' sense of 
identity and patterns of behavior (see Bahr 1994). In the LDS Church 
members are taught through ongoing teaching programs that they 
cannot compartmentalize their religious lives. The LDS Church also 
operates an educational system of seminaries (in high schools) and 
1407 institutes at colleges and universities to provide LOS-orientated 
educational and social programs for students in secular education. 
Additionally, the mission further reinforces these mechanisms of 
socialization and social control,21 and enlists more than 60 percent 
of young Mormons of eligible age. Importantly, having defended the 
church and its doctrines for two years, returned Missionaries tend to 
The spatial limits of culture • 195 
be more orthodox and active in the church than other members 
(Vernon 1980). Overall, these various elements of the LDS Church 
maintain the strength of members' commitment to, and non-
compartmentalization of, Mormonism in later life, reinforcing the 
Mormon cultural inflection of firms' internal structures via the "key 
individuals" and "strength-in-numbers" mechanisms outlined above. 
The final mechanism through which the activities of Utah's software 
firms are regionally culturally-informed centers on US national 
legislation. Specifically, the US Workplace Religious Freedom Act 
(1972) amended Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act (1964) to 
require employers to make reasonable accommodation for the 
religious beliefs of employees and prospective employees, unless 
doing so would "impose an undue hardship," defining religion as 
"all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1997) further increased 
employers' responsibilities to accommodate workers' religious 
beliefs within the workplace. These two key pieces of legislation 
therefore reinforce firms' obligations to allow Mormon religious-
cultural values to be incorporated into their internal structures.22 
The complex intertwining between culture and economy within these 
firms is therefore not pre-given or static, but continually remade over 
time, via this set of multi-scaled mechanisms which mediate between 
everyday social practices within the firm and the reproduction 
of corporate culture structures that mirror key elements of 
regional culture structures. I am not arguing that regional culture 
mechanically or rigidly determines worker and firm behavior, but 
rather that it structures the material and cultural resources that enable 
and constrain the action of individuals and the firms in which 
they work. 
Policy matters: high-tech clusters and the spatial limits 
of cultural economy 
The wider implications of my research center on industrial cluster 
policy, with which policy-makers across the globe have become 
fixated over the last two decades as an important tool for stimulating 
economic growth. While clusters are argued to occur in many types 
of industries, high-tech clusters in particular have attracted most 
policy attention (Swann, Prevezer, and Stout 1998; OECD 1999; 
Keeble and Wilkinson 2000; Norton 2001), viewed as offering a 
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clean and high-wage mode of economic development capable of 
high rates of regional growth. Above all, it is the non-mathematical 
models of local industrial development articulated and popularized 
by Harvard business economist Michael Porter that have been 
widely adopted in policy (see e.g. Porter 1990, 1996, 1998). These 
emphasize the benefits of cooperation between firms, and between 
firms and other institutions through which knowledge and 
information are exchanged. Porter also argues that industrial 
clustering not only fosters economic growth in the regions in 
which clusters occur, but is also a key source of international 
competitive advantage for the industries concerned, in tum 
underpinning national economic growth. The cluster concept also sits 
well with the policy preoccupation with micro-economic supply-side 
intervention, and with the growing trend towards decentralization of 
policy responsibility and with an associated emphasis on developing 
the indigenous potential of localities and regions (see Martin and 
Sunley 2001; compare Radcliffe and Laurie, this volume). Moreover, 
Porter's model has a very clear role for government itself in 
stimulating and supporting the growth of clusters as catalysts or 
"animateurs" for cooperation between firms, one of a set of tangible 
institutional "ingredients" deemed critical to the development of 
other successful clusters (see Table 8.5). 
However, for all this international "policy trade," it has become 
increasingly clear that many cluster policies do not travel well, that 
innovative regional economies may not simply be "cloned" 
elsewhere (Saxenian 1989; Florida and Kenney 1990; Lorenz 1992; 
Malecki and Oinas 1999; Markusen 1999; Scott 2000). I argue that 
these limits of cluster policy are in large part a function of the overly 
narrow economic theory upon which these policies are premised. 
The whole project seems to be one of "add institutions and stir" in 
some assumed inevitable linear process, copying explicitly from 
other successful regions such as Silicon Valley in California, Route 
128 in Massachusetts, and biotech in the San Francisco Bay area and 
the New York tri-state area, which are assumed to offer some 
blueprint manual. There are three interrelated problems with such an 
approach. 
First, while cluster policies are premised on the notion that high-tech 
growth in particular areas is dependent on the "right" mix of formal 
institutions deemed necessary for an innovative regional economy, 
cluster policy initiatives premised on the provision of particular 
incentives and disincentives are unlikely to work in some simple 
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Table 8.5 High-tech cluster policy "shopping list" of necessary Institutions 
Institutional component 
Strong science base 
Growing company base 
Ability to attract key talent 
Availability of finance 
Premises and infrastructure 
Business support services and large 
companies in related industries 
Skilled workforce 
Effective networking 
Supportive policy environment 
Description 
Leading research organizations: e.g. University 
departments, govt labs, hospitals/medical schools and 
charities 
Critical mass of researchers, world leading scientist(s) 
Thriving spin-out and start-up companies 
More mature "role model" companies (exporting and 
with global Presence) 
Critical mass of employment opportunities 
Image/reputation as a (biotechnology) cluster 
Attractive place to live 
Venture capitalists, business angels 
Incubators available close to research organisations 
Premises with labs and flexible leasing arrangements 
Space to expand 
Good transport links: motorways, rail, international 
airport 
Specialist business, legal, patent, recruitment, 
property advisers 
Large companies in related sectors 
High quality skilled workforce, training courses at all 
levels 
lnterfirm networks of suppliers and customers 
Extensive forward and backward linkages 
Regional trade associations 
Shared equipment and infrastructure 
Frequent collaborations between government, 
business, and the independent sector 
National and sectoral innovation support policies 
Support from RDAs and other economic development 
agencies as catalysts for cooperation between firms 
with complementary skill-sets 
Sympathetic planning authorities 
Source: Modified from Biotechnology Clusters, Department of Trade and Industry, 1998 (Section 3.2). 
Note: US innovation policy recognizes the following components of innovation systems: Governance, Legitimation, 
Technology Standards, Scientific Research, Financing, Human Resources, Technology Development, Networks 
and Linkages, Markets. 
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linear fashion. Spatial proximity of institutions, the first usual 
indicator of a cluster, does not guarantee interaction or 
"automatically" generate cooperative interactions between firms 
widely theorized to underpin technological innovation and 
knowledge spillovers in the region (Massey, Quintas, and Wield 
1992; Storper 1997; Sunley 2000). Thus, for example, the uneven 
networks of association documented in the Utah case, in which non-
like firms are excluded in favour of interactions with firms and 
workers of a similar cultural background, demonstrate that physical 
proximity is less important than cultural proximity, defined by 
shared cultural conventions, norms, attitudes, values, and beliefs. 
To undermine further the assumed linearity of cluster institutional 
dynamics, both enablers and constraints on firms' innovative 
capacities stem from the same regional culture in which they are 
embedded. 
Second, while Porter's cluster model does have a limited role for 
culture, its treatment is highly ad hoe, descriptive rather than 
analytical. Worse still, regional culture is reduced to a mere bolt-on 
to orthodox economic analysis, and problematically categorized as a 
stand-alone variable. However, my analysis suggests that culture is 
not simply another item to add to the high-tech cluster shopping list, 
but rather a factor that underlies the functioning of all the other 
institutions within dynamic regional economies. It is therefore highly 
problematic to simply strip the firm's regional cultural context into 
an assumed independent variable in this manner (see also Porter and 
Lyon, this volume). Indeed, this problem is further exacerbated by 
the increased appetite for importing "off-the-peg" policy solutions 
at the international scale (also see Peck 1999). Policy measures 
developed within the US national cultural context have been directly 
applied to the UK, which not only has a different national culture, 
but also within that its own unique mosaic of regional industrial 
cultures. 
Third, a common cluster policy approach has been simply to exhort 
firms doing business within a national jurisdiction to modify their 
own behavior (Gertler 1997: 56), so that, for example, inter-firm 
cooperation or new ways of working become more commonplace. 
However, such policy proscriptions fail to recognize that new 
behavior patterns crucially require that firms and their members 
bend, or indeed break out of, accepted ways of thinking and acting 
to develop new frames of understanding (Harrison 1994). It is 
therefore insufficient to construct institutions that promote openness, 
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cooperation, and collaboration at the level of the region, but which 
do not address questions of transforming firms' internal corporate 
cultures. Fundamentally therefore, regional economic development 
presupposes, yet is not reduced to, cultural change (Oinas 1995). 
However, while the organizational learning and culture change 
literatures are huge, 23 they are striking in their viewing corporate 
culture in isolation. Problematically, however, by not recognizing 
that firms' corporate cultures are but part of a broader regional 
cultural scalar hierarchy, a whole series of mechanisms are ignored 
which strengthen firms' corporate cultures and hence the decision-
making processes and corporate behavior patterns that they inform. 
Conclusion 
Despite an emergent consensus that culture is critical for defining 
and understanding the dynamics of regions, our understanding of 
these links remains partial. Drawing on the case study of Utah's 
high-tech cluster this chapter has focused on three main elements. 
First, the cultural economy of firms in the region can be understood 
in terms of a series of tensions between self-identified regional 
cultural traits also identifiable within local firms, versus key elements 
of corporate and industrial cultures that have consistently been shown 
in the regional learning literature as positively underpinning firms' 
innovative capacities. Significantly, these tensions exist with respect 
to both firms' abilities to access external sources of information, 
knowledge, and competencies, and to use those once they enter the 
firm. Moreover, both enablers and constraints on firms' innovative 
capacities stem from the same Mormon regional culture. Second, 
using a series of metrics it is possible to measure the impact of 
regional culture on firms' economic performance, and that the 
overall impact of these tensions on Utah's lead software firms is a 
constraining one. Third, I have outlined some of the tangible 
mechanisms and causal agents through which regional cultural 
imperatives unavoidably come to inform firms' internal structures, 
decision-making processes, and hence observed patterns of behavior. 
Overall, the findings presented here have a high degree of potential 
generalizability. While the nature of the Mormon regional culture 
studied here is unique, arguably the causal mechanisms through 
which this particular regional culture shapes and conditions the 
behavior of local firms are merely locally contingent instances of 
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more general processes also operating in other regional economies. 24 
To what extent is it possible to manipulate these various 
mechanisms, and how that varies across different national economies, 
are key questions for future research. More fundamentally, if these 
regional culture structures continue to be ignored, then myths will 
continue to be perpetuated in policy about the replicability of the 
formal institutional parts of innovative regional economies which 
do not function independently of regional culture. The overriding 
question, therefore, is not whether we should focus on the cultural or 
the economic; but of how we do both at the same time, coupled with 
an ongoing interrogation and evaluation of existing policies to reveal 
their limitations, with the aim of producing more appropriate and 
effective forms of policy intervention. 
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The definitive collection can be found at www.tbtf.com/siliconia.html. At last 
count there existed 79 appropriations of names beginning with "Silicon" by 105 
areas outside Silicon Valley. These names are either promoted by local boosters 
and/or assigned to an area in a press account. 
2 Post-Fordism refers to the collection of workplace practices, modes of industrial 
organization, and institutional forms identified with the period since the mid-
1970s in advanced capitalist economies, following the era known as Fordism 
(Johnston, Gregory, Pratt, and Watts 2000: 615). It is characterized by the 
application of production methods considered to be more flexible than those of 
the Fordist era. 
3 Saxenian's (1994) account has been contested by others; see Florida and 
Kenney (1990) and Harrison (1994). 
4 Polanyi's work on embeddedness was subsequently reintroduced to current 
debate by Granovetter (1985). 
5 This survey (105 firms in total) generated data at the regional level across five 
key characteristics of firms: (i) basic characteristics in terms of employment, 
age, location, etc.; (ii) inter-firm relationships and external orientation; (iii) 
financing histories; (iv) in-house technological capabilities and innovative 
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processes (occupational structure, R&D employment and expenditure, and R&D 
intensity); and (v) competitive "performance," in terms ofrevenue, rates of 
revenue growth since start-up, and employment. 
6 Indeed, this was often proudly displayed in the executive biographies on 
company websites, and Brigham Young University (BYU) alumni status was a 
convenient proxy - over 99 percent of BYU students are active members of the 
LDS Church and a BYU education has been consistently shown to have a 
strong positive impact upon LDS commitment in later life. 
7 The interviews were conducted over a five-month period (May-September 
2001) with employees in technical and non-technical positions at a range of 
levels within each firm. I also interviewed a range of industry and culture 
watchers whose insights might offer important evidence or counter-evidence 
for hypothesis testing. In total, I conducted I 00 interviews and gained over 
130 hours of taped material. Each firm case study was further developed 
using secondary data sources (annual reports, memos, etc.) as part of a source 
triangulation strategy. In ten cases I was also invited to tour the firm and 
to observe general goings-on. 
8 This case study sample is comprised of firms with the Standard Industrial 
Classification code 7371 (Computer Programming Services) because this subset 
of firms had the highest response rate (70 percent) in the initial survey. 
9 This involved coding the data to break it down, recategorizing it, examining 
the links between groups, and then developing hypotheses with regard to the 
mechanisms and patterns that best explained the data. To make the analysis 
more robust, I also checked the credibility of my analyses with members of the 
group from which I originally obtained the data. 
I 0 The settlement of the barren, harsh desert environment of the Salt Lake Valley 
necessitated a cooperative irrigation effort in an environment that would not 
have yielded to more individualistic efforts (Toth 1974). 
11 Trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior ( of a partner)" 
(Hutt, Stafford, Walker, and Reingen 2000: 52). 
12 Strategic partners defined in terms joint product development and/or R&D, or 
other self-identified formal alliances as outlined on firms' corporate websites 
or by my industry-respondents. Strategic partners for Mormon founded and 
managed firms compared with non-Mormon founded and managed firms: 
(i) survey sample: micro category: 4.1, cf. 7.0; medium category: 3.5, cf. 7.1; 
(medium-large category: 4.9, cf. 12.0); (ii) case study sample: 4.2, cf. 7.8. 
13 Equivalent figure for the Mormon Intermediate firm is 49.1 hours per week. 
This pattern also remains when start-ups (firms less than 3 years old) are 
excluded from the analysis. 
14 The holiday lengths calculated here are for software engineers below the 
Vice-President level who have been with a firm for three years. 
15 US average: 11. 7 days annual paid vacation for professional, technical, and 
related employees after three years service with the company, US Department 
of Labor (1996). 
16 This examined over 300 establishments all of which employ over 20 staff. 
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17 Measured in terms of output while controlling for materials used, employee 
hours, age of equipment, industry, size, and employee turnover. 
18 See also Radcliffe's concluding chapter, which argues that the role of culture 
in shaping creativity is one aspect that has been played down in development 
policy as it is difficult to plan for and encourage, but nevertheless has extensive 
social, economic and political impacts. 
19 Nevertheless, I am aware of the debates surrounding the need for constructive 
confrontation in the firm, and whether this really is critical for innovation, given 
the success of Japanese firms based on very non-confrontational work cultures 
(see Ouchi 1981; Pascale and Athos 1982; Suzuki, Kim, and Bae 2002). 
20 Nor by gender or sexual orientation. 
21 In 1999 the LDS Church supported 58,593 LDS Missionaries in the field to 120 
countries worldwide (Church ofLDS/Deseret News 2000). Approximately 
75 percent are young men aged 19 to 26. After eight weeks' training in Utah, 
Missionaries are sent out in pairs, on two-year assignments (18 months for 
females) to teach the LDS Gospel, win converts, and participate in community 
service. 
22 Although, given that firms sometimes flout the requirements of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act (1964) in their deliberately hiring workers of a particular 
cultural background, the impact of legal frameworks is likely to be uneven 
across different firms. 
23 The main methods outlined in this literature for culture change in the firm 
include: bringing in new management; developing new systems of rewards and 
punishments; implementing training programs; creating a new corporate image 
which employees must live up to; changing around people's positions within 
the firm; bringing in "new blood" through modified recruitment practices to 
introduce new modes of thought and alternative beliefs by which firms define 
and carry out their business; or through out-placement programs to immerse 
employees in fresh viewpoints, approaches, and attitudes. 
24 Indeed, subsequent work on the role of masculinist corporate cultures among 
ICT firms in Cambridge's high-tech regional economy (Gray and James 2006) 
show how the same key individuals, strength-in-numbers, labor market, 
educational and legislative mechanisms are visible in the UK context. 
c» Mobilizing culture for 







There has been a concerted effort by theorists in recent years to shift 
culture from the margins of development studies and to demonstrate 
that it is, and always has been, central to understandings of 
development processes and their impacts on peoples and societies 
around the world (Porter, Allen, and Thompson 1991; Allen 2000; 
Schech and Haggis 2000). Michael Watts (2003; also Watts, this 
volume), for example, argues that culture has always been at the 
center of post-war development theory. Colonial governmentality 
worked through local culture to gradually construct or attempt to 
construct a new sort of colonial subject and yet, paradoxically, 
traditional cultures were also seen as an impediment to progress, 
innovation and "development." Modernization theories of the 1950s 
and 1960s were unable to see beyond culture; theorists "read culture 
out of their own theory of the modem" (Watts 2003: 434). Cultural 
difference has been perceived to have consequences for growth, 
from the cultural particularities of the Southeast Asian "tiger" 
economies (Rigg 1997) to the perceived deficiencies of African 
moral economies (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995). More recently, 
as Watts argues, there has been a shift away from theories in which 
development describes a transition from tradition to modernity where 
cultures converge to those that see modernity and development as 
embedded within specific cultural contexts and are thus sensitive 
to the different starting points of the transition and its outcomes. 
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In other words, development is always culture and site specific 
- "it is irreducibly cultural geographic" (Watts 2003: 435). 
Development is now recognized as culturally and ethnographically 
grounded - in projects, development institutions and so on - and 
thus there is a need for an institutional ethnography of development. 
In addition, theorists and activists seeking to posit alternatives to 
dominant notions of "development" are sensitive to how alterity1 and 
cultural diversity make a difference to imagining and reimagining 
development and in thinking about alternatives. 
Despite this "cultural tum" within development, it might be argued 
that there is a large gap between how culture in the development 
process has been conceptualized and implemented. Rao and Walton 
(2004) acknowledge that cultural notions are now routinely 
incorporated into practice. However, they also point out that 
academics (they refer to anthropologists specifically), on the one 
hand, seem focused on critiquing development rather than engaging 
with it constructively while, on the other hand, policy economists 
either treat culture as emblematic of a tradition-bound constraint 
on development or ignore it completely. While the criticism that 
academics rarely engage constructively with development practice 
might be overstated, it would seem that there are some gaps between 
theory and practice that require closing. I also concur with Watts' 
argument that while a cultural geography critique of development 
is extremely powerful, the search for alternatives is 
often politically myopic, misreads the insights to be gained from 
radical or unconventional development theory ... , has surprisingly 
little to say about economics and economic alternatives, and in some 
cases is simply politically reactionary and crudely anti-modem in ways 
that do no justice to the very idea of modernity itself. 
(Watts 2003: 435) 
In this chapter I want to engage directly with these critiques of 
cultural approaches within development through a case study of a 
specific local development initiative in South Africa - the Amazwi 
Abesifazane2 memory cloths project in KwaZulu-Natal. 
I begin by focusing on the Amazwi Abesifazane case study to explore 
the possibilities of agency, identity, and memory in galvanizing 
culture through women's crafts and neighborhood groups - where 
culture is not necessarily fixed - and how this mobilization of culture 
is related to both economic and social justice. These connections 
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point to the potential of a notion of culture-as-creativity as a possible 
policy avenue in new approaches to culture and development (see 
Chapter 10, this volume). In particular, I develop the notion that 
culture is an end in itself and a factor in the construction of value 
(Sen 1999, 2004), exploring both the ability of culture to inspire, 
express, and symbolize collective memory and identity and the ways 
in which cultural products contribute directly to well-being in more 
than an economic sense. The latter part of the chapter reflects 
on the significance of understanding the different trajectories 
for empowerment and social justice, reification of culture, and 
neo-liberal development that are put in train by these forms of 
organization at the local level. I also consider this case study 
within the broader conceptual framework of gender, culture, 
and development, highlighting the significance of approaches in 
development studies that put women at the center and culture on 
a par with political economy while retaining a focus on critical 
practices and movements for social justice (Bhavnani, Foran, and 
Kurian 2003: 2). I suggest that this framework is a positive move 
in closing the gap between theory and practice and, with its focus 
on social justice, in proposing potentially radical alternatives in 
reimagining development. The Amazwi Abesifazane example, I argue, 
demonstrates how local development initiatives based around gender, 
culture, and creativity might be effective both in galvanizing culture 
and promoting economic alternatives and social justice. 
Gendered subjectivity, development, and social justice: 
the Amazwi Abesifazane memory cloths program 
Identifying women as vital, yet embattled elements within ... cultural 
debate, assumes that true democratic process can only be realistically 
achieved if women are acknowledged as essential elements of the 
social and cultural discourse that must be economically affirmed and 
politically empowered. The Amazwi project has been conceptualized 
and implemented around the premise that women provide the 
consistent, essential social building blocks of the emerging South 
African society and provide stable, nurturing and emotionally affirming 
shelter, where the physical and emotional needs of children can 
be met. 
(Andries Botha, 2002, http://www.princeclausfund. 
nl/source_eng/ gallery/botha.html; 
accessed 10 June 2004) 
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A significant aspect of inclusions and exclusions of citizenship in 
South Africa is the legacy of colonialism and apartheid and the 
multiple oppressions faced by marginalized groups. As South African 
sculptor and founder of Amazwi Abesifazane, Andries Botha, 
suggests, empowering women (and black3 women specifically) is 
seen as critical to the successful transformation of South African 
society. The Amazwi project is based clearly on an essentialized and, 
therefore, potentially problematic notion of women providing both 
the bedrock of society and nurture and shelter for children. However, 
this is a strategic essentialism deriving from the fact that while race 
is no longer the principal line of exclusion defining relations between 
individuals and the state, the value systems upon which societies 
were structured during colonial and apartheid periods remain, to 
some extent, institutionalized. Black women remain most 
marginalized in a still profoundly polarized South Africa. 
Fraser (1997) uses the phrase "bivalent collectivity" to refer to 
the economic and cultural forms of injustice and disadvantage 
that interlock, legitimize, and maintain each other. Despite being 
interrelated, "different forms of disadvantage have their own 
distinct logics and strategic responses" (Kabeer 2000: 86). Where 
disadvantage is largely economic, people are likely to mobilize 
around their interests and formulate demands in terms of 
redistribution. Where disadvantage is largely based on value systems, 
mobilization is more likely to be around questions of identity and 
demands formulated in terms of recognition. In South Africa, this 
produces a further tension: the logic of addressing economic 
disadvantage and of calls for redistribution is egalitarian, while the 
logic of addressing identity-based disadvantage and of demands for 
recognition is diversity. This tension is particularly problematic 
for those bivalent collectivities, like black women, disadvantaged 
by the interlocking dynamics of both resources and valuation. In the 
light of this, Young's (1990) notion of social justice has particular 
pertinence in South African citizenship, especially within feminist 
activism and gender advocacy groups. Social justice is understood in 
terms of freedom from oppression ( constraints on self-development) 
and freedom from domination ( constraints on self-determination) and 
enables a conceptualization of justice that refers to both redistribution 
and the development of individual capacities and group rights. Social 
justice requires not only the eradication of differences that construct 
relations of power, but the creation of institutions that promote and 
respect group differences without oppression. Significantly, a great 
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deal of grassroots and community-based activism in South Africa is 
motivated by the pursuit of social justice and initiatives like Amazwi 
Abesifazane, as the quote above suggests, are clearly positioned 
within this context. 
The Amazwi Abesifazane memory cloths project is part of community 
rehabilitation programs in South Africa aimed at promoting the 
healing and recovery of individuals and groups that have been 
affected by human rights violations, under the broader aims of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Although not directly 
linked to the TRC, the project claims this as its inspiration and 
source of influence. It is a unique project to provide black South 
African women from rural and urban areas with a vehicle to 
articulate traumatic experiences of the apartheid era, and to preserve 
and promote their creativity and memories. It was initially set up 
through women's organizations, including the Self-Employed 
Women's Union (SEWU) and the National Women's Coalition,4 and 
other interested parties who facilitated workshops. A significant part 
of the workshop process was given to the importance of memory 
retrieval. Women from urban and rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal5 
who had experienced the trauma of the apartheid era were invited 
by trained coordinators from the same geographical areas to create 
a pictorial and verbal record of their experiences. Through the 
production of cloths, painful memories are transformed into creativity 
by embroidery, applique, and beadwork, drawing on indigenous arts 
and crafts, as well as Euro-American traditional sources, such as 
samplers and quilts (see Figure 9.1).6 
Beadwork and the diverse material cultures of South Africa have a 
rich social history and the ways in which traditional skills are being 
used in memory cloths as part of an economic enterprise for poor 
people is of cultural and economic significance. Women's memory 
cloths share similarities with clay models made by Xhosa men 
in the Western Cape. They are "beguiling objects," designed to 
appeal as art but simultaneously encapsulating the history of a poor 
community; as such they need to be understood as framed within 
their historical processes and current social, cultural, and economic 
milieu (Morrow and Vokwana 2001). The use of beads is particularly 
significant because in South Africa (and especially in Ndebele and 
Zulu cultures) they are not merely for adornment but play a part in 
cultural rites ( courtship, marriage, homage to ancestors) and modes 
of communication (status symbols, love-letters). The inclusion of 
beadwork within a formal archive is part of a growing recognition 
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Figure 9.1 An example of a memory cloth: no. 41 by Ntombi Agnes Mbatha. The 
accompanying text reads: "In 1992 my husband and I were going into town. 
Our son of 20 asked us to buy him some shoes. We bought him the shoes, but 
when we returned home our son was not there and then we heard he had been 
gunned down. We were so sad ... " 
of the place of ancient traditions and customs within contemporary 
nationhood. Sewing is also significant since, in many cultures and 
historical contexts, it has been used to communicate when, for 
various political and sociological reasons, oral disclosure has not 
been possible (this is discussed subsequently).7 Initially, the intention 
of the project leaders was to assemble a national archive of 1,000 
memory cloths to form a collective memory of life in South Africa 
up to the present day. Each cloth is an original work, to which is 
attached a profile of the artist and her story, written in her first 
language as well as English. According to Andries Botha: 
Through the creation of memory cloths, we are drawing on the 
collective experience of women who have known loss. Through the 
process of creation they will hopefully reach some level of catharsis 
through which they can grow both spiritually, emotionally and 
financially. This is a necessary, albeit humble, attempt to begin to 
transform the oral archive into a more formal record of South African 
history. 
(Cited in Anon. 2001: 7) 
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Although primarily aimed at memory retrieval, the project is also 
dedicated to improving the lives of women by encouraging peer 
support, nurturing dialogue at the local level, and developing 
women's self-employment industry that creates products to market 
internationally. There are, of course, some potential contradictions in 
pursuing both commemorative and market-oriented aims. Invoking 
memories of violence and trauma might not appeal to consumers, 
particularly those unfamiliar with the specific context of KwaZulu-
Natal. It remains to be seen whether the desire to commemorate 
women's lives within South Africa is superceded by a desire 
to generate profits through international sales and by appealing to 
particular consumer groups. To date, the project has managed to do 
both successfully, but it will be interesting to see whether the nature 
of the cloths changes as the national archive is established and if the 
focus switches more towards market-oriented concerns. 
The wider context of Amazwi Abesifazane is significant in bringing 
together culture and economy in a broadened notion of development, 
particularly as it pertains to impoverished South African women. It 
is part of Create Africa South, a non-profit, non-governmental 
organization established in 2000 in response to the diminishing 
funding base for arts and culture to promote and develop creativity 
in South Africa, particularly in historically disadvantaged areas 
(http://www.cas.org.za). With Andries Botha as President, Mazisi 
Kunene, one of Africa's senior poets, is Vice President. Principal 
funding is provided by the Prins Claus Fund in the Netherlands and 
working partners include African Art Centres in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg, the Association for Women's Empowerment in 
Esikhawini, the Documentation Centre in Durban and the Self-
Employed Women's Union. Creating a trust fund under the auspices 
of Create Africa South, but administered and contributed to by the 
participating women, is also an aim of the project. Profits generated 
by sales are intended to contribute to the trust fund; the aim is to use 
these profits to fund children's education (which is not free in South 
Africa - even the poorest parents have to pay a nominal amount to 
send their children to school) and thus provide wider benefits to 
livelihoods, particularly in rural areas. The project was launched at 
an exhibition of memory cloths held at Durban Art Gallery in June 
and July 2001, where as many cloths as possible were exhibited in an 
educational environment. The educational focus is on the process of 
memory retrieval, loss, women's issues (especially gender violence), 
the role of catharsis in healing a nation, and the role of women. 
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Once the national archive is completed, the intention is create a 
computer-based record of the original cloths and testimonies and to 
sell the entire archive. The proceeds of the sale will form the first 
major donation to the trust fund. The 2010 project goal of the trust 
fund is to acquire 5,000 stories and cloths and to create a permanent 
exhibition and educational program in an appropriate facility in 
KwaZulu-Natal. In addition to this, each memory cloth sold 
commercially through a networking system within the cross-cultural 
and international arts community will also contribute to the trust; to 
date this has included exhibitions at art galleries and museums in 
South Africa since 2001, exhibitions in Nashville, Chicago, and 
Waltham, Massachusetts during 2003 and 2004, and in Lisbon, 
Portugal in May 2004. After initial surprise and some bewilderment 
that their cloths could be considered art, the participating women 
articulate pride and pleasure at the fact that their cloths are both 
displayed and purchased within South Africa and beyond. They also 
attach considerable significance to the fact that their experiences are 
being recorded and their stories heard. 8 The purpose of the trust is 
to promote similar self-empowerment projects within localities and 
especially for individual mothers experiencing difficulty in educating 
their children, enabling women to develop their own creative, 
economic initiatives that will lead to personal autonomy. 
Documenting women's lived experiences 
The first cloth made by each woman forms part of the 5,000 cloths 
being collected for the national archive. At present, the program is 
based in KwaZulu-Natal but the intention is that it will be extended 
into other provinces. The women were invited to contribute a single 
memory that they felt was important to the project, and the nature of 
these memories is significant in documenting women's experiences 
of both apartheid and the transition to democracy. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, many cloths reveal relatively recent memories of 
violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Between the release of Nelson Mandela 
in 1990 and the first democratic election in 1994, the National Party 
used its command of the state machinery in a merciless fashion to 
fuel effectively a civil war in the province. As Asmal argues: 
Hit squads intensified, attacks on innocent commuters were carried 
out by the Civil Cooperation Bureau ( an Orwellian name for the state 
security body) and, in the killing fields of Natal, the regime funded and 
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fuelled a civil war which it presented to the world as "black-on-black" 
violence. As many people were lost to political violence between 1990 
and 1994 as were killed during the entire previous history of apartheid, 
dating back to 1948. 
(Asmal 2000: 9-10) 
The TRC hearings ultimately failed to force an acknowledgement 
of the central role that the state machinery played in the violence 
between rival ANC and IFP factions. However, the memory cloths 
project is ensuring that the voices of those whose lives have been 
irrevocably scarred by the violence are embodied within the national 
archive. It is not surprising given the level of violence in KwaZulu-
Natal that memories of this time are represented frequently in 
the cloths. The bewilderment and trauma of these events are 
encapsulated in the written accounts that accompany the pictorial 
representations: 
The day I will never forget is when there was violence between two 
organisations, Inkatha and the ANC in 1985. On June 16 people were 
ransacking the shops ... It was an extremely agonising experience for 
me when they took my cousin Khayini and put a tyre round his neck. 
(Sindisiwe Hlongwane, #266)9 
As a result of friction between two political organisations violence 
erupted on 25th December 1995. This happened on the South Coast 
of KwaZulu-Natal, at Shobashobane. A certain kraal was attacked 
by gunmen and the head killed ... The bodies of the deceased were 
doused with petrol and set alight. The house was also burned and the 
children left destitute. 
(Christobel Ngcobo, #295) 
What a life of unhappiness we lived in 1990, seeing children being 
shot and necklaced. 
(S'bongile Makhanya, #133) 
At Mkhomazi, in the area of Zembane, two political organisations, the 
ANC and IFP were fighting. It was on a Sunday morning when IFP 
members attacked us. They shot and killed my four bothers ... We 
fled the area and took a taxi to seek refuge at KwaMashu K section 
where we now live. We then decided to go to Durban to start selling 
fruit in Victoria Street trying to fend for the orphaned children. 
(Zendile Nzama, #222) 
Violence broke out in 1991 between IFP and the ANC at 
KwaMaphumulo. Many people died there including my uncle ... 
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He left behind his wife Mama Ndlovu and two children ... MaNdlovu 
gets money by ploughing mealies fields for other women in the area 
and fetching water from the river for them. It's sad that a woman 
suffers this much just because of politics. 
(Mavis Ngcubo, #657) 
These lived experiences of violence and trauma within families 
and the dislocation that often resulted were largely absent at the TRC 
hearings. Unlike the grand narratives of apartheid, the memory cloths 
reveal that everyday survival struggles and violence against women 
are often foremost in the memories of black women. 
Many of the cloths relate less directly to the injustices of apartheid 
( although several record the traumas of families being dispossessed 
of land and forced removals) but to the daily struggles for survival. 
In particular, natural disasters and their impacts are recounted. For 
example, Celani Nojiyeza's cloth records one of her most vivid 
memories: "In 1982, the sun was so hot that it burnt all my mealies 
and there was no food for my family. At that time, I was dependent 
on the food I grew to feed my family, so it was a disaster" (Celani 
Nojiyeza, #424). Similarly, Phille Mabaso describes the after-effects 
of the 1987 floods in Pietermaritzburg: 
People who suffered most after the rains were the women who had 
to look after the orphaned children ... Women had to shoulder the 
responsibility of dealing with property damaged by water, falling trees, 
stones, at the same time giving love to their children ... 
(Phille Mabaso, #824) 
Significantly, nearly all the cloths feature homes, reinforcing the 
significance of women's roles in domestic and community life. The 
loss of homes is also a persistent theme within the project, both as 
a consequence of apartheid and of factional violence during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. For example, one woman describes the effect 
of her family being evicted from their land by white farmers in 1970: 
"Even today I still have a loathsome feeling for white farmers for the 
inhumane treatment they inflicted on my family" (Tuleleni Tenza, 
#216). Another woman describes her memory cloth as follows: 
This is the incident that took place at Mkhomazi, in the area of Qiko 
on the 20th September 1987 ... when a faction fight ... broke out 
between the Matshobho and Mkhono factions. I lived with the Mkhono 
faction. People from Matshobho faction came and shot my uncle .. . 
in the chest and he died instantly. I, together with my children ... fled 
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the area. We took a taxi and went to Durban. We now live in 
KwaMashu township. 
(Nokuthala Khomo, #207) 
Men's violence against women is also a common theme: 
It was on Friday of November 1987 when my grandmother 
MaMhlongo, told me that I, together with my children, were going to 
be killed on that night ... The reason for us to be killed was to punish 
my husband ... , as a retribution for the alleged killing of my elder 
uncle in law ... We left our home never to return. I was very 
disturbed because I left behind our livestock, furniture and all the 
clothes except for what I carried in a small bag. 
(Sibongile Myeza, #211) 
My mother was building a house. They had been paying the builder all 
the way through the building of it and when the house was finished the 
builder demanded more money. The money was now finished and an 
argument ensued. The builder became very angry and shot my mother 
dead. 
(Pumazile Khubisa, #356) 
Perhaps the most poignant story of the violence perpetrated against 
women is that ofNonhlanhla Hnyandu, who was killed just two 
months before the opening of the Durban installation in April 2001. 
She had created a memory cloth for the Amazwi archive in the first 
workshop held at Richmond Farm/Ntuzume B. She also co-ordinated 
a subsequent workshop at Phindangane in Richmond Farm and was 
seeking to raise money to educate her children. A simple memorial 
in the installation at Durban Art Gallery explained the circumstances 
of her death: 
Nonhlanhla was a victim of domestic violence. Her boyfriend stabbed 
her to death with a screwdriver in front of her three children. 
Despite cultural silences around sexual violence, several women 
use the memory cloths to relate their experiences. One woman 
recounts: 
I will never forget the day I was raped by a stranger ... I was so angry 
and depressed because he had taken away what I had treasured most -
my virginity ... When women's organizations were formed, we hoped 
the incidences ofrape will be little, but it's not getting better, instead 
it's worse than before. 
(Mathombi Nxumalo, #828) 
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Unsurprisingly, the violence and devastation associated with 
HIV/AIDS, which is widespread in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal, 
is also a prominent theme of the exhibition. For example, Makhosi 
Khanyil tells the story of Gugu Dlamini, aged 22, who was open 
about her HIV-positive status, even going on TV to discuss her 
illness: 
One day as she was coming from Durban, and soon after alighting 
from the train at KwaMashu station, she was stoned and stabbed to 
death. Nobody came to her rescue because she was HIV+. 
(Makhosi Khanyil, #798) 
The memory cloth (Figure 9.2) illustrates her bloody murder. Other 
testimonies reveal the violence and ostracism faced by women with 
HIV/AIDS: 
On June 12, 1995, my uncle Zolani found out that he was HIV+ ... 
My uncle decided to blame his wife Nandipha even though he was 
sleeping with several women. He came home drunk one day, and with 
his friend Yuk.an, he took his wife to the bush where they stoned her 
until they thought she was dead. Nandipha somehow managed to 
stagger to a nearby house . . . She died on the way to hospital. 
(Buselani Nene, #838) 
Nozuzo Gumede was my best friend who lived at Richmond Farm. In 
1997 she died of AIDS. She was 19 years old. She had nobody to take 
care of her during the day because her mother was at work. Her 
mother asked me to help my friend. Nonzuzo was so weak that she 
slept all day and was unable to do anything. I used to wash her, spoon-
fed her and change her clothes as well as her linen. 
(Zama Zulu, #842) 
The text accompanying another cloth states simply: "The whole 
family died of AIDS" (Thembisile Shozi, #357). 
Although the vast majority of cloths relate memories of 
dispossession, loss, trauma, violence, and death, several also record 
happier memories about everyday rural and community life. Others 
celebrate the ending of apartheid and the promise of happier times. 
For example, Margaret Thakane Lesoma produced a cloth entitled 
"Chains are Broken." Her testimony states: 
Previously we were denied our rights but today all that has changed. 
The time has come for us to enjoy, discover and explore the true 
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Figure 9.2 Makhosi Khanyil, no. 798. 
meaning of so-called life. The day has come when all prison doors 
open and we are free from prison chains. Freedom! Freedom! How 
long we've been waiting for you. 
(Margaret Thakane Lesoma, #25) 
Other cloths celebrate the strength of women. For example, Busi 
Mlotshwa's cloth, entitled "Portrait of a Zulu Woman," is 
accompanied by the following testimony: 
She has that inner beauty that only those close to her can see and 
appreciate. Those lips may not have a smile, but they have put smiles 
in many faces. She has acquired wisdom in all that she has witnessed 
through those bold beautiful eyes. Her family is always surrounded 
with her warmth, security and understanding. She is determined, 
full of life. 
(Busi Mlotshwa, #315) 
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It would seem that the Amazwi project is playing a significant role in 
the construction of value and in demonstrating how culture might be 
mobilized to inspire, express, and symbolize collective memory and 
identity. The project also illustrates the ways in which cultural 
products contribute directly to well-being in more than an economic 
sense. The next section discusses this in more detail. 
Memory, development, and social justice 
Through its enabling of the voices of marginalized women, its 
restoration of their historical agency to the national memory-archive, 
and its emphasis on catharsis, economic empowerment, and social 
transformation, Amazwi Abesifazane is playing a small but significant 
role in continuing the truth and reconciliation process, both at the 
local level and in terms of the national archive. The reconstruction 
of post-apartheid South Africa and the development of a viable 
democracy requires acknowledgement of the central role that 
women play in consolidating the building of nation, homes, and 
neighborhoods. Memory cloths are a powerful way of acknowledging 
the agency of ordinary women. Amazwi Abesifazane pays tribute to 
the sacrifices made by women that made democracy possible and 
records lived experiences of daily struggle both in the past and in the 
present. Its radical potential lies in the fact that it can be used to 
counter the erasure of women's historical agency in addition to the 
erasure from dominant discourses of the polarizing effects of neo-
liberalism and the devastation of HIV/AIDS. It draws on the rich 
historical tradition of crafted creativity as a means of communication 
that is at once intimate and public. Small workshops allow the 
participants to share intensely personal events and emotions, which 
are then used to shape the individual cloths. The intimate disclosure 
of traumatic experience, which proved impossible for women through 
the TRC hearings, sets up a necessary catharsis that enables women 
to speak publicly about their experiences and acknowledges the 
importance of memory as part of the oral archive of South Africa. 
The abstract encoded language evidenced in indigenous beaded craft 
techniques of African women helps facilitate disclosure of events and 
emotions that might otherwise be difficult to articulate. The project, 
therefore, is an attempt to engage an oral archive of women's 
experiences that remains undisclosed for the same reasons that the 
TRC remained largely silent on gender violence. It is clearly given 
impetus by the post-apartheid legislative exercise of reconstruction 
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and memory as a mechanism of reconciliation, but also by the need 
to countervail the gender processes that continue to both erase 
the voices and agency of historically disadvantaged women from 
national memory-archives and position black women at the margins 
of economic and cultural processes. 
The memory cloths program is one of several examples of archival 
and crafts-based developmental projects in South Africa and 
complementary or alternative strategies to the truth and reconciliation 
process, including religious and non-governmental organizations that 
are actively involved in creating, documenting, and preserving 
collective memories at the local level as well as pursuing economic 
and social justice (see, for example, Chirwa 1997, Walder 2000). 
Radical memory projects, rooted in both the discursive and material 
empowerment of previously oppressed peoples, are significant in 
terms of how they relate to broader economic processes and how 
they might inform approaches within development studies. Regarding 
economic processes in South Africa, memory projects are particularly 
important given the pressures by vested interest groups to produce 
what Simon Lewis (2000) calls "sanitized" versions of history 
to buttress economic policy. Lewis argues that contemporary 
representations of South Africa and the apartheid past are very often 
sanitized, primarily by the business community, for international 
consumption and in this sense cultural change has not occurred. He 
discusses, for example, the renewed confidence in the significance of 
sport, expenditure of money and organized leisure, the recycling 
of old images of wild animals and exotic landscapes, and the 
transforming of unacceptable racial exclusivity into acceptable class 
exclusivity. In contrast, cultural workers such as policy-makers, 
historians, teachers, writers, and artists see the local processes of 
remaking and re-presenting South Africa as "ongoing projects 
of considerable urgency, complexity, and precariousness, projects in 
which the often uncomfortable de-sanitizing of apartheid era stories 
and images plays a key role" (Lewis 2000: 47). This involves 
acknowledging and confronting the violence of apartheid through 
education, popular culture, radical memory projects, and art, theatre, 
and writing projects with historically disadvantaged groups such as 
black women and youths. 
The gap between "entrepreneurial empire-builders" and "community-
minded nation-builders" has widened since 1994. As Lewis attests, 
while historians and artists, and state-supported processes like the 
TRC, have been laboring to create a "new" South Africa that can 
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come to terms with its violent past and the suppressions and 
misrepresentations of that past, "South African business has tended 
to want to take 1994 as a marker of an end of history or an end of 
politics" (Lewis 2000: 47). These divisions are potentially dangerous, 
especially in a context where a racialized polarization between rich 
and poor still persists. However, the different visions of development 
need not be incompatible and there are examples where white-owned 
businesses have acknowledged the violence of the apartheid 
economic system, embraced notions of "black economic 
empowerment" and are working in partnership with worker's 
groups to build capacity. 10 The Amazwi project demonstrates that 
commemorating the past and working toward social justice in 
the present need not be counter-productive in an economic sense 
and can play a role in improving livelihoods, at least at the local 
level. Indeed, acknowledging the significance of economic and social 
justice requires that the memories of the people who experienced the 
"minutiae of social and community life under apartheid" should not 
be lost, "erased in old or new forms of grandiose history writing" 
(Field 2001: 119) or forgotten by business. As Andre Brink (1998) 
argues, memory is a means of excavating silence; it also provides 
the first step in moving towards economic and social justice. 
The Amazwi Abesifazane case study also highlights the potential 
of approaches in development studies that, as Bhavnani, Foran, and 
Kurian (2003) have called for, put women at the center and culture 
on a par with political economy while retaining a focus on critical 
practices to bring about social and economic justice. For example, 
they demonstrate the importance in developmental terms of creating 
postcolonial, post-apartheid national memory-archives. First, in 
memorializing the past, it is important to keep multiple versions of 
history alive and "not to privilege, as has so often been done, a few 
master narratives that offer sense of unity at the cost of ignoring the 
fracture and dissonance" (Nuttall and Coetzee, 1998: 14). Resisting 
various kinds of amnesia is essential to the creation of a shared 
past, a shared sense of national and communal belonging, and the 
prospects of agency in social and economic development. As Lewis 
(2000: 47-8) argues, amnesia allows South Africa's business leaders 
to maintain their wealth and privilege while urging "all South 
Africans to bury the past unconditionally." This amnesia threatens 
to erase past economic exploitation "even as the actual bodies of 
apartheid violence are being exhumed" (Lewis 2000: 48). Projects 
such as Amazwi Abesifazane play an important activist role in 
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countervailing attempts to sanitize accounts of the past and blithely 
to sell South Africa abroad "as if it were fully rehabilitated already" 
(Lewis 2000: 48). In this sense, while the project could be thought 
of as generating culture-as-product (Chapter 10, this volume), where 
cultural difference illustrated by handicrafts and folklore generates 
income through international sales, it is arguably more productively 
thought of as culture-as-creativity, where culture is perceived as a 
resource by the participants, a flexible combination of tradition and 
modernity that does not rely on a problematic nostalgia for the past 
or a presumed purity of non-Western cultures. The project engages 
with efforts to mobilize poor women's concepts of culture and social 
change and thus has the potential to provide an alternative viewpoint 
on development rather than work within existing (neo-liberal) 
frameworks as culture-as-product. In its efforts to fill the "great blank 
spaces of still repressed memory in South Africa" (Lewis 2000: 55) 
and to bring about social and economic justice it also raises the 
possibility of more radical and less problematic notion of the role 
of culture in development. 
Second, projects like Amazwi Abesifazane facilitate the preservation 
of collective memories of traumatic events and the possibilities of 
healing in the process of development, especially in post-liberation 
or post-conflict contexts. As Duvenage (1999: 17) attests, " ... the 
identity of the present and future South Africa will not escape a 
moral obligation to the past"; constructing and preserving truly 
collective memory is, therefore, of the utmost importance. Collective 
memories, of course, have certain shortcomings. They raise questions 
about how collective they are and whose memories they are. There 
are also dilemmas about whether the memories of victims take 
precedence over those of perpetrators, or if myths of innocence and 
victimhood construct powerful obstacles in the way of confronting 
unwelcome facts. Chirwa (1997) argues, however, that because 
collective memory goes beyond an individual account, and has 
historical and emotional relevance, connecting seemingly discrete 
events in a cause-and-effect manner, it becomes part of the process 
of healing, reconciliation, and reconstruction at both the individual 
and communal levels. Therefore, Ignatieff (1996) is correct in 
arguing that nations do not have consciences, identities, and 
memories like individuals; thus, they cannot be reconciled to their 
pasts by replacing myths with facts as can individuals, nor can they 
be healed by working through traumatic events or memories. 
However, collective memory through the creation of national 
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memory-archives can be an effective tool for reconciliation and 
healing for individuals and groups. As Stanley (2001) argues, newly 
emerging truths have had impacts at personal levels (individuals feel 
for the first time that they have been listened to by the state) and at 
collective levels (stories have challenged the traditional perceptions 
of groups and individuals). For black women, the simple act of 
publicly telling a story in their own language has provided, and 
continues to provide, a sense of symbolic liberation (Bozzoli 1998). 
Third, locally based projects are essential in ensuring that women's 
voices can be incorporated into national projects of remembering and 
notions of belonging and their agency prioritized in development 
processes. It is particularly important to consider the role of gender 
in erasing the historical agency of women and denying them agency 
in the present. Without spaces for the articulation of memory, black 
women's citizenship, in terms of social standing and belonging, 
continues to be compromised. The role of women's personal 
testimony and agency in shaping the nation and citizenship is 
particularly important in a country such as South Africa, where the 
legacies of colonialism and apartheid have effectively silenced black 
women's voices. Those legacies persist today and the relating of 
personal testimony by black women is extremely important to their 
being able to claim space in the imaginings of the nation, both 
historically and as citizens in the present. As socio-historical 
processes, intimate disclosure projects ultimately become part 
of broader social movements that shape the dominant culture. 
Moreover, the participants produce valuable public discourses. 
The projects are potentially moments in the creation of a radical 
discourse, revealing a great deal about black women's experiences of 
racial and gender oppression and the ways in which their citizenship 
is constantly mediated through gender norms and power relations. 
As Graybill (2001: 6) argues, there is a need to "pierce that which 
destroyed or constrained women's voices." It is imperative that 
women do speak out, and only when they do will they begin the 
healing process. Women's private suffering needs to be made 
"visible as social suffering, enabling them to stake their historical 
claims and thereby restore their dignity" (Ramphele 1996: 114); this 
is clearly critical in building capacity and recognizing the centrality 
of women's agency within grassroots development. 
Individuals, groups, and institutions have collaborated in mapping the 
past and recording personal histories in the light of the findings of 
the TRC and criticisms of the process (de Kok 1998). The challenge 
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for grassroots memory projects is arguably twofold. First, the 
absence of black women in the histories of apartheid needs to be 
continually addressed since it has a direct bearing on their role in the 
still unfolding transformation of South African polity and society. 
Second, memory projects must also be connected to notions of social 
justice in order to be truly transformative. In developmental terms, 
decisions for societal transformation cannot ignore the gendered 
experience of conflict and violence. To prevent further repression 
and discrimination, there has to be a form of social justice. The 
government's commitment to human rights requires it to promote 
women's equality of opportunity, economic security, and protection 
from violence. The challenge is in allowing those people who do 
not have access to state-level processes such as the TRC to 
create collective memories to facilitate the process of healing, 
reconciliation, and reconstruction. The localization of the truth and 
reconciliation process and its associated grassroots memory projects 
such as Amazwi Abesifazane plays a critical role in this. Creating 
"postcolonial" archives, where previously silenced and marginalized 
voices are brought to the fore in an effort to counter the epistemic 
and material violence of erasures under colonialism and apartheid is 
clearly important. It plays a significant role in constructing individual 
and collective identity given the inability to conserve memory within 
distressed communities that often results in the erosion of local 
knowledges. It also points to the significance of culture in questions 
of gender and development and opens up the possibility of new 
ways of imagining development, which I now discuss further. 
Closing the gap: culture and development 
Projects like Amazwi Abesifazane offer new perspectives on locally 
based initiatives concerning empowerment and social justice, 
drawing on the centrality of culture to development and proposing 
an alternative to neo-liberal development with an emphasis on 
grassroots rehabilitation. They relate to and inform broader notions 
of gender, culture, and development, while focusing on critical 
practices, pedagogies, and movements for social justice (Bhavnani, 
Foran, and Kurian 2003: 2). Within this approach, culture is neither 
fixed nor reified. Instead, it draws on a notion of culture as lived 
experience; not simply as a set of habits or traditions, but as a way 
to understand how people actually live their lives. 
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This has significance for how we might conceive of development, 
since it deploys a notion of culture as conceptualized by Raymond 
Williams - as a "structure of feelings." It employs an agentic11 notion 
of human beings, based on dynamic sets of relationships through 
which inequalities are created and challenged, rather than a single 
notion that resides within an individual, group or nation (Williams 
1960; Hall, Hobson, Lowe, and Willis 1990). Conceptualizing the 
relationship between development and culture in this way avoids 
many of the problems in much of the gender and development 
literature that either glosses over the significance of culture or sees 
women as victims of culture. As Prabhu (2003: 242) argues, Raymond 
Williams' notion of culture brings with it debates about how other 
terms such as economic, material, gender, class, race, or ethnicity, for 
example, articulate themselves within this definition. She suggests 
that any understanding of agency or resistance within particular 
cultures must necessarily relate to how exactly this notion of culture 
is defined. The Amazwi project demonstrates the significance of 
understanding how people live and experience structures of relations 
and the importance of emphasizing creative and historical agency. 
The Amazwi Abesifazane case study also supports Prabhu's 
contention that a more culturally informed approach to gender and 
development is required because of the urgency to move away from 
economistic analyses, specifically in the context of Third World 
women, in order to understand women's lives and agency in all 
their complexity (Prabhu 2003: 242). It usefully points to a notion 
of culture as "enunciation" rather than as epistemology, where 
the "enunciative is a more dialogic process that attempts to track 
displacements and realignments that are the effects of cultural 
antagonisms and articulations - subverting the rationale of the 
hegemonic moment and relocating alternative, hybrid sites of cultural 
negotiation" (Bhabha 1992: 443). Memory projects are a process of 
generating culture that is anchored in specific social contexts, as the 
specific memories recorded by the Amazwi participants demonstrate. 
However, they are also tied closely to disruptions of static ideas of 
culture and tradition. They work in contrast, for example, to cultural 
stereotypes about South Africa, such as those invoking exotic rural 
landscapes, game parks or the ubiquitous "Zulu warrior," that are 
often promoted by businesses and tourist agencies. As Prabhu (2003) 
argues, the consideration of these disruptions that are enabled by 
oppositions and ongoing practices within the circumscribed space 
upsets an understanding of culture as a given that pre-exists action. 
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Such an understanding provides a means for questioning purely 
economistic conceptualizations and opens up possibilities for reading 
development that can take into account multiple spaces, especially 
those inhabited and generated by women, and unconventional types 
of action, with a new understanding of "production." This raises the 
possibility of a more complete, nuanced understanding of women in 
the context of development, which engages their creative resistances 
to various hegemonic forces. As Appadurai (2004) argues there is a 
need to strengthen the capacity of the poor to exercise "voice" -
treating voice as a cultural capacity - because it is not just simply 
a means of inculcating democratic norms but of engaging in social, 
political, and economic issues in terms of metaphor, rhetoric, 
organization, and public performance that work best in their cultural 
worlds. Appadurai argues that the cultural contexts in which different 
groups live form the framework of the "capacity to aspire," which is 
not evenly distributed. Voice and the capacity to aspire are 
reciprocally linked and are significant to issues of development. For 
the women of Amazwi Abesifazane, having a voice in creating stories 
of the past and accounts of the present informs their aspirations both 
to claim meaningful citizenship and a sense of belonging in post-
apartheid South Africa and to improve the material circumstances 
of their lives. By aspiring to improve their lives in this way they 
are also, in turn, asserting their cultural capacity. This raises the 
importance of closing the gap between cultural analyses that too 
often have eschewed the significance of the economic, and more 
reductive economic approaches that have failed to consider lived 
experiences and notions of social justice. For Prabhu (2003: 253) this 
involves not only a "cultural shift in analyses relating to areas 
already considered in development studies," but rather, would 
involve "parallel enlargement of the field of inquiry itself, which 
would require legitimization of other bases of information on, and 
insight regarding, its central question." 
Conclusions -
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate the significance of 
culture in development through a specific case study in South Africa. 
I want now to make a few brief points by way of conclusion. First, 
the Amazwi Abesifazane example demonstrates that development 
projects that bring together cultural and economic approaches have 
radical transformative potential since they are reflective of the strong 
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commitment among grassroots activists and artists to create 
a "rich knowledge based both on women's experience, and 
on the complexity of gender relations as relations of 
production/reproduction" (Bennett 2000: 5). These knowledges 
involve challenging the critical under-representation of women (in 
histories and elsewhere) by giving rigorous attention to their complex 
and multiple experiences. They also challenge the androcentrism of 
African knowledge production by asserting that African women can 
be producers of knowledge. This requires a commitment to applying 
knowledge to create social justice. Memory cloth projects are part of 
those knowledges that can be activated to bring about gender justice. 
They reveal the persistent economic and political discrimination 
against women and the intransigence with which unequal gender 
roles are inscribed into everyday life and socio-legal practice 
to compromise women's citizenship; they also work to counter 
these discriminations, revealing the various ways in which South 
African women are attempting to resist this to claim material and 
metaphorical spaces of citizenship, a sense of belonging, and a 
means to improve their livelihoods. 
Second, apartheid era human rights abuses, and the willing 
participation of global economies in prolonging the legacies of 
apartheid inequities and injustices, emphasize the importance of the 
flawed, fragile role of memory and oral disclosure, of constructing a 
postcolonial archive and of the possibilities of culture-as-creativity. 
The Amazwi cloths demonstrate that, to a large extent, the lived 
experiences of those who bore the brunt of state brutality have not 
altered significantly, despite the promises of democracy. In allocating 
a space for those who have been previously silenced, the project is 
playing a small but significant part in affirming that individual 
experiences of trauma are important at a societal level, both in terms 
of the past and the present. This "disclosed" oral history informs the 
legislative framework of amnesty and forgiveness required by the 
South African Constitution and the importance it places on the 
culture of human values. Documenting such oral experiences by 
means of an archival, legislative, and creative process is essential to 
acknowledging the complexity of democracy in South Africa, and 
of women's role as active citizens. Forms of public representation by 
women are potentially a politically vigorous means of constructing 
visibility and accountability. As Bennett argues, echoing Zeleza, in 
order "'to imagine a South Africa free of gender injustice, and to 
understand the intersecting vectors of racism and misogyny' in the 
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present, 'access to women's experiences of the past is critical"' 
(Bennett 2000: 46). Attempts, like the Amazwi project, to construct 
gender-sensitive archives that also have a positive impact on 
grassroots development will continue to play a significant part in this. 
Finally, in broader terms the chapter has demonstrated that the gap 
between how culture in the development process has been 
conceptualized and implemented might be closed by a greater 
understanding of grassroots development and reconciliation programs 
like Amazwi Abesifazane. Furthermore, this case study has attempted 
to answer the various criticisms (by the likes of Jackson 1997; Watts 
2003) that cultural approaches in development have had little to say 
about economics and economic alternatives. As Rao and Walton 
argue: 
In recognizing the role of culture as fundamentally dynamic, 
endogenous, changeable, both forward and backward looking, and 
affecting both the ends and means of development, we see an 
acceptance of the social embeddedness of economic action and the 
economic embeddedness of social action ... [C]ulture affects power 
relations within a society and is therefore fundamentally linked with 
the perpetuation of inequality. 
(Rao and Walton 2004: 30) 
This is, of course, a small case study in a very specific 
developmental and transformative context. However, it raises a 
number of significant issues around the complexities of culture, 
development, gender, and social justice. Watts (2003) argues that a 
critical cultural geography of development should be capable of 
understanding actual development practices in cultural (semiotic, 
representational, discursive) and spatial (regional, territorial, global) 
terms. Although there is still much to be done in this regard, the 
Amazwi case study demonstrates the potential of galvanizing culture 
in development projects and how this mobilization of culture might 
be intrinsically connected to economic development, issues of agency 
and empowerment and the pursuit of social justice. 
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By alterity, we mean "otherness," referring to the systematized construction 
of difference between groups of people on the basis of such factors as "race," 
ethnicity, or culture. Alterity has been central to development theory and 
practice, with the construction of First World/Western/Northern/advanced/ 
developed/modern "self" and Third World/Southern/backward/developing/ 
traditional "other" framing interventions in both colonial and postcolonial 
contexts (see Power 2003). 
2 This translates from isiZulu as "Voices of Women." The discussion here 
is drawn from information garnered through interviews with members of 
Amazwi Abesifazane at Durban Art Gallery (June 23 and 24, 2001), from 
the organization's website at http://www.voices.org.za and that of its supporting 
NGO, Create Africa South, at http://www.cas.org.za. 
3 I use the term "black" as inclusive of all women of color, while being mindful 
of the sensitivities associated with such terminology. 
4 SEWU was a new trade union to support self-employed women in South 
Africa. It was established because the interests of self-employed women, 
especially those employed in the informal economy (as many women are in 
South Africa), were not addressed within the traditional trade unions. The 
Women's National Coalition was launched in 1992 to bring together women 
across the political, economic, social, religious, and cultural spectrum and 
to identify, through a research program, the changes necessary for their 
emancipation in the post-apartheid context. Both organizations were established 
at a time of intense mobilization by diverse women's groups in response to the 
ending of apartheid and the recognition of the need to assert women's agency 
and presence in the "new" South Africa. 
5 KwaZulu-Natal is one of the nine provinces of South Africa, incorporating the 
administrative area of Durban (eThekwini) and the Zulu Kingdom. 
6 There are also similarities with the tapestries, known as arpilleras, made by 
women in Latin America. These originated in Chile in 1974 to commemorate 
women's experiences of the violence of the Pinochet regime and to register 
protest, particularly at the "disappearance" of relatives. The art form spread 
to Peru, Bolivia, Columbia, and Ecuador and is now produced primarily to 
generate money, particularly through overseas sales and sales to tourists (see 
Agosin 1987, 1996; Gianturco and Tuttle 2000). 
7 See the discussion of the secret messages and symbols stitched into Red Cross 
quilts by British women POWs in Japanese camps during World War II in 
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Archer (1997). There are also some interesting parallels with Aborigine 
women's secret knowledges (Jacobs 1996). 
8 Informal author's interviews with women of Amazwi Abesifazane, Durban Art 
Gallery, July 16, 2001. 
9 All references to the cloths relate to the Amazwi Abesifazane Memory Cloths 
Exhibition, Durban Art Gallery, June 2001. 
10 The issue of black economic empowerment is deeply contentious in South 
Africa (Black 2002; Heese 2003; Iheduru 2004). However, initiatives like 
Rooibos Tea at Wupperthal and Thandi Wines (both in the Western Cape) have 
made strides in involving black workers in the production process, in building 
capacity in terms of business knowledge, and in profit sharing. There has 
certainly been no wholesale transfer of ownership of the means of production, 
but efforts are being made by some white-owned businesses to transfer some 
land, resources, knowledge, and profits to historically disadvantaged groups. 
11 Agentic infers that individuals have agency, or the capacity to exercise control 
over the nature and quality of their lives. 
fl!) Conclusions: the future of 
culture and development 
Sarah A. Radcliffe 
Development has experienced a cultural turn and its language, 
paradigms, and actors are to a profound degree now engaged in 
understanding the cultural field within which development occurs. 
The reasons for this are varied, depending on diverse actors' 
standpoints - African writers are concerned about the loss of 
historical-geographically specific ways of organizing society and 
meaning, while policy-makers offer cultural alternatives to failures 
of the past. The decentering of the West through postcolonial and 
feminist criticism combined with the experiences of East Asian Tiger 
economies resulted in a revaluation of development's implicit values 
and a questioning of the Westward trajectory that undergirded much 
development practice. Yet culture as a factor remains wide-ranging; 
although anthropologists and cognate disciplines find it hard to 
pin down, they are agreed that culture is embedded in economies, 
politics, and racial formations. As material culture and structures 
of feeling, as well as specific forms of ( re-)production, culture 
inevitably informs economic ( and reproductive) life although it 
remains highly contested and becomes entangled in racial hierarchies 
and patterns of exclusion. 
Development's cultural turn - as pointed out by a number of 
contributors to this volume - has occurred critically in the context 
of neo-liberal policies which have gained a global hegemony, albeit 
with local and national variants and resistances. After the harsh 
structural adjustment policies of the 1980s that marked the first phase 
of a neo-liberal project, the cultural turn in development marks 
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a further instantiation of the "post-Washington Consensus" through 
which neo-liberal patterns of governance, production, and social 
reproduction are deepened and extended across new spheres of 
society and space. Yet for all its newness, cultural development 
draws on the meanings and powers invested in concepts that have a 
much longer history, namely community and scarcity, as Michael 
Watts describes in his chapter. Culture is often equated with 
a community; a community has culture, just as culture rests in a 
community. Examples of cultural development from Ghana, Ethiopia, 
and the Andes, described in this collection's chapters, illustrate how 
consistently these equations between culture and community are 
made in policy and development practice (even when the sums don't 
add up). Likewise, Watts shows, the Malthusian specter of scarcity 
has worked its way down through economics and successive 
generations of policy to frame discussions about the conduct of 
economic actors and their interrelationships. For centuries, this 
framework excluded discussion of social subjects in their non-
monetary interactions, their voluntary, reproductive, and ritual 
activities, and in meaning-laden universes. Postcolonial critiques 
of economics' normativity and post-development's rejection of 
metaphors of scarcity can potentially lead us out of the articulation 
of conduct-biopower-money into more empowering and creative 
livelihoods. Yet, as Watts argues in his chapter, the ongoing 
production of neo-liberalism's hegemony reveals a formidable 
arsenal that would need to be challenged and engaged. 
Development practice, of course, operates within the parameters set 
by the uneven expressions of capitalist political economy, where 
culture too has a new prominence. In the switch from a production-
oriented to consumption-oriented economy, culture gains a 
heightened salience in differentiating consumers and driving the ever-
changing goods through which modernity and identity are appraised 
(Harvey 1989; Jameson 1991; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). In the 
mid-twentieth century, countries' cultures provided the infrastructure 
for belonging, being the material expression of a supposed national 
community, and the basis for mobilization for development goals. 
Culture and development - however intricately interrelated - were 
kept at arm's length. Now by contrast culture has gained the status of 
being an additional value - given to a place, a group, an institution, or 
a piece of material production. According to the UNESCO Decade 
on Culture and Development, cultural pluralism is "one of a country's 
most fundamental and creative aspects" ( citied in Davis 1999). 
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Development's cultural turn, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, has -
over the past decade or so - had an impact on development policy 
and practice on the ground with a number of different initiatives and 
interventions being informed by actors and paradigms which treat 
culture seriously as a factor. Through case studies and thematic 
discussions, the chapters explore in detail how development policies 
are being negotiated at a variety of scales by different actors and 
institutions, and how culture is being interpreted and mobilized. 
Working on the basis that culture has become one component in 
development's toolbox, the chapters analyzed how this general 
commitment to bringing culture into development is played out on 
the ground in highly diverse settings, and in the context of struggles 
over development and culture. In other words, the chapters describe 
how cultural development is put into practice in specific programs in 
particular locations, the why, how, when, and where of culture and 
development. 
Cultural development has been used to inform community-based 
natural resource management programs. Whereas the second phase of 
Ecuador's Indigenous Development project has only just introduced a 
NRM component, Ethiopia's development practitioners have been 
talking about and using "culture" for a number of years, as described 
by Elizabeth Watson in her chapter. While the "traditional" 
institutions of the Borana group in this case appear to offer an ideal 
cultural tool for development practice - in that they are assumed 
to be legitimate locally, enduring, non-politicized, and culturally 
appropriate - in effect, as Watson shows, they are inevitably 
entangled within conflictual relations of culture, history, and power. 
As the development project failed to consider this wider field within 
which the specific "cultural" institutions were embedded, so too were 
deep flaws introduced into the project's management, decision-
making, and long-term sustainability. 
Culture defined in relation to a specific "ethnic" group has also been 
put to developmentally oriented ends in the Andes where indigenous 
culture has been celebrated. As Sarah Radcliffe and Nina Laurie 
show in their chapter, indigenous development that treats diverse 
Indian ways of life as the launch pad for development, rather than as 
an obstacle, represents a significant reworking of the region's cultural 
economy and development. Self-generated indigenous development 
comes about when Indian groups can carve out a livelihood for 
themselves with secure access to resources, a setting for inter-cultural 
relations, and an enduring sense of cultural identity. However, 
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indigenous development projects devised under the banner of neo-
liberal agendas of free markets and multicultural good governance 
have not addressed this combination of requirements, emphasizing 
instead the ways in which Indians can self-produce themselves 
as cultural consumption items ( via crafts, tourism, and services). 
A tension continues to exist therefore between the promise of 
indigenous development ( demanded by politically astute and 
powerful indigenous confederations) and the experiences on the 
ground. 
Another arena through which culture has been put to work in 
development has been in relation to the concept of social capital, 
and its supposed corollary, local development groups. As Gina 
Porter and Fergus Lyon discuss in their chapter here, the tendency 
for development policy to persist with its model of social capital = 
groups = development persists, regardless of the experience on the 
ground. Moreover, development projects implement subtle 
arrangements of credit availability, technical support, and appropriate 
transport technology yet, when it comes to culture, rely upon a 
nation-state model of "Ghanaian culture" that fails to engage 
sufficiently with the country's regional unevenness and its 
corresponding cultural, ecological and social diversity. Grassroots 
beneficiaries articulately express their understanding of their 
situation, and locate conflict at the heart of their understanding 
of the "culture" of groups. 
These chapters examine in depth the ways in which classic forms 
of development intervention - targeted areas and beneficiaries in 
the majority world - bring in culture. The other chapters in this 
collection recast the frame for analysis of culture and development 
by exploring the nature of development as ongoing political 
economic dynamism in relation to culture. In other words, these 
chapters retain a focus on culture and its relationship to achievements 
of prosperity and other pursuits outside the parameters of 
development projects and programs.1 As Jan Nederveen Pieterse 
shows in his chapter, long-run transformations in cultural economies 
have often contained within them interactions between different 
groups' cultures. In the context of trade exchanges over centuries, 
and in the context of culturally distinctive goods and services now 
available in the global North, cultural development is characterized 
by multicultural and multiracial interactions in globally reaching 
( and regionally meaningful) networks and flows. In such a context, 
Nederveen Pieterse argues, the notion of an ethnic economy is highly 
232 • Sarah A. Radcliffe 
problematic as a conceptual and policy tool as it misses out the very 
fluidity and interactivity that these situations rest upon. His chapter 
reminds us of the importance of a historically ( and - I would add -
geographically) informed view of cultural relations. 
One example of such global flows and multicultural interactions 
is explored in Michelle Bigenho's chapter on Bolivian musicians 
touring Japan. Bigenho describes how the nightly production 
of "Bolivian" music on stage in front of Japanese audiences rests 
upon the flexible and dynamic skills of inter-cultural interaction that 
Nederveen Pieterse describes for numerous other groups. Yet with 
post-Fordist political economies and neo-liberal imperatives of 
labor "flexibility" and entrepreneurialism, the conditions for wealth 
generation and secure livelihoods for the Bolivian musicians remain 
constrained. Moreover, the terms of power between representatives 
of an impoverished majority world nation and a wealthy country 
work to reproduce cultural stereotypes that perpetuate their uneven 
terms of engagement. Although the Bolivians attempt to recast 
Japanese audiences' knowledge of their country, their contracts 
and conditions of work limit their agency in this regard. 
Al James in his chapter examines the experiences of Mormon high-
tech firms in the United States, questioning the generalities about 
"culture" in much economic and economic geography literature. 
A detailed analysis of firms' behavior, work cultures, and priorities 
demonstrates that Mormon firms do not replicate exactly the 
"cultural" features expected in successful regional industrial clusters. 
Moreover, he shows how Mormon culture - conceptualized as a 
multi-scalar interaction between firms, industrial sectors, and regional 
cultures - establishes certain features of greater social sustainability 
(such as work-life balance and holidays). The case of these firms 
illustrates the diverse ways in which the pursuit of accumulation is 
simultaneously the pursuit of many other goals (Amin and Thrift 
2004). 
Finally, Cheryl McEwan's chapter provides an analysis of the 
memory cloths by South African women as an example of how 
culture engages issues of memory, power, and conflict. In the 
multicultural and post-conflict situation in South Africa, women 
turn to recording the horrors of the apartheid era with cloth and 
embroidery. Although these cultural productions cannot be 
romanticized as a therapeutic closure on apartheid in a celebratory 
postcolonial moment (Gooder and Jacobs 2002), McEwan highlights 
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the women's direct engagement with legacies of violence, HIV 
status, and rape. Rather than being associated with processes of 
economic accumulation, such cultural work represents a strategic 
intervention in the accumulation of mutual respect, identity, and 
communication. 
All of the chapters treat development in a globalized field of multiple 
meanings and practices where cultural difference - often the premise 
of previous development thinking and its current cultural turn - is 
embedded in a contested discursive and material arena. Culture 
is not simply an attribute of societies undergoing development but 
development itself operates as a cultural process. When development 
introduces "culture," it engages not only its own paradigm-specific 
working definition of culture (held variously, and sometimes at odds, 
by planners, practitioners, and beneficiaries), but also a broader field 
of different cultural registers (which include state and popular 
cultures, youth cultures, as well as overlapping structures of 
feelings). The chapters moreover highlight the need for a critical 
attitude to contested material culture and the broader processes 
of accumulation within which it is embedded. In the case studies of 
cultural development, the instrumental use of culture comes across 
clearly whether in relation to natural resource management, transport 
policy, or socioeconomic development. This critique of cultural 
development has been made before, yet can be pushed further in 
order to attempt a rethinking of the institutional and global context 
within which culture and development occurs. 
Culture and development: culture as production, 
institution, and creativity in development2 _, ________________ _ 
In much recent culture and development thinking, culture has 
been brought into development primarily as a product and as an 
institution. Recent culture and development thinking draws explicitly 
on culture as a product and as an institution, and hence treats culture 
as a resource although the treatment of culture as product or 
institution entails certain consequences as detailed in the preceding 
chapters. As development appropriates culture as a resource or 
as an institution, each understanding entails a particular articulation 
of tradition and modernity, while each interpretation offers distinct 
templates for development interventions. 
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By treating culture as a product, culture and development projects 
can emphasize a product or service that is culturally distinctive, or 
which is associated with a simpler or healthier lifestyle. Development 
thinking has gone through two moves to reach this conclusion. First, 
there is a broad recognition that cultural activities and objects are 
economically remunerative. Second, income generation depends 
directly and indirectly upon cultural facilities and the general cultural 
environment (Sen 2004 for an overview; James, this volume). In 
relation to the first point, neo-liberal development projects explicitly 
aim to generate income from indigenous culture, for example (Davis 
2002; Bigenho, this volume; Radcliffe and Laurie, this volume). 
Development and state officials alike recognize the attractive 
niche represented by non-W estem lifestyles and products in which 
a romantic association with Indian lifeways contributes to a 
product/service's value and attractiveness (Kaplan 1995). Culture-
as-product treats culture as a set of material objects and distinctive 
behaviors. When this interpretation of culture is inserted into 
development thinking, it promotes the orientation of culturally 
distinctive products and services onto the market. These 
interpretations are embedded within neo-liberal development's 
awareness of a post-Fordist global economy (Comoroff and 
Comoroff 2000), where in globalized markets for niche products in 
late modem political economies, culturally distinctive craft products 
appeal to the Western search for authentic lifestyles. In other words, 
cultural development thinking needs to be understood within the 
context of a globalizing capitalist market economy, rather than as 
- or in addition to experiments of - a grassroots "alternative" 
development model. Recognizing how global political economies 
work through difference, culture-as-product plays to the market 
opportunities opened up for culturally unique goods and services. 
Culture-as-product thus represents neither an alternative to 
globalization nor the protection of pristine unique cultures ( and 
hence works against the critiques of globalization that inform much 
culture and development thinking). 
In its emphasis on material culture, culture-as-product tends to 
suggest that the "traditional" or "classic" forms of culture are more 
appropriate for the market than hybrid or modem styles. Ethno-
tourists wish to buy pottery or textiles, not plastic or synthetic 
fabrics. By ignoring cultural hybridity and dynamic material cultures, 
this policy prescription rests upon a problematic nostalgia for a 
clearly defined culture. Moreover, such development thinking reveals 
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a strong anti-statist thread; the market is perceived as the arena 
where cultural diversity might be preserved. Whereas under 
modernization the invention of tradition by non-state actors was 
inauthentic, in today's culture and development culture-as-product 
is seen to originate with non-state groups whose authenticity rests 
precisely on a perceived distance from the state. 
Treating culture as an institution results in different development 
dynamics. In this aspect of development thinking, culture appears as 
a form of organization that provides structure and stability to society. 
During the 1990s, economic development planners and scholars 
expressed increasing concern about how non-economic factors (that 
is, factors unrelated to prices) influenced peoples' behavior. For 
example, development economics struggled to understand why 
sharecropping and other "pre-capitalist" economic behaviors were 
re-emerging in Indian agriculture (Hart 2002). New institutional 
economics, as this field became known, "can be seen as a way 
of trying to incorporate culture into orthodox economic theory" 
(Worsley 1999: 38). With the social stability associated with 
embedded cultural features, a number of projects draw upon 
so-called "traditional" forms of social organization in order to 
implement projects and to structure project management. Influenced 
by the concept of social capital, development policy seeks out the 
well-established and locally legitimate forms of social organization 
and decision-making to provide a facilitative arena within which 
development interventions can be initiated and implemented. 
When development calls upon culture as an institution, culture 
combines the idea of stability and incorruptibility associated with 
a form of tradition that nevertheless connotes a modernist order. 
As a means of legitimating authority and local power relations, 
culture-as-institution appears to offer templates for the regulation of 
social groups in diverse fields such as natural resource management 
and credit organization. In effect, when mobilized for development 
interventions culture represents a non-state formality which carries 
considerable legitimacy in multilateral and agency thinking to 
promote civil society and participation under neo-liberal "good 
governance" policies to encourage organized civil society (Leftwich 
1996). In the context of policies to establish neo-liberal 
governmentality such as the rolling-back of the state and the granting 
of legitimacy to non-state institutions (Shore and Wright 1997), 
culture holds out the promise of a non-state structure. 
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A different possible interpretation for cultural development is to 
treat culture as creativity, as a way of "thinking outside the box." 
Although this application of culture has been less frequently analyzed 
(compare Appadurai 2004), viewing culture as flexible innovation 
releases development from the disempowering forcing of cultures 
into markets or forms of political engineering. Culture and 
development thinking has only begun to examine and explore the 
potential and implications of viewing culture as creativity. When 
recognized at all, culture-as-creativity has been pictured as existing 
in non-state groups whose deployment of culture challenges and 
reconfigures political and economic relations. The cases of 
participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and shantytown 
organizations in Villa El Salvador, Peru, have both been offered as 
examples of how grassroots social actors rework tradition with 
positive development outcomes (Kliksberg 1999). Similarly, the non-
governmental Inter-American Foundation worked widely from the 
1980s to release what it termed the "cultural energy" of grassroots 
popular culture throughout Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Kleymeyer 1995). 
Projects on the ground offer opportunities to ensure agendas of 
intercultural understanding and empowerment by providing a flexible 
combination of tradition and modernity. In other words, culture 
can speak to adaptable political economies and open forms of 
governance, in which tradition or distinctiveness is not held to 
a rigid template but reflects the everyday bricolage and hybridity 
of livelihoods and forms of organization. Compared with anti-statist 
product and quasi-statist institution, culture-as-creativity arguably 
offers a less tradition-bound notion of cultural difference, in which 
engagements with facets of modernity are not a problem but part 
of the context of reworking "tradition." Defining culture as a flexible 
resource offers a way of drawing on social structures and meanings 
to offer innovative solutions - often in combination with existing 
social organization - to development problems. Nevertheless, 
culture-as-creativity requires further analysis in order to understand 
how culture acts as a toolbox for lateral thinking and empowering 
action. To highlight the potentially creative and problem-solving 
aspect of dynamic culture is not to sideline economic injustice 
or exclusionary racial formations that often compound uneven 
development outcomes in the global South. Treating culture 
as creativity entails dealing simultaneously with the structural 
Notes 
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inequalities of political economies, and the damaging effects of 
racial formations on subalterns' development opportunities. 
* 
Culture and development currently works from cultural difference, 
not from culture. The background cultural assumptions that informed 
much mainstream development thinking have been criticized roundly 
for their positionality, hierarchies, and exclusions. Such a critique has 
informed development's cultural tum. Yet by identifying cultural 
difference within the beneficiary population - a cultural difference 
that leaves unexamined the culture of the development agent -
development leaves out the meaningful ground upon which cultural 
development is constructed and operationalized. Cultural difference 
is identified in the institutions, livelihood strategies, gender relations, 
and material cultures of beneficiary populations and is treated as 
another tool of development. In its appropriation as governance, 
product, or resource, culture qua cultural difference contributes to the 
managerialist and organizational goals of development, albeit with at 
times beneficial socioeconomic outcomes for participants. The 
reduction of culture to cultural difference reinscribes development's 
inability to deal with culture as creativity, by failing to take on board 
dynamism and fluid boundaries. 
Yet the instrumentalization of culture exists itself within a contested 
cultural economy within which diverse actors are attempting to 
rework the bases of livelihood, politics and expression. In this 
context, culture and development refers to the fact that culture is 
not primordial but is reworked and reproduced around and through 
development, just as development ( as political economy and as 
planned intervention) is embedded in "imaginaries of desirability," 
material culture and social relations. Treating culture and 
development as co-producing and recognizing the cultural 
imperatives to livelihood improvements offers a constructive way 
forward for development thinking and practice. 
As Al James notes however (this volume), policy-makers in many countries are 
trying to devise projects that would replicate the success of Silicon Valley. 
2 This section appears in a slightly amended form in Radcliffe and Laurie (2006). 
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